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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides guidelines to develop a C3 system, including both
organizational and physical systems. It contains the concept, architecture, design
and engineering approaches, the integrated C3 framework, test and evaluation
methodologies, system acquisition procedures, system development constraints and
environment, and C3 research trends. This thesis is mainly descriptive and is
comprehensive to help beginners in the C3 research area. It will give a fundamental
understanding about the roles of all individual researchers, that is, the roles of
people in computer science, operations resparch, military science, physiology, social
science, organizational management, and so or.. The focus of this thesis is on the
decision-oriented design and engineering activities based on a consistent approach
such as time-uncertainty distribution over the command and control process. For
the real implementation of the C3 application system, the "battlefield equation" is
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE HISTORY OF COMMAND
The problem of commanding and controlling armed forces, and instituting
effective communications with and within them, is as old as war itself. A Stone Age
chieftain had to devise the optimal organization and find the methods and technical
means to command the forces at his dispospl. [Ref. l:p. 1]
The history of commar.d in war consists essentially of an endless quest for
certaintv--certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy's forces; certainty
about the manifold factors that together constitute the environme't in which the
war is fought, from the weather and the terrain to radioactivity and the presence of
chemical warfare agents; and, last but definitely Prt least, certainty about the state,
intentions, and activities of one's own forces. [Ref. 1:p. 264]
Certainty itself is best understood as the product of two factors, the amount of
information available for decision making and the nature of the task to be
performed. An invisible hand, much like that which, according to Adam Smith,
regulates the balance between supply and demand, determines the relationships
between the two. Everything else being equal, a larger and more complex task will
demand more information to carry it out. Conversely when information is
insufficient (or when it is not available on time, or when it is superabundant, or
when it is wrong, all of which can be expressed in quanttative terms), a fa!l in the
level of performance will automatically ensue. Thus, the history of command can be
understood in terms of a race between the demand for information and the ability of
command systems to meet it. [Ref. l:p. 265]
But, the nature of the task is not the only detcrminant of the amount of
information :equired for its performance; equally important is the structure of the
organization itself. In other words, uncertainty is not dependent solely o, the nature
of the task to be performed; it may equally well be a function of a change in the
organization itself. [Ref. l:pp. 268-269]
B. BATTLE MANAGEMENT AND C3 SYSTEM
Battle management is the process of managing a battle with the intent of
destroying an enemy's weapon system [Ref. 2:p. 1]. A battlefield management
system needs an electronic informaton gathering, processing, and distribution
system, handling real-time battlefield information in a responsive manner. It is
designed to facilitate timely and well-founded battlefield decisions at the fighter
level [Ref. 3:p. 28). That function is performed by a battle manager through a
system called Command, Control, and Communications (C) [Ref. 2:p. 1]. The
decisions of battle managers will be based on the best information available from the
C3 system.
However, confronted with a task, and having less information available than i0
needed to perform that task (another form of its difference is uncertainty), an
organization may react in either of two ways. One is to increase its information
processing capacity, the other is to design the organization, and indeed the task
itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information [Ref.
1:p. 269]. Thus, the components of the C3 system must include organizational
design and technical irreans for information processing.
Given the uncertainty, each battle manager incurs a risk in managing the
battlefield or his forces to the degree of his own uncertainty in time. It is obvious
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that the decision by a battle manager with the relatively less certainty has the
higher probability to cause a negative response to the battlefield environment than
the decision with the relatively greater certainty does. Also, greater certainty at the
top is only bought at the expense of less certainty at the bottom. In other words, if
the top battle manger has greater certainty, he will control his lower level command
with superior strength and have his forces in reserve monitoring until he confirms
that the situation is in favor of his forces. The lower level battle manger, however,
will operate his forces based on the ad hoc directives from the higher level command
with less certainty about the overall situation. In this case, the probability of a
negative response in the higher level command is low, but once this happens, the
lower level battle manager has a high challenge to solve this problem because his
operation is highly dependent on the higher level battle manager. It requires a
strong control mechanism. So the uncertainty management style will determine the
types of control of the organization: centralization and decentralization [Ref. 1:p.
274].
In the centralization type of control, information merges to the top battle
manager. So the top manager has greater certainty for decision making, but the
bottom manager has to accept the expense of less certainty for situation assessment
until he receives information that is transformed by the top manager. But, if he has
some challenge within his responsibility area, he has the small span of control
because of the lack of his own situation assessment capability. In the
decentralization type of control, on the other hand, the bottom manager in the
battle execution level has his own information processing capability and no time
delay of information circulation between top and bottom managers. But, he has to
accept the larger deviation of the uncertainty. The certainty on his part is
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generated by the narrow source- of information. If an event occurs within his
interested area, he will evaluate the situation in his point of view, then the situation
assessment will have a larger deviation statistically due to the small volume of
information.
Among the considerations that permeate the command and control process
and supporting C3 systems, those of uncertainty and time are key criteria for
selection of C3 systems because the achievement of a timely reduction of
uncertainty facilitates intelligent decision making. As it will be seen, much of
command and control effort is expended to reduce both time and uncertainty, so
that a key characteristic of any military organization is the way that time for
planning and for uncertainty reduction are allocated to the different echelons of
command. [Ref. 4:p. 11]
C. THE NATURE OF WAR AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY
As a result, the best command system is to reduce the time-uncertainty
product. But, it is important to recognize that the nature of warfare puts some
practical limits on our ability to create a "perfect" C3 system that would eliminate
uncertainty because combat is not a deterministic process [Ref. 4:p. 11]. As
Clausewitz also points out, war brings to the fore some of the most powerful
emotions known to man, including fear, anger, vindictiveness, and hatred.
Consequently, even disregarding the manifold ways in which the human mind can
distort information in the very act of processing it, the quest for certainty cannot be
expected to proceed rationally all or even most of the time. And war consists of two
independent wills confronting each other [Ref. 1:p. 266]. To the extent that
outcomes are influenced by decisions, they are influenced by decisions--some
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rationpl, some emotional - made by commanders at several echelons on both sides.
Even though there is no perfect C3 system due to the nature of war, reduction
in uncertainty can be achieved by increasing the available knowledge through the
conversion of information into knowledge. On the other hand, reduction of the
needed knowledge by an individual commander can be achieved through
organization design-for example, the introduction of doctrine that implements
distributed decision making or the use of decision aids. [Ref. 5:p. 8]
Fortunately the modern technology of sensing system, communications system
and data processing system can improve the system performance in terms of its
timeliness and information fusion. Thus based on the timeliness and accuracy of
outcomes from a system, the optimal C3 system rather than the perfect C3 system
can be developed.
D. SCOPE
The purpose of this thesis is to give guidelines to Project Managers or the
beginners in C3 research about C3 I system acquisition or development. The first
stage of acquisition for any weapon system is the concept definition stage. For the
C31 system, many studies have been done conceptually and theoretically. But, there
is no definitive concept of a C3I system. Nobody can tell that this is the C3I system
clearly. Some say that it is an information system, the other says it is a battle
management system. Everybody has his own definition from his perspective. So, in
Chapter II, the author will review studies about C31 systems concerning with its
fundamental theory, models, and applications. Then, in Chapter III, this review will
drive the definition of C31 system and its boundary in a visible way, and a
integrated framework of C3I system will be discussed with the various perspectives
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for real system development. It will be the background knowledge to understand the
remaining chapters. Then, Chapter IV will present a consistent approach to develop
a C3 I system using the model of the integrated framework. Then, Chapter V will
show a procedure to develop a C3 I system at the unified forces level as a sample
case. In Chapter VI, the C3 system operation support environments and the system
development constraints will be analyzed. Finally, the last chapter will cover the
system development and research trends and some recommendations for the
effective implementation of the system development.
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II. THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF C3I SYSTEM
A. FUNDAMENTAL THEORIES
1. Command and Control
The words C2 , C3 , and C3 I have different meanings to different people,
and their indiscriminate use can create a great degree of confusion. For this reason,
some distinction between the C2 and C3 terms will be made. It is not easy to define
command and control (C2 ), command, control, communications (C3 ). command.,
control, communications, and intelligence (C31).
a. Concepts Definition
A good starting point is the official Department of Defense
definition for command and control: (JCS PUB 1)
Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of
the mission. Command and control functions are performed through
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of
the mission.
Now what is the commander trying to get his assigned forces to do?
And how is he to use the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures placed at his disposal in order to do this? This definition does not answer
those questions. They are the function of command in combat operations and the
command and control process.
b. C2 Purpose and Functions
A primary function of command is deploying and maneuvering
forces or other sources of potential power to be in the best possible position to
7
exploit opportunities as they arise. This function can be viewed as controlling the
power distribution. [Ref. 6:p. 51] And command and control is that integrated
function which enables the establishment of objectives and associated selection of
action alternatives for force deployment. The basic C2 functions are information
gathering, situation assessment, action selection, response planning and execution,
and monitoring of the implementation of alternative courses of action.
The terms of C2 , C3 , and C3 I are, however, made by adding one or
more components to the backbone component, command. Thus the function of each
of C2 , C3 , and C3 I has one or more additive functionality corresponding to the
extra component. In terms of C3 , an effective communications system for command
and control is necessary to support the information sensing, processing and
transmission capability of military commanders in these tasks. This decision support
system is often called a C3 system. A major purpose of C3 systems is intelligence
analysis. And the goal of intelligence analysis is to predict human intent and
behavior on the basis of retrieved information. This includes: estimates of personnel
and equipment locations; the size of these elements; and their capability, options
available, and intent. It is called a C31 system. [Ref. 7:p. 55]
c. C2 Process
A number of observers are beginning to define C2 as a process.
Usually C2 is visualized as fundamentally a management information system with
feedback loops and other elements of cybernetics, control, and decision theory.[Ref.
8:p. 29] The C2 process is the means by which a team of human military
commanders make decisions that relate to the deployment of the resources and
assets assigned to them to carry out a military mission specified by a higher
authority. [Ref. 9:p. 31]
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2. Problem Solving - Decision Making Theory
Orr describes problem solving and decision making in terms of a state
transition model quoting Dieterly's work, "Problem solving and decision making:
An integration (N\SA Technical Memorandum 81191, April 1980)". According to
this model, the basic decision problem condition involves a state A, a state B, and a
transition from state A to state B, as shown in Figure 1. Real situations can be even
more complicated than indicated since it is possible to have multiple states or
transitions. Situations involving multiple states usually involve probability
concepts. At the same time situations involving multiple transitions require a choice
for implementation and are usually associated with decision making. [Ref. 6:p. 36]
Figure 1. Basic Problem-Decision condition
A tremendous amount has been written about the decision making
process. The most interesting area of research of direct use in analyzing combat
operations is the utility-based decision methods. The general approach is to select a
set of alternative decisions to evaluate subjectively the utility (or value to the
decision maker) of outcomes expected under each decision, and to select the decision
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maximizing the utility. In the event that outcomes depend upon circumstances not
controlled by the decision maker, estimates of the probability of these circumstances
are used to determine the expected value of the decision outcomes and the expected
values are used to make the decision. [Ref. 6:p. 38]
In real life, however, and especially in combat situations, the
commander's decisions may not completely determine which transition will occur.
External circumstances beyond the control or knowledge of the commander may
actually determine the transitions. Such conflicts are called stochastic because of the
seemingly random nature of actual outcomes. Transitions involved in the stochastic
process are governed by principles that can be affected by the commander's decision.
Stochastic cases can be distinguished according to the amount of influence of the
commander's decision. If the commander's decision completely determines which
state will occur next, the commander's problem is determinant. On the other hand,
if the commander's decision has no influence at all, the conflict is indeterminant
from the commander's view. [Ref. 6:pp. 48-50]
In either case, the commander's decision making itself has no meaning.
In fact, the decision maker avoids direct outcome predictions (which are quite
sensitive to uncertainty) and instead concentrates on monitoring a few observed
variables. Due to the probabilistic or stochastic nature of combat process, decisions
influence the probability of outcomes rather than directly controlling outcomes [Ref
6. p. 47]. Thus the key concept required in decision making is that of the control
system, especially the hierarchical control system in military command structure.
Military command style is a reference to the many somewhat arbitrary
choices concerning the ways to employ available technical means within the military
command structure. Mainly there are two opposed visions of the proper character
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and style of military command. One is the centralized command style which is
illustrated by the hierarchical control model, and the other is the decentralized
command style which is illustrated by the distributed problem-solving model. [Ref.
6:p. 88]
The hierarchical control style of command attempts to turn the entire
military force (or the entire nation system) into an extension of the commander.
Subordinate levels respond in precise and standardized ways to his orders and
provide him with the data necessary to directly control the entire military
apparatus. The emphasis is upon connectivity between levels in the hierarchy, upon
global information gathering or upon passing locally obtained information to higher
levels, and upon centralized management of the global battle [Ref. 6 :p. 87]. The
primary advantage of a centralized command and control structure include: allowing
the controller (decision maker) more response time to assess and/or review whatever
data or information is available prior to decision making. As a result it reduces the
effects of complexity and probabilism within the environment [Ref. 10:p. 324].
The distributed problem solving style, on the other hand, views the
commander as controlling only in the sense of directing a cooperative problem
solving effort. Commander's duties are to decompose and allocate subproblem to
lower levels, to allocate resources to be used in these solutions, to determine and
propagate constraints on acceptable solutions, and to monitor constantly
subordinate activity. The emphasis in this style is on autonomous operation at all
levels, upon networking to share the elements needed to detect and resolve possible
conflicts, and upon distributed decision making process. [Ref. 6:p. 89] The
advantage of this decentralized command and control style is the compensation of
the disadvantage of the former control style. The major disadvantages of
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centralization include a degradation of the reliability, flexibility, and survivability
of the C3 system. Another disadvantage is the increase in communications
equipment requirements supporting the additional redundancy. Moreover, as
information requirements increase, so do personnel requirements to process and fuse
the information.
3. Military Decision Making and Control Theory
Due to the multiple states, multiple transitions, and two characteristic
behaviors from both friendly and enemy sides, there is no deterministic decision
making process in combat operations. Instead, the decision making process is
characterized by the stochastic model which describes the multivariate micro-state
process, and distributed decision making and cybernetic control theory are referred
frequently because their characteristics specify the unique military organization.
Distributed decision making is a particular type of group decision
making. In distributed decision making each member of the group acts individually,
making decisions in an area of responsibility or expertise to advance group
objectives. And each person in a group of decision makers is assumed to be using a
personal library of schemata to assess situations and take actions. Each of these
schemata models a different possible type of situation that may be encountered, and
each is associated with a course of action. If the schemata models of the individuals
are similar and if there is a common understanding of the course of action, then
effective distributed decision making will be facilitated. [Ref. 1l:pp. 128-129]
But it is assumed that distributed decision making is based on the
doctrine of centralized planning and decentralized execution [Ref. 1 l:p. 1271. In
other words the higher level command use centralized control style, and the lower
level decentralized control style. But whatever the level is, C3 1 systems are
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dynamic, extremely complex, information-rich, and nondeterministic. It is also said
that the purpose of C31 system is to reduce the uncertainty as well as time. In other
words it is the "infqrmationaP' system. Production, transmission, assimilation,
utilization, correlation, etc., of information-bearing elements (i.e., symbols) are
their common features [Ref. 12 :p.86]. This system will be specified by cybernetic
control theory.
Cybernetics is the study of control and communications in complex
systems. Cybernetics studies the flow of information round a system, and the way in
which that information is used by the means of control [Ref. 10:p. 254]. Cybernetics
gives us a language and a topology for describing complex systems, a language that
explicitly identifies uncontrollable (environment) factors, the decision making
functions, communications channels, and feedback. The intrinsic random nature of
many of the detailed system variables requires that dynamic behavior and final
state conditions be defined in probabilistic terms. The science of cybernetics gives,
however, a "microscopic picture (microstates)" of the information
transmission/processing/decision making process. So it is possible to analyze a
behavior as a multivariate stochastic process by handling either a finite number of
states or infinite number of states (no final states) [Ref. 12:p.86].
4. C3I in Combat Operations
A lot of work has been done on defining the C2 process. A convenient
model of the command and control process can be derived by considering it to be a
cybernetic system which is attempting to control the environment around it.




In Lawson's model, the process starts with a sensing of the
environment. This sensed data must be processed in some way to provide a
perception of the environment. Data on the environment can be provided by
external sources. This is followed by a comparison of the resulting perception of the
environment with some "desired state" of that environment, generally established by
higher authority. Based on this comparison, decisions are made and actions initiated
to bring the environment into closer conformance to the "desired state". But what
people usually think as a "command and control process " really has no effect on its
environment. So the forces assigned to that commander must be included. That is,
the commander can only really control changes in his environment by the
threatened or actual delivery of ordnance on one or more targets. Figure 2.1 shows
such a model, which provides for interaction between the environment and the
command and control process through its assigned forces. [Ref. 13:pp. 64-69]
b. Boyd's Model
The basic O-O-D-A loop structure model suggested by Boyd's
work shows observation-actions dynamics. Just as people must be able to read
before they can write, one must be able to observe before they can act. As showi.
Figure 2.2, Boyd's O-O-D-A loop structure consists of OBSERVE, ORIENT,
DECIDE, and ACT functions which are identical to SENSE, PROCESS, DECIDE,




Figure 2.1 Lawson's Thermodynamnic Model
Figure 2.2 Body's O-O-D-A Loop structure
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c. Implications of C31 in Combat Operations
The common feature of those models is the simple feedback control
loops. Simple feedback loops depend on essentially continuous control by the control
mechanism. While this applies sonetimes with the process models, control is not
always continuous, especially at higher command levels. There are some time delays
at various stages. Also there are two or more levels of cooperative control systems
connected into an organized whole in combat operations. A single control system at
the highest level controls the overall behavior of the system. This system perceives
the errors between the actual and observed state and acts to eliminate them.
Instead of acting directly on the environment, however, the high-level system
adjusts the desired states for the control systems at the next lower level of control
hierarchy. This process is repeated until the control mechanisms at the lowest level
actually interact with the environment. [Ref. 6:p. 35] This is called a hierarchical
control mechanism that is on the vertical chain of command line. But each desired
states assigned to its subordinate C31 system requires different decisions and
actions. These multiple decisions and actions from different subordinate C3I system
levels can cause the overlap of effects over the entire environment in the higher
level. This overlap irn--,s on their mutual superior the requirements that higher
level C3 I system avoia ,uting goals or desired states for his subordinates which put
them in contention. It is the superior's responsibility to see to it that his air-defense
people do not shoot down his own returning strike aircraft. Figure 2.3 shows both
hierarchical control over vertical C3 I systems arid mutual coordination connectivity
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Figure 2.3 Coordination of C2 processes
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B. C3 SYSTEM CONTEXT
The system context is defined as the total environment in which the system is
expected to operate. The C3 system context consists of all those conditions or
requirements that must be satisfied by the system. The C3 system context includes
the definition of system boundaries, the system topology, performance requirements,
system functions, organizational/command relationships and operating states. [Ref.
14:pp. 82-83].
1. C2 /C 3 Relationships
Remembering that C2 is defined as "The exercise of Authority and
Direction by a ..." by Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JCS PUB 1), C2 is
considered a behavioral function. The purpose of C3 system is to support the
commander's behavior. Then the C3 system is the means of the C2 process, that is,
an arrangement of basic elements satisfying the required functions and boundary
conditions of the system [Ref. 14 :p.82]. In other words, the C3 system is defined as
the technological system and its architecture that defines the interconnection of the
C3 elements. Assume that the C2 process is the decision making process of decision
makers, then the whole purpose of the physical C3 system is to provide information
to the C2 organization and implement the decisions generated by the C2 process.
This relationship between the C2 process and the C3 system is shown in the Figure
2.4 [Ref. 9:p. 33].
The essential ingredients for C3 are a commander, a mission, and the
supporting C3 system with the commander being its keystone. In terms of military
decision making theory, a commander can be considered as a decision maker and
controller, a mission as the desired state in its decision area, and the C3 system as
the distributed information processing system In the previous section, however, the
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Intelligence component of C31 represents the intelligence analysis function in
addition to C3 functions. So the C3 I system may be called the "Distributed Decision
Making System" including the decision maker's behavioral function, that is, the
hybrid system of decision makers, states variables, and distributed information
system.






Figure 2.4 Interactions between C2 process and C3 system
19
2. C2 Organization
To accomplish missions the commanders must establish a command and
control (C 2 ) organizational structure that can deal effectively with a rapidly
changing tactical situation. The central organic part of CI system is the decision
agents such as commander or decision maker, or controller. In a system level
decision process, the decision agents invoke a system-level decision rule to select a
system-level action for a given system-level observation [Ref. 15:p. 49]. As for a
C3 , system, there is more thqn one system level in combat operations process
because the decision agents are geographically dispersed due to the environmental
and survivability reasons. So the sequence of system-level observation-action pairs
characterize the dynamics of the system-level decision process as shown in the
Figure 2.5 [Ref. 16:p. 5].
Deiso Dbe ision -
Observation Action Observation Action
DeiinDecision
_ _ _1 ____
Observationj~ ~ IOcinbser, ation IAto
Observation FAction ObsrvtionI
Environment
Figure 2.5 The general structure of C3 paradigms
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In Figure 2.5, actions in each system have effects on the environment, and the effect
from an action from a system provides a chain of effects to another system. So the
decision agent in each system has to keep the environment updated continuously. In
order for this to occur, the decision agent has to absorb and interpret all the tactical
information. However, different weapon systems have their unique capabilities and
effects, so the decision agent must be the central organ with the capability of an a
true expert tactician and technician for a specific weapon system. Finally, the
decision agent must have a sufficient amount of time to correlate correctly the
real-time information with the tactics that it has stored in its brain to arrive at the
correct decision [Ref. 9:p.33]. The necessary C2 organizational structure is very
much dependent upon sensors, communications, and weapons technology [Ref. 17:p.
211.
But the behavior of one human decision maker is not capable of all of
these tasks due to the limitations of Short Term Memory (STM), Learning Time,
Long Term Memory(LTM), and Retrieval Time From LTM, etc. So the military C2
system must be a multi-agent organization. Figure 2.6 shows the Multi-agent C
2
organization model by Michael Athans [Ref. 9:p.37].
The principle of this hypothetical C2 organization model is that there
must be a "team of experts" instead of a commander. The C2 organization model
consists of Principle Expert Model (PEM) and Mutual Expert Model (MEM). PEM
is the tactical decision making process of an individual commander and MEM is the
collective coordinated decision process of commanders operating within a C
2
organization. PEM's would define the nature and level of detail of the tactical
information needed by each commander to properly utilize his expertise in his own
particular area. On the other hand, MEM's would define the nature and minimum
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level of aggregation of the information necessary to be common knowledge to all
commanders in the C2 organization so that suitably coordinated decisions can be
made related to the location, motion, and even reassignment of the assets. This in
turn would specify the subset of tactical information that must be common
information to all appropriate commanders in the C2 organization [Ref. 9:p.3 7]. The
decision agents will use both human decision-makers and computer-based
algorithms [Ref. 18:p. 6].
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Figure 2.6 Hypothetical C2 organization
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3. Decision Making Categories
After commanders establish the C2 organization, they will encounter
some problems that require commander's decision making. Those problems will take
place in three areas. During the battle, commanders continually have two questions:
What is happening ?
What (if anything) can or should I do about it ?
The former calls for an information decision, the latter for an operational decision or
organizational decision. Operational decisions concern the employment of his forces
or controlling fire distribution. Once a mission is assigned to the force, the
commander will make a organizational decision, which redesigns the command
structure, establishes a chain of command for the execution of his operational
decisions, and also establish the structure for the flow of orders and reports as well
for the intermediate processing of information necessary to support his own decision
making and to some extent the decision making of his subordinate commanders.
Information decisions are those decisions made by a commander as to what he
believes the situation to be, in the context of the mission he is trying to accomplish.
A commander's information decisions about what is happening, although often
unstated, nccessarily precede his operational decisions about what actions he and his
subordinate commanders ought to take. [Ref. 4:p. 12]
4. C3 System Elements
Now, the commanders have to solve the problems using the C3 system.
In the previous section, that is defined as the physical system and its architecture
that defines the interconnection of the C3 elements. C3 elements are those itcms of
physical and technological hardware and software that generate, manipulate,
communicate, and display information and the weapon systems. The typical
(physical) C3 elements are as follows [Ref. 9:p. 31]:
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Sensors (fixed or moving)
Communication links (mostly radio for tactical C 2 ) and related devices
Computers and Displays (hardware, software, firmware, decision aids)
viewed as system
Weapons platforms and weapons system
The overall system elements will include functions from the hybrid of those
hardware and software, procedures, and personnel related to operations of the
system as well.
5. System Functional Components
In order to perform the entire C3I system function, the combination of
these system elements will build up some sub-functions as the task is reassigned to
each sub-echelon. As a result of war games and of a detailed functional analysis
conducted at Johns Hopkins APL [Ref. 19], a number of functions are identified.










The command function includes planning, directing, and assessing
the operations of forces to achieve assigned mission objectives. Within a
multiple-echelon command structure, it permits senior commanders to
provide direction and guidance to subordinates who interpret, detail, and
execute actions, while providing the commanders with supportive information
and plans.
b. Information Management
The information management functions include acquiring,
processing, and distributing data and information. The primary objective is to
ensure the receipt of timely, accurate, and complete information by users. This
area provides information collection, processing, evaluation, and distribution
services at each command node, resulting in an up-to-date tactical
surveillance picture for the area of interest.
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c. Engagement Management
The engagement management functions include allocating,
controlling, coordinating, and monitoring force assets that permit the
execution of combat operations to support the course of action selected to
meet the mission objectives. They coordinate the use of own-force weapons to
maximize the destruction of enemy forces while minimizing the expenditure of
resources in both offensive and defensive roles. This task requires that
information, tactics, and the allocation of resources and responsibilities be
coordinated among the various warfare areas, while an overall viewpoint of the
engagement and its objectives is maintained.
d. Sensor Management
The sensor management functions include allocating, controlling,
coordinating, and monitoring sensor assets. They support command decision
making and weapons use (consistent with the constraints of the rules of
engagement, emission control, and mutual interference with other sensor or
communications assets by ensuring that surveillance information is provided
to the information management functional area).
e. Communications Management
The communication management functions include allocating,
controlling, coordinating, and monitoring communications assets. They
provide the connectivity needed to implement the exchange of commands and
information between or among designated force elements to allow the most
effective direction of dispersed force elements.
f. System Management
The system management function include allocating, controlling,
coordinating, and monitoring force assets that comprise the C2 system, with
the exception of the communications assets. The C2 system assets include
information handling systems, displays, and decision aids, among others.
System management allows a commander to establish and adjust the C2
system state, measure and assess its status, and develop options and timing for
system reconfiguration or reconstruction in the event of disruption while
maintaining system stability.
6. System Characteristics Requirements
The entire C3 I system consisting of these six sub-functions requires
some characteristics to enable the C3 system to perform its mission of aiding the
battle commander in the exercise of command and control. These characteristics can
be classified in many ways. The general system characteristics will include
reliability, survivability, flexibility, responsiveness, interoperability, and
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user-orientation [Ref. 20:p. 22]. But considering the tactical operations, a couple of
characteristics must be considered in addition. They are mobility, security,
maintainability, and risk [Ref. 21:p. 57]. But some of these characteristics will have
similar definitions or sub parts of the others. They are different only based on the
priority of characteristics varying the viewpoint of tactical, strategic, system
engineering, or overall system descriptions. Here the overall system characteristics
will be explained only.
a. Reliability
Reliability, or dependability, is defined as "the ability of an item
to perform a required function under stated conditions for a specified period of
time" [Ref. 22:p. 305]. Reliability, in engineering terms, means the probability that
a system or component will not fail on any given trail or during any period of
operation [Ref. 23:p. 1291. The reliability will be represented by availability and
operability [Ref. 21:p. 50].
b. Survivability
Survivability is defined as "the measure of the degree to which C3
equipment items and system capabilities will be able to withstand either natural or
man-made hostile environments without suffering abortive impairment of its ability
to accomplish its designated mission" [Ref. 24:p. 676]. Survivability of C3 systems
can be related to the ability of our C3 systems to first of all withstand the initial
attack, and secondly to be able to recover and reconstitute immediately thereafter
[Ref. 21:p. 47]. Survivability can be achieved by hardening, redundancy, dispersal,




Flexibility is defined as "the ability of C3 systems to be responsive
or readily adjustable to changing conditions or situations. Flexible systems or
equipment are not limited in capabilities, but have the inherent ability to be able to
operate successfully under a variety of conditions and situations. In addition they
must have the ability to expand, contract and/or reorganize in such a manner as to
satisfy a wide range of user demands and requirements. The flexibility will be
represented by expandability and adaptability. [Ref. 21:pp. 45-46]
d. Responsiveness
A C2 system must respond quickly and accurately to provide the
commander with essential information in a timely manner. In crisis situations, time
becomes the the critical factor. Time-late information is useless information. [Ref.
25:p. 27]
e. Interoperability
Interoperability of C3 systems and subsystems is critical to the
success of military operations, especially in joint and combined operations. JCS
PUB 1 defines interoperability as "the ability of systems, units or forces to provide
services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together". It's beyond
the "compatibility" that is merely the ability to "function in the same system or
environment without mutual interference". According to a briefing notes from
Armed Forces Staff College: Principle of Command and Control (Unpublished),
compatibility is the "technical sameness," and interoperability is possible through
the compatibility, information standards, and procedures.
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f. User-Orientation
A C2 system must be designed for the user. Information must be
readily accessible in a format usable by the commander and his staff. Displays,
graphics, and decision aids should not require extensive analytical interpretation.
[Ref. 20:p. 221 Standardization and simplicity will be the design factors for
user-oriented system [Ref. 21:p. 521.
C. C3 INFORMATION SYSTEM
A C31 system is essentially an information processing system, if the behaviors
of human decision makers in organizations, which is defined earlier, is excluded .
The primary purpose of the C3 system is to reduce the time-uncertainty product.
Then what is the C3 information system and how does the system work ? In this
section, that system will be defined from the perspective of information system for
command and control rather than Computer-Based Information System (CBIS).
1. Background
a. Uncertainty and Information
In a previous section, uncertainty was defined as the difference
between the required information to carry out a mission and the available
information at a time. In fact, information itself is not enough to describe this.
There are degrees of accuracy in information itself. Restrictively speaking, the
decision maker needs not information but the knowledge to make a decision. But it
is not always possible to get the knowledge. So the decision maker adapts the
information with a high probability of accuracy as the decision making factors. Now
let Kd represent the knowledge to carry out a mission, or solve a problem, or make
a decision effectively, and let Ks be the knowledge that a decision making entity has
28
at the point in time and place that a choice needs to be made. Then, uncertainty
can be defined as the difference between these two quantities,
U = Kd - KS
namely, the difference between what one needs to know and what one knows [Ref.
5:p. 71.
Now what is the difference between information and knowledge?
What is (ifferent from data? Data, are facts which are in(lepen(denIt, uInrited a;i(d
unli,7ted in number. Information is the organized, intellii )ie and 1iIea Iii ifil result
once data are processed and evaluated. Information adds to relevant knowledge,
reduces uncertainty and supports the decision making process in an organization.
[Ref. 2 6 :p. 111 Data are transformed to information, primarily by technological
processing: an electromagnetic pulse is converted into a set of symbols on a radar
screen. Transformation of information into knowledge is, however, a cognitive
process that is (lone by humans. Figure 2.7 shows the relationships among those






Figure 2.7 Data, Inforination, and Knowledge
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Information is a resource which can change a decision or state, lead
to act on, and have meanings [Ref. 271. The value of information depends on
analysis, interpretation, explanation, and finally, understanding [Ref. 28:p. 19]. This
means that information can be used to make a decision as well as gain knowledge
after processing them ii, i proper way. Information systems support decision makers
by way of analysis, interpretation through the correlation and the best presentation,
then decision makers will be able to understand tile diversity of information and
make a d,-cision. Decision makers may be either human or a computer algorithm, or
both depending on the context.
b. Information-Organization-Decision Loops
Organizations exist to serve human needs. They help individuals
accomplish things that normally could not be done alone. Therefore the organization
serves as a medium for acquiring knowledge or information that can be used to
make decisions for reaching an objective [Ref. 26:p. 171. Organization is organized
through its information processes; thus the organization produces the information
system and vice versa. An action involving several actors in an organization results
in the production of information appropriated and stored by the grou,'. But in
military organization, information is produced by the enemy organization as well.
That is the reason that the military organization needs the cybernetic control
system.
In the Organizational Information System (OIS) Model (Figure
2.8) presented by Moigne and Sibley [Ref. 29:p 241], however, OIS allows the
organization to represent itself and define its data, its behavior, and its
transformations with the means of controlling the information process (in the sense
of controlling the collection, production, and use of the data). So if the identification
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of information process (the production by the organizational action or flow from












Figure 2.8 The Systemic Model of the Organization and OIS
The systemic model has the great advantage of allowing two different
viewpoints of organization and information: production and memorization. The
interaction of the system with the environment and other processors (input and
output) normally involved formatted data. The system needs to retain some
memory of its transactioas. Data generated by this behavior are called generic
information [Ref. 29:p. 242]. The other information transmitted from the external
source will be called circulating information. Generic information belongs to the
organization that creates them. The other viewpoint is the memorization of
information. On the other hand, production of information demands a method for
its storage (and thus its corporate memorization). Memorization is more than mere
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retention and storage; other functions include its addressing, indexing, classification,
updating rules, etc. Thus a database management system (DBMS) is merely a
somewhat constrained aspect of the OIS [Ref. 29:p. 242].
The relationship among information, organization, and decision is
that the organization produces information by either its own production function
such as generic information generated by the group's behavior, or external flow of
information such as circulating information, then the decision and control system in
an organization makes a decision by processing the information through information
system which manages the collection, manipulation, storage, retrieval and
presentation of information to user, and finally controls the organization to obtain
the objective.
2. Command and Control Information System (CCIS)
a. Utility Functions of CCIS
Once information is obtained, the information is used in every
stage of the cor..mand and control process. The command process model (Figure 2.9)
by Holman and others in their research "The Specification of Surface Naval
Command System", shows the continuous impact of information on the command
process [Ref. 30:p. 23].
The value of the information system is its ability to characterize
the event or process it describes. And the ability of the information system to
adequately describe an event or process is directly related to its utility. [Ref. 31:pp.
249-250]. But, the information system for command and control can not be a single
utility program. It must be an integrated utilities support system to support all
those needs of information in command process. The functional relationships of
CCIS with its user and its activities is shown Figure 2.10 [Ref. 32:p. 157].
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Computers are used as aids both in the information gathering stage and in the
operational stage of decision making. And each organization has its own operations
and requirements of information, so each organization could determine its
computing requirements, the size of computer appropriate to its function and its
internal user group in an organization. Also when a node determines that it
possesses information that may affect the overall mission at another node, it will
then broadcast that information to those nodes that may be affected. Also, if a node
requires information that it knows another node may have, it will transmit a request
for those data. CCIS in each organization has to have its own computing size,
various utilities, distributed networking architecture. Figure 2.11 [Ref. 32:p. 1.58]
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Figure 2.11 CCIS in the Role Military Battlefield Management
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b. User Interface Functions of CCIS
In a previous section, it was said that the value of information
depends on the interpretation and decision maker's understanding. The ideal model
of decision maker would be the computer system that has the human intelligence
capability or human beings who has the computing rate and memorizing capacity as
same as the computer system. But, it is not possible to build a computer system
with the human capability with the current state-of-the-art. So the alternative
solution is to build the Decision Support System rather than Decision Making
System using computers, that is, the hybrid decision making system of human
intelligence capability and computerized memory capacity and computing rate. This
is possible through the close interface between humans and computers. In DSS, the
interface function between the CCIS and human decision makers will be designed for
the best interpretation and understanding of the state. Then CCIS will have the
decision support capability. In addition, computers are used as aids to the decision
process itself. The relationship between computer and user is shown in Figure 2.12
[Ref. 33:p. 270].
3. Information Presentation
The ability to quickly and easily display geographical and tactical data
in various graphical forms and perspectives is a technology that has come of age.
The digital data bases that are offered by the Defense Mapping Agency are
providing separate addressable digital information such as terrain, elevations, road
conditions, city locations, etc., that is needed for developing such graphical display.
Together with the use of icons, mouse and touch screen technology, graphical
displays will find increasing use within decision support systems in representing
situation assessments as well as planning and resource allocation. [Ref. 34:p. 218]
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The use of voice to control the interactive graphic displays, to query the
knowledge base and to provide data reports to the decision support system is a
major technological means to the interface technics.
Of course, the conventional technology using text and tabular form,
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Figure 2.12 Man-Machine Interface to Meet DSS Needs
D. C3 ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of C3 system is the initial stage of the overall system
engineering process. Architecture is the arrangement of (or process of arranging) the
basic elements of a C3 system into an orderly system framework. [Ref. 14 :p. 82] It is
composed of functions, structures, connectivities, and interfaces. [Ref. 19:p. 13]
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One of the characteristics of a C3 system architecture is that it describes the
interrelationships between selected elements of the system. These C3 system
elements are functions, facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and
personnel. [Ref. 14:p. 82]
The purpose of architecture is to build a system using some resources and
materials. For example, One use wiring for electricity support, plumbing for water
support, walls and roofing for protection from hostile circumstances like animals or
wind. [Ref. 14:p. 82] So the function of architecture is to "map" the elements to its
function. In other words, architecture means the translation of function into form.
And the system architecture includes the clear identification of subsystem, the
allocation of functions to subsystem, and the establishment of the interrelation
through standards for interfaces between subsystems [Ref. 4:p. 851.
1. Classifications of Sub-System
The C3 system varies depending on the mission and type of forces. The
sub-system of C3 system will also vary depending on each overall C3 system itself
in turn. But the subsystem will be classified through the functional decomposition of
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C3 system. A subsystem is a subset of system resources including their imbedded
dynamics. The general functional basis used to divide the C3 system into
subsystems, thus, can be the observation subsystem, the decision subsystem, and
the action subsystem which describe the dynamics as shown in Figure 2.5 above.
The observation subsystem is the collection of all resources which are
involved in making observations with regard to other resources and the
environment. The action subsystem is the collection of all resources which are
involved in executing actions which may impact on other resources and the
environment. The decision subsystem is the collection of all resources involved in
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making decisions, i.e., those resources responsible for deciding how to best utilize
the observation and action subsystems to accomplish the mission evolving from the
conflict. These subsystems may then be decomposed into specialized subsystems for
different phases of observation, decision and action which may occur sequentially or
in parallel as shown in Figures 2.13.a and 2.13.b. Each of the blocks represent a
complex, collective and compound process [Ref. 16:pp. 4-61.
Once the C3 subsystems are identified, then the C3 system's six
functions will be allocated to each subsystem in the context of system boundary.
But architecture is not a set of functions or a partitioning of these functions into
subsets. Also it's not a set of standards, protocols or procedures for the system.
However, the architecture can be expressed in terms of warfare and command
functional relationships, network diagrams, connectivity charts, information flow
diagrams, design guidelines and standards [Ref. 14:p. 84J. The basic building block
of architecture is the structure and connectivity.
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2. Basic Building Blocks: Functional Relationships
A generic building block of the C2 architecture consisting of six
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The connectivities among the six functional areas have been defined as follows [Ref.
q:p. 12]:
Command - The connectivity that allows a commander to direct and
*control his forces;
Coordination - The connectivity between functional areas required to
ensure that assets are employed in accordance with command guidance;
Information Exchange - The transfer of data and information items
among the various areas to support the needs of the six functional areas.
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The command portion of the command and coordination connectivities
allows a commander to exercise his authority and the functional areas to
respond to his direction. The coordination portion allows engagement, sensor,
communications, and system management areas (the implementation arms of
command) to interface with one another (in accordance with the guidelines
established by command) and with command during the planning and
implementation process. Two-way information flow connects each functional
area with information management. That information flow provides for the
transfer of data and information within the command level, allowing an
information base to be developed and maintained and its contents
disseminated. [Ref. 19:p.12]
Those six functions will be connected to each other through three
connectivities to be allocated to the subsystem. Once they are connected in a way,
they will have their own C functions corresponding to each subsystem. That may
be called the system level architecture of C2 process. Those functions in terms of C
2
process will be information management, decision management, and execution
management [Ref. 25:p. 126]. Figure 2.15 shows the conceptual architecture of those
C2 process. The conceptual architecture of the C2 process presented here is a result
of a study performed in 1986 by the Armed Forces Staff College as described in
"The Conceptual Architecture and its Value" prepared by Major Patrick T.
Thornton, USA. The architecture consists of the general flow of information and
information processes which occur through three functional areas of the C2 process.
[Ref. 25:p. 141] The next question is what is the basic structure of the function.
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Figure 2.15 Conceptual Architecture of the C 2 Process
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3. Mierarchical Structure of a Functional System
The structure of a functional system will describe how a function is
constructed, and also define the limits of centralization and decentralization of
control. A hierarchical structure of a generic C2 system was explored in detail over
four levels in terms of the defining features at that level by Coe and Dockery. [Ref.
35:p. 221:
Level Defining Feature Focus
Micro Data NodesMeso Structure/Information LinksMeta Rules/Transaction Processes
Macro Goals for the C2 system Functions
The four level structure can be used graphically to build a generic C2






Figure 2.16 Hierarchical structure of a generic C2 system
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Each of these levels can be translated through its operational description
and defining features into a firm and ongoing program of theoretical studies. (Ref.
35:p. 23] Once a framework of function is constructed, a couple of functions will be
combined through connectivities and interfaces to support a subsystem.
4. Connectivity and Interface
Connectivities are the means for command, coordi-,ation, and
information flow within the C2 system. A similar flow to and from external entities
occurs via interfaces [Ref. 19:p.13]. The concept of connectivity leads to questions
concerning the connectivity of procedures and training and their influences on
system design, and the perspective on connectivity is extended from a
one-dimensional to a multi-dimensional view, freeing us from a purely
communication representation bias. The multiple approach to expanding the
definition of connectivity is illustrated in Figure 2.17 by contrasting
communications connections with C2 relationships [Ref. 35:p. 23].
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5. Types of Architecture
So far the architecture is viewed in terms of functional relationships.
But, in military organizations like the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, each
echelon down to its primitive resource unit provides a service to its
parent/command organization. And each echelon may be regarded as a complete C3
system with a corresponding C3 structure. The size of C3 system, thus, depends on
the organization as well. So this functional architecture is not enough to describe C2
system. There are three general types of architectures currently used to describe C
2
system. They divide the overall architecture into three distinct architecture:
organizational, functional, and physical. [Ref. 25:p. 128]
The organizational architecture will be represented by the command
structure which will describe the chain of command, the C2 authority and
responsibility, and the relationships of the various level of command. The functional
architecture performs a functional decomposition of the various mission areas
presented in the organizational architecture. The physical architecture represents
the specific hardware systems and their physical relationships. [Ref 25. :p. 129]
Also there must be a different levels of architecture corresponding to its
size. As system developers specify from the top down and build from the bottom up.
the same applies in an architecture. From the standpoint of architectural
specification, one must know the architecture of next higher level (or, as a
minimum, the plug-in points) before developing the architecture for a given level.
There are levels of architecture to be specified depending on the boundary of the
system: processing, nodal, network, and global architecture. [Ref. 14:p. 83]
Processing architecture is the architecture of the system processing
elements. Examples include serial or parallel computer architectures and electironic
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or photonic technology processors[Ref. 14:p. 83]. In the bottom level of architecture,
it has the common identity as the physical type of architecture.
Nodal architecture is the architecture of the individual nodes itself. A
node can be a facility space like a command center, a command like a battle group,
or a platform like an aircraft carrier, or destroyer. The nodal architecture provides a
blueprint of the relationships of the basic system elements of the node. For example,
a node could have a fully distributed architecture, a partially distributed
architecture or a centralized architecture [Ref. 15:p. 83]. This level of architecture
will be the key point of C2 organization design of organizational architecture.
Network architecture is the relationships of the nodes to each other and
the means by which they are connected to form larger operational units or networks
[Ref. 14:p. 83]. In this level, the architecture will represent the command
relationships like those of hierarchical, parallel, supporting, etc. in organizational
type architecture, and also describe the control types of open loop control or closed
loop control. On the other hand, in this level, the decomposed functional C3 system
of functional architecture will be integrated.
Global architecture is the interconnections between networks to form a
global network. It is, in essence, an architecture for a network of networks [Ref.
14:p. 83]. The total system can be characterized as a network of "nodes" and
"links". So once the organization and missions are defined, the nature of C3
architecture can be illuminated by considering the way that computers can be
interconnected at a distance through telecommunications system.
6. C3 Reference Model
This interconnection ought to be designed in such a way that
modifications to portions of the total system can be made in the future without
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doing violence to other portions. The solution has been to divide the end-to-end
connection into seven clearly-identified "layers". That is the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) established by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) [Ref. 4:pp. 87-88].
The OSI's modular framework provides for the transfer of data among
application processes today, while retaining the flexibility for incorporating
advancing technologies in the future. In order to provide the framework of choice to
guide the development of a consistent set of standards and specifications for
interoperability and to offer substantial protection of extensive investments in
acquisitions by being conducive to the promotion of modular reusable technologies
the C3 RM (Command, Control and Communications Reference Model) was
developed by Joint Directors of Laboratories, Technical Panel for C3 , C3 Research
and Technical Program [Ref. 16:p. 1].
The structure of C3 RM is shown in Figure 2.18. C3 RM describe a
framework for modularizing interoperability among resources which must be
networked to comprise C3systems. It includes the ISO OSI RM by adopting it for
the communications types of interactions.
The C3 RM shows three generalized canonical dimensions of C3
architectures: resources, interactions, and conflicts. The mission of the C3 system is
a primitive notion which defines the goal, aim, objective, purpose, intent, decision
requirements, function, or desired state of the C3 system. The mission must be
derived from the conflict in which the C3 system is involved [Ref. 16 :p. 7]. That's
why the conflict is involved as one of dimensions. The highest structure of the model
is the layered structure of conflicts. The intermediate structure is the layered
structure of the C2 applications which try to resolve the conflicts. The lowest
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structure is that of the layered assets. The assets are utilized by the C2 applications
to interact with other sources in the environment. In a sense, the C2 applications
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Figure 2.18 An Autonomous Multi-Interaction Resource
In terms of C3 networked architecture, the key point of the C3 RM is the
interaction dimension because C3 RM embraces analogous architectures for all the
key types of physical interactions and utilizes the application layer to provide
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command and control over all types of interactions in an integration fashion. The
four fundamental types of interactions are identification, communications,
transportation and infliction. Identification is an interaction which directly results
in the recognition of objects in the environment. It's used to determine the stages,
phases and targets required for each layer of conflict. Communications is an
interaction which directly results in an exchange of information. It is used to
command, control and coordinate between and among the resources. Transportation
is an interaction which directly results in the motion of objects. It is used to carry,
supply, strengthen, equip and/or load the resources with the necessary personnel
and materials. Finally, infliction is an interaction which directly results in the
destruction, damage, degradation or disruption of objects. It is used to destroy,
damage, degrade and disrupt the capabilities of the targets involved in the conflict.
[Ref. 36:pp. 16.2.2-16.2.3]
E. THE OTHER VIEW OF C31: C3 CM
Intelligence support to a commander is a -tal part of the combat process. In
Lawson's model of command process, the intelligence process can be thought of as a
sense function that tells the commander what is going on in the environment. This
sensed data will be compared to its desired state after undergoing process. Then the
commander will decide on a course of action that will bring him to closer to its
desired state, and finally the commander will take a proper fire distribution action.
In combat operations, there is a continuity of operational processes from sensing to
fire distribution. Briefly, the battle management system consists of intelligence from
sense function, fire from the force, and the command, control, and communications
components between the sense stage to act stage. If those components are well
organized, the power of the force will increase, otherwise, it will decrease.
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1. Force Multiplier or Divider
Assume that the performance level of each C3 I component is represented
by the ratio of current capability over ideal perfect capability with the value of 0 to
1. That is:
Current Capability of C 3  Component ()
Ideal Capability of C 3  Component (i)
where
P(i) is the performance level of each C3 component.
Then the power of friendly force will be driven by the following formula:
Power Driver = f V- (i)
where
P(i) is the variables derived from the definition of C3 boundary.
The f function is, however, at least neither additive nor multiplicative.
Assume that the communications system is down at a specific time, then there is no
effects from the current C3 system directly to operate the forces, that is, the
effectiveness of the C3 system is zero. In other words, the f function has a
multiplicative function partially. But there is still a power driver to operate the
force. So the definition of C3 component as a power driver is not limited to only the
four components. There is another power driver which looks like a self maintenance
power of an organization when there is a malfunction which affects the
50
organization's operation. In military organizations, that may be a kind of inertia
operator from accumulated experiences and training. Let this inertia power be a,
then the f function may be represented with both additive function and multiple
function including another variable a in addition to the basic C3 components.
Assume that there are simply command, control, communications, and intelligence




P( 3) = comm
P( 4 ) = Pint
P(5 ) = a
Then, the power driver will be simply the function of four variables:
Power Driver = fPcmd, P ctl, Pcomm, Pint' a]
The methodology to measure the level of performance will be discussed
in Chapter IV, "Test and Evaluation" section. It is obvious, however, that, if every
component is well organized with a ideal capability excluding human factors such as
motivation and distortion of information by human, the value of Power Driver will
be 1, and it will drive 100% of fire distribution to the target. This is represented by
the formula such as
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Operational Force Power = f [•P()] F
where
F is the fixed force power available for commitment to an operation.
Adapting the characteristics of the f function, if any one of those
components in C31 has a critical poor performance, regardless of the other's
capability, the total power of the force will decrease by the critical weak
component's ratio. On the other hand, any increase in each component will increase
the total power by the multiple ratio, too.
So it is not true that the force must attack only the enemy's fire weapons
to remove his response capability to carry out war. To attack those C3I components
is another point of fire distribution. These attack techniques are collectively called
C3 CounterMeasures or C3CM.
2. C3 Countermeasures
Assume that both Blue and Red forces have the same fire assets, then
the balance of power depends on the their C3 I capability. If the forces have a C3CM
capability to degrade the Red Forces' C3I, then the total Red Forces power in
battlefield will be degraded and the total Red Forces power will be represented by
Red Forces' Operational Battle Power = [1 - g(C 3CM)] • Fr
where
Both Blue and Red Forces C31 capability are the same
Fr is the Red Forces' fixed force power for operations.
g is the function of C3CM performance
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Countermeasures are comprised of one or more of the disciplines or
techniques employed by themselves or, more commonly, in some combination to
deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C3 capabilities and to
protect friendly C3 against such actions. The concept of C3 CM can be broken down
into two related concepts, degradation of enemy C3 and protection of friendly C3
from enemy degradation: Counter-C 3 and Protect C3 . These use the techniques of
jamming, military deception, OPSEC, and physical destruction [Ref. 37:p. 18].
Jamming - This technique involves both acoustic and electronic
jamming. Acoustic jamming is the deliberate radiation or reradiating of
mechanical or electroacoustic signals with the objectives of obliterating
or obscuring signals that the enemy is attempting to receive and of
deterring enemy weapon systems. Electronic jamming is the deliberate
radiation, reradiation, alteration, or reflection of electromagnetic energy
for the purpose of disrupting enemy use of electronic device, equipment
or C3 I system.
Military Deception - This technique involves actions executed to
mislead foreign decision makers, causing them to derive and accept
desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or
other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the
originator's objectives.
OPSEC - Operations security is the process of denying adversaries
information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying,
controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and
conducting military operations and other activities.
Physical Destruction - Although physical destruction is an option, it
must consider the rules of engagement, expendable nature of lethal
weapons, and their requirement for extremely accurate target location
information, which may make non-lethal options (e.g., jamming and
deception) more effective.
But thanks to the current state of the art, there is anothtr possible
technique to degrade the enemy's C3I capability. It is to insert the computer virus
into the defense computer network in peace time as well as in war time so that it
works during the initial engagement of battle in order to disrupt the early warning
system.
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11. THE FRAMEWORK OF C3 SYSTEM
A. OVERVIEW
In order to develop a system, the fiLst step is to define the concept. But the
various terms of C2 , C3 , C3 I, C4 , and C4 I2 cause confusion. In Chapter I, however,
battle management is defined as the process of managing a battle with the intent of
destroying an enemy's weapon system. This is done by battle managers through the
C3 system. In this thesis, the various terms of command and control will be
represented by C3 . When a C3 system is developed, the developer has to approach it
in two ways. One is the invisible form of C3 (C3 process), the other is visible form
of C3 (C3 system). In the remaining part of this thesis, the term of C will be used
as the process of command and control, and the C SYSTEM will refer to the
tangible form of command and control. Basically, the concept of C3 will be defined
as the process, through which commander controls his resources and ensures unity of
effort to respond to its challenge, which is conducted by C3 system.
The purpose of C3 process and C3 system is to assist the commander in
accomplishing his mission. So the development of C3 system highly depends on the
commander. The problem solving way of a commander is called the command
structure, and control is a support mechanism for command. The way to assist the
commander through C3 system is to reduce uncertainty so that the commander
makes a sound decision. This is the capability of intelligence analy. - of C3 system.
But the decision must be made in time, faster than the enemy's action. This
requires fast and large volumes of communications traffic. So for the purpose of C
3
system, it requires a well organized command structure, control mechanism,
intelligence capability, and communication link.
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C3 system is a means of battle management which is an overall term for the
commander's activities to reach his goal on the battlefield. A battle management
system consists of the battlefield to be managed, sensors to monitor the battlefield,
weapons to change the battlefield to the desired state, a battle manager who
manages the battle, and the C3 system which is used by the battle manger.
The boundary of the C3 system is limited to the command and control
functional system and its subordinate organizations. Figure 3.1 depicts a battle
management system configuration. The C3 system is located between sensor and
weapon. The boundary of the C3 system will include both the command and control
process and organization. And, it depends on the system context which affects the
transformation function of command and control and on the various types of
organization.
The function of the sensor is to monitor the change of states and the function
of the weapon is to respond to the change in order to make the battlefield stay at
the desired state. The function of the C3 system will be the transformation of threat
(change of state) into peace (desired state). This transformation function will be
conducted in accordance with its force organization.
The battle manager will be the commander of the force, or staff of the
commander who has a limited command authority. They are the control organ of
the C3 system. In Chapter II, they are considered as decision makers. So, if they are
included in the C3 system, the C3 system will be the decision making system,
otherwise the C3 system will be the decision support system. But, it is very difficult
to develop a C3 system using the model of decision making system which includes
the commander's role within the system itself. Also, the characteristics of the
commander vary as much as the characteristics of human problem solving vary. So,
if the system is developed like that, it will create a commander-dependent C
3
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system. So the battle manager should have a standard model. It is the C2
organization model or decision maker model which is the distributed decision
making model in the hierarchical military organization.
SYSTEM CONTEXT ENVIRONMENT
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Figure 3.1 BMS Configuration
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In developing C3 system, the development will be divided into three
fundamental area. They are the standard, distributed, hierarchical decision making
mc Jel, the force organizing model, and the C3 functional transformation model.
But, all of these three development approaches will have a certain consistency. It is
the time-uncertainty distribution under its system context.
The information base and communications components will be used
continuously to perform those functions by the subsystems. So the information base
must be developed properly to support each function corresponding to each
subsystem. The main components of the information base are the data base, the
model base, and the rule or knowledge base. The communications components will
be the voice communications system, the common user multichannel system, and
the high volume digital data communications system.
Figure 3.1 can be viewed in three directions: the physical layers of a C3
system from the side direction, the C2 process with time and information
distribution from the front direction, and the operation of the C3 system from the
rotation direction.
The physical layc, of a C3  system may be represented by
communications core layer, information base layer surrounding the communications
path, C2  transformation function layer, and C3  system structure layer
corresponding to the force organization level (Figure 3.1 1).
However, the process of C ' system can be viewed in terms of C2 process
time line and information distribution over the sequential C2 process time line. As
shown in Figure 3.1, the C2 process is to transform a status information from the
sensor into the command or control information for the weapons. This process
consists of many sequential or parallel substeps and links between those substeps.
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As the information is transformed, each level of organization has a distributed
information at a time. The major steps of the sequential transformation process
consists of observation, decision, and execution. Figure 3.1.2 depicts this
information transformation function.
The operation of a C3 system is conducted by the interaction between
the C3 system and the users, or man-machiiie interaction. The definition of the C
3
system includes the force organization structure (e.g., the chain of command) as
well as the C3 information system network. Figure 3.1.3 depicts the interactions for
the C3 system operation. The type of interaction for C3 system operation has three
classes. The first is the tactical interaction between or among the elements of the
force organization such as peoples (e.g., operators, staffs, and commanders) in the
same level or different level using the C3 system, weapons, or units. This can be
conducted by identification, transportation. communication, and infliction. The
second class is the technological interactions between or among the C3 system
network within the network or outside the network. This is possible through the
compatibility, standardization of data and procedures. The last is the man-machine
interaction between the C3 information system terminal and the operators. The C3
system operation is initated by the sensor management for data collection and
terminated by the weapon enagement control for fire distribution.
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B. THE PERSPECTIVES OF SYSTEM CONTEXT
1. System Operations Environment
The battlefield is filled with uncertainty, stochastic combat outcomes,
and the other manifold factors such as human motivation, high probability of
communications link failure, and failure of control over the subordinate force. The
system context is the outcome of those factor's analyses. The C"3 system must be
designed to meet the requirements of the system context. Figure 3.2 is depicted to
be used as a reference for C3 system development expanding Figure 3.1. As shown in
the figure, the environment has three attributes: uncertainty, time, and threat. It
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Figure 3.2 The Integrated Framework of C 3 System
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Given an amount of time and uncertainty to response to the threat, the
C3 transformation system will make various decisions: informational decisions,
organizational decisions, and operational decisions, and this decisions will be
transformed via a mission to its subordinate organization. Then, the subordinate
organizations will require the time-uncertainty product to carry out the mission in
turn. In terms of requirements, if the force is well organized with its subordinate
force structure, doctrines, sensor, and weapons in order to carry out the mission
effectively, the requirements of time and certainty at that level will be less than
that of the opposite case. In other words, the force must be organized corresponding
to its operational condition and the expected missions. The C3 organizational
system determines the requirements of time-uncertainty Droduct at that level.
Once the requirements are determined, the C3 transformation system
should have a capability to meet this requirements. A good C3 transformation
system will reduce the uncertainty more than the poor C3 transformation system
does in a given time and support a better decision.
The battle manager of the battle management system is, however, a
separate area in terms of a C3 system, even though it is the central element of a C
2
organization. It is not possible to develop a battle manager except for a computer
algorithm in a limited area, because it is highly dependent on the ability of the
commander to use the battle management system. An alternative way is to train the
commander as the good battle manager. But, in this thesis, the way of making a
good battle manger will be excluded because it is a separate part of C3 system in
terms of system development.
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2. Decision Types
In a tactical situation each commander is presented with a view of the
"state of the world" which he knows can be inaccurate and not necessarily very
timely. Nonetheless, on the basis of this incomplete information, each commander
must make decisions consistent with the constraints imposed by the preplanned
actions. Typical decisions involve [Ref. 17:pp. 22-23]:
Control of surveillance resources (e.g., turn on a radar, launch a
reconnaissance aircraft, etc.) to gather more information or clarify
ambiguous information;
Control of electromagnetic radiation (e.g., communicate or not, jamming
strategies, etc.);
Control of resources (e.g., relative positions of ships, aircraft, tanks,
troops, etc., and control of their movement);
Assignment of weapons to targets (e.g., sortie planning by deciding what
aircraft, from what bases should be armed, with what weapons to attack
what targets or other objects of military value);
Weapons control.
These decisions are always made by human commanders and partially by
computer algo-ithms. Some of the decisions are strategic in nature, i.e., they are the
outcome of extensive preparation and planning. In a system theoretic context, the
strategic decisions and planning are roughly equivalent to the establishment of
desired open loop controls and trajectories; and one can argue that such strategic or
command decisions are the outcome of a strategic or dynamic deterministic
optimization problem. In this phase, intelligence information is crucial. In the
planning phase, many details are not taken into account. Uncertainty is usually
handled by planning in detail alternate options; specific and unambiguous
objectives; and directives are command for execution and implementation by the
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appropriate commanders. The command function effectively specifies the reference
trajectories in time and space for the mission to be performed. [Ref. 17 :p. 23]
C. THE PERSPECTIVES OF C3 ORGANIZATION
The C3 organizational system will consist of force organization and doctrines.
The force organization is classified by the level of organization, type of forces. The
systemic organizational model, which is presented in Chapter II, states that the
function of organization is to produce information and control the organization itself
by its control and operational system. The forces must be well organized for the
effective information handling and environment control. Related to a command and
control organization, there are three primary organization models which must be
reviewed to be applied to C3 organization design: the rational system model, the
natural system model, and the open system model [Ref. 38:p.31.
1. Overview of Organization Model
The rational system model emphasizes the role of the organization in
attainin, specific, predetermined goals with a maximum of efficiency. The
classical/traditional theory (Mooney, Reiley, 1939; Gulick, Urwick, 1937) of the
rational system model stresses the hierarchical structure, unity of command, span of
command, management by exception, distribution and grouping of specialized
subunits, and line/staff distinctions. But the formal organization model ignores the
informal, or behavioral structure of the organization. Also it is impossible for the
behavior of a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality. To
compensate the behavioral aspects of organization, the natural system model
emphasizes the importance of the behavioral structure rather than formal structure
of the organization. [Ref. 38:pp. 4-9]
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The informal factors underscore the difficulties in effectively matching
information support systems to the partially structured decision tasks faced by
battle staffs during combat. So they introduced "structured" versus
"semi-structured" versus "unstructured", instead of "rational" versus
"non-rational" (Keen, Scott Morton, 1978). A perspective on organizations
emphasizes the influence of the organization's environment on its internal structure
and operations. In military organizations, it is a critical because the implications of
command and control process is to control the environment toward the
organization's desired state. However, the rational system models are internally
oriented and do not account for the larger environmental contexts within which the
organization exists. So the open system model states that organization can be seen
as imbedded within larger organizations (Boulding, 1956). [Ref. 38:pp. 12-14]
The open system model emphasizes the process of organizing, rather than
one structure of the organization. The process of organizing serves to reduce the
level of equivocality or uncertainty in the interaction with the environment. That is,
organizational structures and operating rules will evolve to reduce the equivocality
of the information received from its environment. The purpose of such structures
and rules is to establish a workable level of certainty for the organizational decision
process. [Ref. 38:pp. 14-15] In other words, the organization forms the command
structure, which generates the chain of command in military organization.
According to Weick (Weick, 1969), this reduction of information uncertainty occurs
in three stages: [Ref. 38:p. 15]
Enactment - the information collectors of the organization "creates" a
perception of the environment which contains a certain degree of
equivocality.
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Selection - the organization applies rules or routines to this information
in an effort to structure it in relevant terms: the greater the equivocality,
the fewer number of rules which can meaningfully applied.
Retention - the organization determines what information is to be
retained (and acted upon) and what information is to be discarded (i.e.,
the organization picks and choose which inputs to react to.).
The centralization of command and decentralization of control (two
doctrinal principles of U.S. military forces) are direct interpretations of the rational
model and in particular, reflect Simon's concept of bounded rationality, and a third
doctrinal principle, coordination of effort, reflects the basic notions found in Max
Wever's discussion of bureaucracy [Ref. 38:p. 5, translated writings of Wever, 1947].
Taylor's concept of scientific management is manifested in two primary ways: the
definition of specialized positions and the design of specialized information support
systems. Thus the rational system model is seen to closely resemble the ideal or
prescriptive form of command and control. [Ref. 38:p. 6] In addition, the review of
all those models suggests that, much of the open system model of organization
applies directly to command and control systems. Certainly, command structures
can be viewed as imbedded, hierarchical systems: theater commands can be broken
down into component service commands, component service commands into
geographic or specialized subordinate commands, and so forth. At each level there
exists an organizational entity with defined goals and procedures. [Ref. 38:p. 16]
2. Internal Structure of Organization
The scientific management theory of the rational system model states
that positions and responsibilities would be redesigned to match human capabilities
while personnel would be trained to perform at maximum proficiency [Ref. 38:p. 5].
Also commanders and battle staffs are required to develop informal operating
procedures and organizational structures. Informal liaisons and other ad hoc
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relationships evolve to exchange critical information [Ref. 38:p. 8]. To design the
position and responsibility and to develop the organization structure, the internal
parts of organization must be analyzed. Different parts of the organization play
different roles in accomplishment of work and of these forms of coordination. Henry






Figure 3.3 The Six Basic Parts of an Organization
The operating core is where the basic work of producing the
organization's products and services gets done.
The strategic apex is the home of top management, where the
organization is managed from a general perspective.
The middle line comprises all those managers who stand in direct line
relationship between the strategic apex and operating core.
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The technostructure includes the staff analysts who design the the
systems by which work processes and outputs of others in the organization are
formally designed and controlled.
The support staff comprises all those specialists who provide support to
the organization outside of its operating workflow.
The ideology is a kind of halo of beliefs and traditions that surrounds the
whole organization.
Mintzberg points out two major points regarding this view of the
organization. First, there is a distinction between "line" and "staff", which is a valid
distinction in certain types of structure. Second, there are two kinds of staffs. The
support staffs provide just special services while the techno structure "advises" in
the usual sense normally associated with a staff.
3. Command and Control Structure
In the open system model of an organization, the military organization
was described by an embedded system within the larger organization. This
embedded system model is formulized as the divisionalized form of an organization
in Mintzberg's work [Ref. 39:p. 301], Figure 3.4 is the divisionalized form by
Mintzberg.
Figure 3.4 The Divisionalized Form
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The command and control structure, which is classified with two major
types: centralized and decentralized, describes the delegation of formal power down
the the hierarchy of authority. In terms of military command and control, the
formal power is the decision making power. So with the sharing of the decision
making power, if all the power rests at a single point in the organization, the
structure is called centralized; to the extent that the power is dispersed among
many individuals, the structure is called relatively decentralized. [Ref. 39:p. 289]
Centralization has one great advantage in the organization. By keeping
all the power in one place, it ensures the very tightest form of coordination. All the
decisions are made in one head, and then implemented through direct supervision.
But one brain is often not enough. It cannot understand all that must be known.
However decentralization allows the organization ro respond quickly to local
conditions in many different places, and it can serve as a stimulus for motivation
[Ref. 39:p. 290]. By mixing the advantages of two parameters of command and
control types, an organization can be designed for the optimal performance.
With the direction of dispersing the power, there are vertical
decentralization and horizontal decentralization [Ref. 39:p. 290].
Vertical decentralization - the delegation of formal power down the
hierarchy to line managers
Horizontal Decentralization - the extent to which formal or informal
power is dispersed out of the line hierarchy to non-managers (operators,
analysts, and support staffers).
When organizations decentralize extensively, they do so selectively,
delegating power for each decision process to that level in the line hierarchy where
the necessary information can best be accumulated. Power is dispersed to different
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places for different decision processes. The power over only one or a few kinds of
decisions is dispersed to the same place in the organization. It is called selective
decentralization. On the other hand, the dispersal of power for many kinds of
decisions to the same place is called the parallel decentralization. [Ref. 39:p. 290]
With two distinction parameters of decentralization (vertical/horizontal
and selective/parallel), there must be a different form and a different degree of
decentralization. Then centralization can be a type of decentralization with high
degree of power ratio over one place. Among the six types of decentralization (Type
I - Type VI), Type I is the centralization form of an organization [Ref. 39:p. 292].
For the military decision making organizations, which is considered as
the distributed decision making based on centralized planning and decentralized
execution [Ref. ll:p. 127], the command and control structure will be represented by
Type I centralization form embedded in the larger organization. Figure 3.5 is
depicted for the distributed decision making organization form. The inflated size of
the shaded parts indicates their special power in decision making, not their size.
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Figure 3.5 Distributed Decision Making Organization
4. Doctrines and Policy
The rational system model of an organization states that personnel must
be trained for the maximum proficiency of the organization objectives. The national
security objectives are supported by the force's strategy in strategic level and tactics
in operational level. In business management, the strategy is defined by Andrews
that "strategy is a pattern of decisions a company that determines and reveals its
objectives, purposes or goals, produces the principle policies and plans for achieving
those goals..." [Ref. 40:p. 59, quoted from Andrew, 1980]. The concept of strategy in
military field is defined that " strategy is the comprehensive direction of power, and
tactics is the immediate application of power" [Ref. 40:p. 63, quoted from
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Rosinsky, 1977]. Also Clausewitz says that the aim of strategy is the destruction of
the enemy forces on the battlefield. Adapting these definition, Liddel-Hart
definition of the strategy, "the art of distributing and applying military means to
fulfill the ends of policy", is adequate to military term of strategy [Ref. 40:p. 63,
quoted from Liddel-Hart, 1968]. The implications of art of distribution and
application of military means can be expanded by military analysts in various way.
One form of this art is the principles of war.
FM 100-5 says that there are nine principles of war such as objective,
offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise,
and simplicity.
The meaning of objective is that the direction must have the clearly
defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Offensive is to seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative. Mass is to concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
Economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary
efforts. Maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the
flexible applications of combat power. Unity of command is to ensure the unity of
effort under one responsible commander. Security is not to permit the enemy to
acquire an unexpected advantage. Surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or plr.'e,
or in a manner, for which he is unprepared. Simplicity is to prepare clear,
uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure successful operations
through understanding. [Ref. 41]
But, the point of views between Western military scieiists, Soviet
military'scientists and others are little different. The different viewpoints are shown
in Figure 3.6 [Ref. 42:p. 4].
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Figure 3.6 Principles of War
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in the real battlefield, these principles will be inserted into each tactical
operations corresponding to the battle manager's way of doing. This way of doing of
each battle managers in a force command must be standardized toward the force's
objective. Otherwise, the power of forces will be scattered. So the objective must be
in mind always, and the forces must have a standard operating procedures (SOP).
By training the battle managers through the SOP, they can have a consistent way
of doing in the real battlefield over the mission. In the perspective of command and
control, this resembles the coordinating work or interaction among the subparts of
an organization. A role of doctrines is to tain the individuals toward the consistent
way of problem solving for organization's own benefit. As a parameter in the design
of individual positions, indoctrination resembles training in many ways. It too takes
place largely outside the job-often before it begins-and is also designed for the
internalization of standards.But the standards differ and are unique to each
organization. Thus indoctrination must take place within its own walls under full
control of its own personnel [Ref. 39:p. 282].
D. THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTERACTION
The techniques of interaction such as compatibility, information standards.
and procedures. Those of interaction will be the classification of identification,
communications, transportation, and infliction.
For the coordinating works, Mintzberg developed "the six basic mechanisms of
coordination" (Figure 3.7). Six meclhnisms of coordination seem to describe the
fundamental ways in which organizations coordinate their work. Two are ad hoc in
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Figure 3.7 Six Basic Coordinate Mechanisms
Mutual adjustment achieves coordination of work by the simple process of
informal coordination. The people who do the work interact with one another
to coordinate, much as two canoeists in the rapids adjust to one another's
action. Figure 3.7a shows mutual adjustment in terms of an arrow between
two operators.
Direct supervision in which one person coordinates by giving orders to
others, tends to come into play after a certain number of people must work
together. Thus, 1.5 people in a war canoe cannot coordinate by mutual
adjustment; they need a leader who, by a virtue of his instructions,
coordinates their work, much as a football team requires a quarterback to call
the plays. Figure 3.7b shows the leader as a manager with his instructions as
arrows to the operators.
Standardization of work processes means the specification- that is, the
programming-of the content of the work directly, the procedures to be
followed, as in the case the assembly instructions that come with many
children's toys. As shown in Figure 3.7c, it is typically the job of the analyst
to so program the work of different people in order to coordinate it tight.
Standardization of outputs means the specification not of what is to be
done but of its results. In that way, the interfaces between jobs is
predetermined. Such standards generally emanate from the analyst, as shown
in Figure 3.6d.
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Standardization of skills, as well as knowledge. is another, though looser
way 103 achieve coordination. Here it is the worker rather than the work or the
outputs that is standardized. He or she is taught a body of knowledge and a
set of skills which are subsequently applied to the work. Such standardization
typically takes place outside the organization-for example in a professional
school of a university before the worker takes his or her first job-indicated in
Figure 3.7e. In effect, the standards do not come from the analysts; they are
internalized by the operator as inputs to the job he takes. Coordination is then
achieved by virtue of various operator's having learned what to expect of each
other. When an anesthetist and a surgeon meet in the operating room to
remove an appendix, they need hardly communicate (that is, ube mutual
adjustment, let alone direct supervision); each knows exactly what the other
will do and can coordinate accordingly.
Standardization of norms means that the workers share a common set of
beliefs and can achieve coordination based on it, as implied in Figure 3.7f. For
example, every member of a religious order shares a belief in the importance of
attracting convert, then all will work together to achieve this aim.
Chapter II introduced that the technologies of interoperabilit consists of
compatibility, standardization, and procedure. In the section above, also, the
procedure is a mean of interaction among the subparts in an organization. But the
organization refers to the overall embedded organization which specifies the
distributed decision making and execution organization. If the six basic mechanisms
of coordination are expanded out of the overall organization, however, interactions
among each subparts of all component organizations can be formulized over the
distributed decision making model which is a embedded organization.
In Chapter II, the open system model stated that the interaction can be
implemented through the four fundamental types: communication, transportation,
identification, and infliction. Each resource involved in a conflict in each component
level of a lager organization, as a minimum, must be capable of communications,
while the capability for any one or more of the remaining types of interactions
depends on the specialty of the resource. For example, weapon resources must be
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capable of infliction, sensor resources must be capable of identification, and logistics
resources must be capable of transportation [Ref. 36:p. 16.2.3].
In terms of command and control, however, the critical resources in the
environment are people and information. The interaction among people in the
organization is possible through the expansion of the six basic coordination
mechanisms. On the other hand, information systems, encompassing the processors
and interconnecting networks, provide the interaction between people and
information, and among the information in different places [Ref. 43:p. 12.2]. To
provide significant interoperability, in the C3 mainframe environment, there must
be extensive communications support. A mainframe user is now someone with an
intelligent terminal, workstations or user on another system. These users need the
flexibility to transparently access the data processing resources in their organization
[Ref. 43:p. 12.2].
The most information that a commander needs is the location, velocity, and
identity of his own, enemy's and neutral objects [Ref. 17:p. 22]. So the
standardization of information provides the easiness of access. The methodology of
accessing the information will be the OSI seven layer model of information system
and ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) technology in communications
networking. The application designer has a major responsibility in achieving
interoperability.
E. THE PERSPECTIVES OF C3 TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM
In the previous section, various organization models introduced the formal
structure of power delegation. In the real world, however, the formal structure is not
good enough for tactical information exchange and technical weapon (or force)
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control. The sharing of decision making power over the formal organizational
position inust be augmented by the sharing of decision making functions over a
virtual networking node. In other words, C3 system is built by a virtual functional
system under the main frame of the formal organizational architecture.
The C3 functional transformation system is divided into three subsystems
which will perform the C3 process. The functions of these subsystems are identical
to information management, decision management, and executive management
functions of Thornton's conceptual architecture of the C2 process. The input to the
observation subsystem is the data from the sensor, and the output is the situation
assessment. The data will be processed through various steps such as aggregation,
filtration, correlation, analysis, and dissemination. This assessment is then
transformed to a decision through the decision subsystem which develops a course of
action, estimates the enemy's response, and evaluates the course of action with
comparison. Finally, this decision will be transformed into implementation form
such as fire distribution in execution subsystem through the steps of development of
plan, preparation of directives and reports, and issuance of plans, orders, and
reports.[Ref. 25:p. 141J
1. Information and Control Applications Model
The implemented form of the conceptual architecture is the applications
information system. The applications model of information system determines the
system capability to support the battle managers including both commanders and
staffs. Current research for modeling of C3 functional system intends to develop C2
process -model, command and headquarters model, combat and conflict models,
surveillance and fusion models, communications model, EW and counter-C 3
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models, and information and control model. The typical elements of C3 functional
models are shown in Table 3.1 [Ref. 44:p. 291
For the C2 process model, general C3 paradigms are discussed in
Chapter 1I. Sample dynamic theory has been approached by many researchers. The
representative dynamic models are: [Ref. 44:p. 32J
Classical state variable models
- Thermodynamic (Lawson)
- Markov models (rubin, Mayk)
Statistical mechanics models (lngber)
Possibilistic models (Zadeh, Goodman)
Catastrophe and chaos (Dockery, Woodcock)
Adaptive control (Strack)
Table 3.1 C3 Functional Models
FUNCTIONAL MODELS TYPICAL ELEMENTS
PROCESS MODELS SYSTEM DYNAMICS
COMMAND AND HEADQUARTERS MODEL DECISION-MAKING MODEL, STAFF ELEMENTS,
DATA FUSION
COMBAT AND CONFLICT MODEL PHYSICAL RED-BLUE ENGAGEMENT MODEL
SURVEILLANCE AND FUSION MODEL CLASSICAL RADAR. IR. SONAR. PHOTO
(BOTH FIXED, MOVING). INTERN rING,
PRELIMINARY FUSION. (RED, BLUE.
ENVIRONMENT) STATUS REPORTING,
INTELLIGENCE, I&W, WEATHER FORECASTING
COMMUNICATIONS MODEL CAPACITY. CONNECTIVITY. SIN. ERROR
RATE. SECURITY, AJ CAPABILITY
EW AND COUNTER-C1 MODEL DECEPTION.DESTRUCTION, JAMMING
EXPLOITATION
INFORMATION AND CONTROL MODEL TOPOLOGY. PROCESSING AT VARIOUS NODES.
DATA BASE DISTRIBUTION & MANAGEMENT,
CONSTRUCTION & DISSEMINATION OF TASKING
ORDERS. EAMS
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At their present stage of development it is premature to attempt a
comparative analysis of the value of these various models. To make these or other
dynamic models useful, three steps are important: [Ref. 44:p. 33]
Model a reasonably realistic scenario,
Correlate the results with a simulation, test bed, or actual experience
and understand the differences between the results,
Explain the lessons learned and the significance of the conclusions in
terminology that is familiar to a commander.
Command theory is the first functional area of interest. For command
and headquarters model, some of the representative elements of a command theory
are: [Ref. 44:p. 33]
What decisions are going to be made at each level in the hierarchy?
What constraints are there on the commanders option?
Who does the decision-maker have to interact with?
What information is required to make each decision?
What is the decisions time line?
How timely, accurate and complete must the input information be?
How should the information be presented to the commander?
What decision aids are needed?
Human behavior in a stressed environment.
On the other hand, the elements of headquarters theory consists of
Information flow patterns,
Intra-nodal processing, communications and displays,
Physical topology of headquarters function (distributed, dispersed,
centralized),
Data base structure and maintenance,
Decision aids, the use of artificial intelligence,
Survivability of headquarters function.
The headquarters functions are those processes needed to support the
commander. Some representative command and headquarters models are: [Ref.
44:pp. 33-34]
80
Headquarters effectiveness assessment tool (HEAT)
Data flow and decision making structure (Petri nets)
Models of decision makers
Resource allocation
HEAT treats the C2 process as an information management system and attempts to
measure effectiveness in terms of military mission accomplishment. An application
of Petri nets will be discussed in the next chapter.
The next category of models is the combat and conflict models. The
representative models are: [Ref. 44:p. 341
Lanchester-type equations (deterministic differential equations)
Stochastic combat models (Markov processes), and
game theory.
Communications theory is perhaps the most advanced of the various
functional areas. The representative elements of communications theory consists of
User requirements (connectivity, quality, capacity, survivability,
environment)










Communications is an area in which the C3 research community has nad a major
impact on procurement of DOD systems. As an example, the ARPAnet significantly
influenced current DOD communications networks.
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For surveillance and fusion theory, the representative elements consists
of: [Ref. 44:p. 35]
Volumes of responsibility and interest
Generic properties of sensors (e.g., detection, resolution, tracking,
capacity, processing capabilities)
Tasking procedures (e.g., responsibilities, timeliness)
Information flow from non-organic sensors
Topology of sensor information flow and fusion
A simple definition of the commander's volume of interest is that space around the
commander where actions could have a "real-time" or "near-term" impact on
mission accomplishment. Napoleon's volume of interest was probably a circle with a
radius of about 100miles. The JCS volume of interest consists of the entire globe.
Sensors have continually tried to keep up with this volume of interest in order to
reduce the uncertainty about the enemy's intention. This will be discussed in the
next chapter in detail.
In terms of command and control, however, these different applications
models by different people lack the relationship with the real world. The EW model
presented ESM, ECM, and ECCM technologies, but it is still a weapon-oriented
system. The essentials of a command and control system are the interaction between
or among the people resource and information resource, the response to the enemy
commander's potential intentions, and control the forces toward the desired state.
So the first mission in command and control studies is to catch the human's
intention. But the human intentions will be presented ad hoc by his actions.
However, processing the information which is accumulated by observing the
pre--actions or diagnosis until the threat takes place, commanders can expect what
is happening and what must be done for that. Then he can control his forces based
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on this expectation utilizing those applications model above. Thus the key of the
models are the information and control model. The elements of information and
control model will be
the uncertainty parameter of battlefield information
the quality of decisions in response of the information
the time constraint of control system executing the decisions.
Thus for the information and control system model, the key applications models
must be focused on the information base generation model, individual and
organizational (or group) decision making model over the chain of command and
decision support system corresponding to this modei. and the operational (or
tactical) control model of the forces in different time and space dimension.
2. Computer-Based Information System
In information system, there are five major types: transaction processing
system (TPS), office automation system (OAS), management information system
(MIS), decision support system (DSS), and executive support system (ESS) [Ref.
28:pp. 33-36].
A TPS is a computerized system that performs and records the daily
routine transaction necessary to the conduct of the business. TPS serve the
operational level of the organization when tasks, resources, and goals at the
operational level are predefined and highly structured. The decision has been
programmed. TPS are major producers of information for other systems and
span the boundary between the organization and its environment.
OAS are computerized devices and systems devoted to document and
message processing. Included are word processing, document storage, graphics,
reproduction, facsimile transmission, and electronic mail system. OAS support
both clerical and managerial functions, spanning the operational and
management level.
MIS provide managers with reports and, in some cases, on-line access to
the organization's current performance and historical records. MIS primarily
serve the functions of planning, controlling, and decision making at the
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management level. Generally they condense information obtained from TPS
and present it to management in the form of routine summary and exception
reports. MIS have highly limited analytical capabilities; they simply use
models to present data. Typically, they are oriented almost exclusively to
internal, not environmental or external, events.
DSS are devoted to supporting management decisions that are
semistructured, unique or rapidly changing, and not easily specified far in
advance. DSS have more advanced analytical capabilities that permit the user
.o employ several different models to analyze information. These systems draw
internal information from TPS and MIS, and they often bring in information
from external sources. DSS tend to be more interactive, proving users with
easy access to data and analytical models through user-friendly computer
instructions. An example is a ship tracking system that calculates the ship's
optimal speed and direction based on current weather, availability of port
facilities, and current location.
ESS are a new category of systems that support decision making by
senior management. They serve the strategic level of the organization. ESS
address unstructured decisions and involve a generalized computing and
communicatiors environment rather than any fixed application or specific
capability. ESS are oriented toward external events, although they draw
summarized information from internal MIS and DSS. ESS represent less a
solution to a specific question than a generalized computing and
telecommunications capacity that can be applied to many situations.
Compared to DSS, ESS tend to make less use of analytical models; instead,
$hey deliver information to managers on a demand and highly interactive basis
in a more open-ended manner.
The roles played by each of the major types of information systems in
the organization are shown in Figure 3.8 [Ref. 2 8:p. 37].
The information system uses the information base as the basic resource
of processing. The information base has three types: database, model base. and
knowledge base. A database is a set of data organized to serve many applications
efficiently by centralizing the data and minimizing redundant data [Ref. 28:p. 242].
The database is the elementary source of information processing. DSS provide
models as well as data as a basis for discussing and deciding semistructured and
unstructured problems [Ref. 28:p. 495]. The model base has strategic models,
tactical models, operational models, and analytic routines [Ref. 28:p. 497, quoted
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from Sprague and Carlson, 1982]. The knowledge base have two types of base: rule
base and frame base. Rule base is a collection of statements in the form "If x then
y," where x represents a condition and y an action. Rule base is used for expert
system which is one of application system (rule based expert system). The other
type of expert system is a frame based expert system. The frame is a collection of
knowledge that describe related concepts by listing each concept's features and
showing the relationships to other concepts [Ref. 28:p. 545].
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Figure 3.8 Types of Information Processing System
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The information base must b+- built to support interoperability between
various decision makings. Thus the information base must have a standardized data
structure. For multi-users and multi-services, open system model of organization
presented the OSI seven layers for the networking. So that information base must be
compatible in other networks as well, an output of one information system must be
acceptable as the input of other system. Then the application decision model base
must be developed in a consistent way.
In C3 information systems, commanders will make decisions analyzing
information using DSS or decisions will be made partially by expert system or
artificial intelligence system following a set of rules or procedures which is the part
of knowledge base. The knowledge base of a C' system is the entirety of the
knowledge, information, or data held in some form in tf'.e system's memory, ue it
maps, books, computer memory, documents, human memory, o. switch positions.
The assigned mission, rules of engagement, and tables of assigned frequencies are
part of knowledge base. [Ref. 45:p. 21
Data refers to physical observations or measurements of the real world,
including such things as charts and histories [Ref. 45:p. 2]. Data is obtained by
sensors when events occur externally out of organization and actions are taken
internally by individual groups in an organization. This data is processed in
observation subsystem. Database in observation subsystem must be developed
accessible by other subsystems as well because it is the lately updated information.
Decisions are made when a event requires a response to it. Whether to
take a action or not is dependent on the conditions which are the relationships
among data elements, and rules which are the basis for many of the decisions that
the system makes. In other words, the decisions in decision subsystem is highly
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event driven. A event in the battlefield is sensed by different levels of organization
at the same time or at least disseminated over the chain of command for t te
response. Thus the decision making model in decision subsystem must be in
distributed network. And the authority and responsibility for the decision making
must be shared over the chain of command. It is the distributed decision making
system. So the decision support system must support multi-users and
multi-services. The process of decision making is that a system selects a model from
a model base appropriate for a specific decision, then invokes data from database
involved in the decision, finally make a decision based on knowledge. If the
knowledge is invoked from knowledge base of computer storage the information
system is a stand alone computerized decision making system such as expert system
or Al. If the knowledge is inserted by the input of human decision maker through
the I/O processes over the information analysis, it will be the decision support
system in assistance of decision makers.
3. Transformation Function of Distributed C3 System
The basic decision making process is represented as consisting of two
distinct parts; the evaluation of the current state of the decision maker's
environment (situation evaluation), and the selection of responses to minimize the
divergence between the observed and goal states (response allocation) [Ref. 46:p.
65]. The first is an information decision and the last is an operational decision. The
implication of these decision by decision making system is to transform the situation
evaluation into response implementation.
Assuming that the command system is the means for achieving an
organization's objectives using assigned effectors and sensor resources to interact
with the physical environment, Galley simplified the system as three processes:
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perception, command, control process, and signal flows. Figure 3. 9 shows the
overall command system [Ref. 47:p. 70, 77].
perception process- system feedback path
command process - system feed forward path
control process - system feed forward path
signal flow of
objectives - goals to be obtained and penalties to be avoided;
raw sensory data - sensor resource's response to physical sensation;
perception - an intelligible view of the world;
method -demanded resource activities, i.e., a required course of
action;
resource manipulation - orders given to the resources to be
translated into physical acts performed on the outside world or
other resources.
The role of the perception process is to construct an intelligible view of
the world. This entails interpreting and integrating the whole spectrum of
sensory data ranging from sonar echoes to political speeches [Ref. 47:pp.
70-711.
The idealized command process must transform objectives and
perception of the world into a course of action which will achieve these
objectives. Mission planning and mission effectiveness monitoring are two
operations mode of command corresponding to the preparatory and execution
phase of mission [Ref. 47:p. 71].
The idealized control process must transform the required course of
cation, together with a perception of the world, into resource manipulation
orders such that actual resource activity complies with the required resource
activity. The control process operates in two modes corresponding to the
preparatory and execution phases of resource manipulation: resource order
generation and compilance monitoring [Ref. 47:p. 71].
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Figure 3.9 The Overall Command System
In general, command systems consists of a distributed, hierarchical
organization of cells, possibly performing a mixture of both command and control,
and with all but the lowest level of cells generating objectives for their subordinates.
In general, command cells at intermediate levels within a command chain receive
and produce hybrid tasking. They are presented with plans comprising a mixture of
high level objectives plus some method, which will be transformed into lower level
plans (lower level objectives plus much method). [Ref. 4 7 :p. 73]
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Hybrid tasking has two major implications. One is hybrid incoming
command messages which must be analyzed to discriminate between the different
kinds of message statements (objective and method) so that they can be handled
appropriately. The other is hybrid outgoing messages which imply an ability to
decompose a high level objective into a set of intermediate objectives. [Ref. 47:p. 73]
Command systems consists of hierarchical networks of decision makers
which provide commanders with the means of controlling and directing the
execution of complex tasks; this is achieved by partitioning the tasks into set of
similar tasks for serial or parallel execution by parts of the command system [Ref.
46:p. 65]. Because there is a limit to the size of command task which can be
performed by a single command process, it is preferable to devolve some
responsibilities, together with authority over some force resources, to subordinate
commanders.
Command chains within a distributed command system can be
represented by the interconnection of separate C-processes. Each C-process will
have a declared responsibility within this structure. A example chain of command is
shown in Figure 3.10 [Ref. 47 :p. 79].
The high level commander C0 has created two subordinate command
posts, C1 and C2, and assigned to them a number of controllers (C'11,...C'22)
and resources (R1 1 ,...R 2 2 ). The high level commander CO responds to the
assigned tasks A...Z by producing a high level plan (P 0 ) which in general, will
involve the participation of both groups 1 and 2. The specific task for each
group, within the context of the overall plan P0' will be defined by objectives
1 and 2 (01, 02). The subordinate commanders C1 and C2 must in turn
produce lower level plans (Pill P 12 and P 2 1, P 2 2 ) aimed at fulfilling their
respective objectives. Each lower level plan will be assigned to a controller
responsible for implementation of that plan. [Ref. 47:p. 75J
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The purpose of co-ordination (C3 ) is to ensure co-operation between
c,-existing command and control processes in other that the force accomplish
its total task with the minimum of internal conflict. Considering the role of
C3, the C-process is tasked, via objective 03, with co-ordinating aspects of
the activities of group 1 and group 2. The plans for C1 and C2 (Pill P 12 , and
P 2 1, P 2 2 ) are copied to C3 and incorporated in C3 's world model which can
then predict the combined outcome of these plans. This prediction will be
monitored. When prediction of undesirable situation is detected, the
co-ordination process may be expected to submit proposals for solving the
problem. The procedure for generating such proposals is identical to that for
command. If however, the proposal is rejected by C1 or C2, then C3 must
issue warning (W3 ) of the impending problem and refer to a higher authority
for resolution. There exist many forms of co-ordination, some being resource
oriented, others being objective oriented. [Ref. 47:p. 75]
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Figure 31.10 Distributed Command Organization: An Example
91
Summarizing Galley's discussion, transformation of command and
control processes can be mainly the task allocation to the subordinate command
posts, and resource allocation within a command post corresponding to the task, and
coordination, while the perception process assess the situation by processing the raw
data and provide information to command and control process.
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IV. APPROACHES TO C3 I SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
A. SYSTEM CONTEXT ANALYSIS
1. RIle of Time in C
2
In a typical discussion of "command and control", it is taken as
axiomatic that the information presented to the commander must be "timely" as
well as accurate, complete, etc. During the battle, the commander has a deadline to
accomplish a task by, and some required time to perform that task. There must be a
balance between the time demand and time supply. Col. Savkin represented this
relationships using a mathematical formula [Ref. 48:pp. 183-184]. He used the
critical time Tc for the deadline, T0 for the operations time required to perform an
order of task, and Tcon for the cyclic time to be spent to command and control the
task. Then the sum of T0 plus Tcon must be less than Tc* Based on this concept,
C3 systi, i must meet the next equation state:
Tcon < Tc -To
If this inequality is fulfilled, then it can be boldy stated that control is being
accomplished efficiently, otherwise one must try to decrease T0 or Tcon up to the
required level.
The measurement of time Tc, T0 , and Tcon can be estimated by
analyzing the threat, the capability of subordinate operational units, and the
existing C3 system. When a event occurs, the C3 observation subsystem will
estimate the time sensitivity of the threat. For example, assume the threat is
93
identified as a fighter, then the critical time available to respond to this threat is
limited to a couple of minutes. Now, the commander has to make a decision about
the types of his response. Assume he decided to use a missile to solve the problem.
Then, according to the characteristics and performance of the missile, the missile
needs some period of operations time from tracking to destroying the target. It will
take a couple of minutes, too. Both Tc and T0 are determined. Now, if the
commander has the fire button to control his missile launcher on hand, the control
time to perform a fire direction is Zero. But, the normal military organization has
some level of chain of command to control its assigned forces. So, the control time
Tcon will be affected by its organization structure. In this example, the commander
already used his time for decision maeing to select a response type of missile rather
than a friendly fighter. The total Tcon is the sum of decision time and
communication time through chain of command. This is well represented by
Schutzer's work: C Theory and Measures of Effectiveness [Ref. 49:pp. 139-141]. He
used tcs as Tcon , ta as T o, and tp as Tc* The tcs is the control system time that is
the time from the event to which the orders are received by the forces in a tactical
operational level. A good C3 system will reduce this command and control time
more than a poor system does. The ta is the time between response initiated and
response implemented at tactical level (tm) plus the time that the response is
executed (tr). The tp is the time from a event occurs to the response preempted.
The ta and tp are determined by the near-uncontrollable factors. If the commander
has preplanned well, of course, his forces will be prepositioned, and the time
required to move his maneuvering forces or to fire his firing assets will be reduced.
But. the threat and missions are ad hoc faced or assigned on the commander. Then
the command and control time must be adjusted properly to give enough time to his
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operational level forces. A complete C3 system will perform a full C2 process during
the problem solving phases. And each steps take a time. So the total tcs will be the
sum of time that is spent in each steps of C2 process. The sequence of theses events
and time intervals between them is shown in Figure 4.1: Savkin's Command and
Control Time Line. Total prior time to take actions will be
tcs = td + twc+ tcd+ tcc
where:
tcs = total system control time up to a response initiated
td = the event detection time
twc = the warning communications time
tcd = the command decision time
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Figure 4.1 Command and Control Time Line
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An event, at time To , initiates the situation. When the commander has
recognized the situation, formulated a response, and his forces have received their
direction, the response will be implemented at a time TR. If TR comes before Tp,
the response is successful or at least appropriate. If TR is later than Tp, because the
higher level commander uses too much time for decision and command, the response
has been preempted and will fail or be inappropriate. In the dynamic battle
situation, there are more than one cycles of C2 process. The hightr level command
structure has a deep chain of command, and the operational level command
structure has a single cycle of C2 process. Let's call this the depth of the chain of
command. Then the total time to respond to a threat in N-level chain of command
will be represented by Figure 4.2.
From the Figure 4.2, the total mission accomplishment time (C2 time
plus weapon system operation time) to respond against a event is
T = [To(i) + Td(i)I + Te(1)i=l
where:
T is the total response time
T0 (i) is the observation time in the ith level command
Td(i) is the decision time in the ith level command
Te(i) is the execution time in the ith level command
Te(1) is the weapon system operation time at the tactical bottom level.
Based on the internal functions of each C3 subsystem described in
Chapter II, those To, Td, and Te in each subsystem will be subdivided in detail. If
the processing time in the detailed steps of each subsystem is reduced and the depth
93
er chain of commad is reduced, the operational level commander Call Iiav, t 1we
time to implement and execute the response. The former depends oti the t eclmiology
of computer, communications, and human operators of the information system. On
the other hand, the later one depends on the structure of the force orgaization and
commander's problem solving way. The first one is called the system enmiineering
approach and the other one is called the organizational approach.
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Figure 4.2 Time Allocation in Multi-Level C2 process
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2. Uncertainty in C
2
The purpose of collecting information and intelligence data is to reduce
the uncertainty in decision making. While the uncertainty is reduced by a good
intelligence data, the intellig-,ce data itself will contain uncertainties. Also
uncertainty is added in the processes of information collection, analysis, and
distribution. So it is unlikely that uncertainty can ever be removed completely from
decision making, even when voluminous data are collected. [Ref. 50:pp. 10-11]
Generally, the more data a system has, however, the more value of information it
has. And the more a system has time to process, the more the system has the input
data and the value of information. Figure 4.3 describes this phenomena.
In Chapter II, the uncertainty was defined as the difference between the
required infornuttion to perform a task and the available information at a given
time. In terms of the task of the decision maker, the degree of uncertainty at a given
time must be acceptable. This value of degree will be represented by its
probabilities. Lindley described the procedure ef coherent decision making with the
following statement [Ref. 50:p. 14]:
"... there is essentially only one way to reach a decision sensibly. First, the
uncertainties present in the situation must be quantified in terms of values
called probabilities. Second, the various consequences of the courses of action
must be similarly described in terms of utilities. Thirdly, that decision must
be taken which is expected-on the basis of the calculated probabilities-to give
the greatest utility."
Lindley states that uncertainty about situation must be quantified with a value of
probabilities and course of actions must be quantified with the value of utility. Then
the decision making will follow the utility function with the input of probability of
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In the military situation, commanders will ask "location of the object,
the size of the object, the speed of the object, and the intention of the opposing
force, etc.". But, the answer will be limited to the boundary of the real location, the
real size, the real speed, and the real intention. In other words, the available
information has an amount of deviation or fraction around the real factors. In
decision making, some amount of deviation or fractions are allowed based on the
significance of the decision's outcome. So, if the deviation between the required
information and available information can be measured by the normal statistical
methods, uncertainty can be represented in a quantitative manner.
However, information has two attributes. One is that it describes
something. The other is that the description has degrees of accuracy. The
descriptive attribute will be used to measure the utility and the degrees of accuracy
will be used to measure the risk while making a decision. For example, assume that
a decision about the target allocation requires information such as the expected
number of targets in his responsibility area and its probability. Then the answer will
have such a form that the number is X + AX with Y percentage accuracy. Here, the
number (X+ AX) will be used to develop the course of actions, the value Y, its
probability, will confirm the utility functions of the course of actions. The value AX
is the deviation between the required information and the available information, and
the value Y becomes the probability of information accuracy. The definition of
uncertainty is the difference between the required information and the available
information. Then, the value of uncertainty about one object will be measured by its
description deviation and the gap of probabilities between the required accuracy and
available accuracy.
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The effects of both types of uncertainty in decision making will be
divided into two sub types. One is that the significance of information, that is, the
probability of accuracy is preset by the policy or decision criteria according to the
types of decision maker: risk taker or risk avoider. For example, in the case of
missile control, the significance must be close to 100 percentage, and the infantry
unit control may require less significance. Once the significance is set, the available
information will describe the object with some deviation and its probability. Then
according to the balance between the deviation in its description and probability
between the required and available information, the uncertainty will be used to
develop course of actions. The other is that the deviation of description is )reset.
For example, the location of target will be described by the circle with the radius
300m centering a point. Based on the effect range of the fires, the radius is limited
to 300m or 30m. Once the required deviation is set up, the available information
confirms the accuracy, and is used to measure the risk.
Let the mathematical form of uncertainty be the 1 by 2 matrix of
deviation and probability, then the uncertainty will be represented such as:
Uncertainty = (Xu, Yu)
where:
Xu = P(required information)- P(available information)
Yu -- Deviation of description of available information
The utility function, of course, must be formulized properly to be applied
to the unique military situation, that is, the dynamic situation (or stochastic
model). Also, the utility function will be determined by the various types of decision
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and the causes of the uncertainty case by case. So a good utility function highly
depends on the study of operations research about military decision making model.
The significant influence of uncertainty through C3 system architecture
is placed in the requirements of uncertainty in the structure of hierarchlical,
distributed C3 information network. If the information is examined by timing, and
precision needs of different levels in the C3 hierarchy, then it is apparent that the
lower levels require timely and precise detailed information, while the higher levels
require the less detailed overall picture that evolves in a slower time scale. Figure
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As shown in Figure 4.4, the lower the level of command is. the higher the
density of the information is, and the higher the level of command is, the more the
diversity of the information is. It is because each level of organization makes
different types of decisions, and carries out different missions. And these decisions
are related to its threat and the expected response types against the threat. So the
required information will be represented by the information demand function:
I ( i )  = f(threat or mission)
D
= g(decision type or response type)
= [Xd, Yd, Zd]
where:
Xd = degree of description of required information
Yd = degree of accuracy of required information
Zd = diversity of required information
In the equation above, i is the ith level of command. In the real world,
however, it is impossible to measure the total uncertainty about all activities in an
organization. Fortunately, it is not necessary to measure the total nncertaility.
because the uncertainty is used in making a decision about an action among the
various activities within an organization. So the term i is equivalent to ith type of
decision.
On the other hand, in order to meet this pattern of requirements at each
level, different levels of command will require different types and number of sensors
and its functions. The density and diversity of information supplied to the decision
making system at ith command level in N levels command structure will be
represented by the information production function Is
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(i)I S  f(i) (T, N, P)+g[ n I(j ) ]  (hilij)
j=i+l j=1
=[Xs' Ys) Z s]
where:
1(i) is the information available in the ith level of command
T is the Types of sensor
N is the Number of sensors
P is the Performance of intelligence analysis function
Xs = the degree of description of available information
Ys = the degree of accuracy of available information
Zs = the diversity of available information
f - information production function within the ith level
g = information support function from the higher level
h = information support function from the lower level
The affect of variable T, N, and P to the information production
function is shown in Figure 4.5.
Information from the (i+l)th level command will determine the
boundary of information of the ith level command that makes the diversity of
information narrower, and support an amount of density. Then, its own information
processing system in ith level command will provide more information and reduce
the uncertainty. S, the f-function represents the capability of the intelligence
analysis in a C3 system.
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Figure 4.5 The Variables of Information Production Function
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Given the generi.l pattern of spatial and temporal certainty requirements
in different levels of command, the most appropriate data distribution structure
could be determined. Existing distributed command and control systems are usually
structured on a tree principle that is orderly and easily controllable, both in the
upward reporting and in the downward dissemination of orders. But, there is doubt
whether that structure is well suited to information exchange.
An extended structure with cross-links at the intermediate levels or a
virtual network through overall structure could be considered in C3 system
networking design. The g-function depends on the structure of C3 information
system network from the top level command to the ith level command, and
h-function depends on the structure of C3 information system network from the ith
level command to the bottom level command.
Uncertainty is used in decision making stages case by case. So, the
uncertainty must be represented in terms of both the decision type and the level of
organizations. The attribute of uncertainty related to this decision type and its
organizational level will be represented by its diversity. Kinds of the required
information increase as the complexity of decision increase. Also, the kinds of
information decrease as the mission is transferred down to the weapon control level.
The kinds of information will be represented by its diversity. The probability of
uncertainty in the ith decision type in the Jth organization would be formulized with
its deviation and density of all individual diversities between those of demand and
and supply.
S k f[Xu(k), Yu(k), Zu(k )
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where:
m is the total number of diversity in ith decision type
xu (k) = the deviation of description in kth diversity information
Yu(k) = the difference of probabilities in kth diversity information
Zu(k) = the kth diversity in the ith decision type in Jth organization
In the equation above, the role of C3 system can be interpreted in terms of
uncertainty such that, when the commander makes a decision, the C3 system must
have the capability of filtering information narrowed down to a specific focused area
to the level of certainty corresponding to the ith decision type. And, the C3 system
must be organized to correlate information effectively from the various sources for
the diversity of certainty to some acceptable level corresponding to the ith
organization level.
3. Quality of C3 System Product
The role of time and uncertainty in a battlefield is discussed as
constraints for C3 system development. One product out of C3 system operations is
decision. In turn, it is converted into missions of the subordinate units. As discussed
in the previous section, the decisions are carried out by individual commanders at
different levels of the command hierarchy. The quality of the decisions made by an
individual commander depend on the following key factors: [Ref. 17:pp. 23-24]
The planning horizon time;
The nature, quality, and especially timeliness of the available
information (this can be grea',ly influenced by a superior C3 system);
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The complexity of the tactical situation vs. the time available to arrive
at a satisfactory decision (computer decision aide for the commander call
help him to either arrive at better decisions within a given time limit
and/or complete his decision sooner).
The rules of engagement (these act as constraints upon the commander's
decision process);
The goals and objectives assigned to him by superior commanders at the
strategic planning phase;
The commander's available resources (these again act as constraints to
his decisions);
Focusing these factors about decisions, the decision process can be a
resource allocation process using the available information following the battle
doctrines under the time constraint. On the other hand, the word "control" in C3
systems refers to the function that indeed the preplanned courses of action are more
or less being accomplished in a tactical situation. To correct the undesirable
deviations, real time decisions are required to control in real time the available
resources [Ref. 17 ;p. 23]. In other words, the control function is tw reallocate the
resources based on the real time information upgraded since the initial
implementation of the preplanned courses of action. Real time information requires
the real time surveillance and real time communications. Thus the quality of a C3
system used by individual commanders at each level of command depends basically
on the real time surveillance system and communications system used for the
resource allocation and resource control. But the global C3 system must includes all
organizations from the decision making level to decision implementation level. Then
the quality of overall C3 system depends on
the organization of resources for a certain decision (grouping part of force
organization),
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The organization of authority to be allowed to use the resources (command
structure),
the social communications network among humans and positions (control
mechanism)
the virtual network and real time performance of information system
(intelligence capability),
the technical communications network and its real time capability for the
effective force control and information exchange (communications link)
the decision-oriented applications process (transformation utility).
B. PRINCIPLES OF APPROACH
1. Time-Uncertainty Distribution in C2 Process
Chapter III stated that the time is distributed through the C2 process in
multi-levels of the chain of conmand from T0 to Tp, and the uncertainty
requirements have different patterns in different levels of command which is
represented by both density and diversity of information. Also, as time flows, the
value of information increases. So, along the time line, the uncertainty has a
decreasing form while observation subsystem is in operation. However, during the
decision time, even while the uncertainty is still being reduced, the commander will
make a decision using the constant uncertainty as the same level of the observation
system. Thus the level of uncertainty will stay on constant value temporally. In the
next step of C2 process, this uncertainty will be narrowed down and a higher
density in turn through the information processing system in its level. Figure 4.6 is
depicted to describe this Time-Uncertainty productivity in a C2 process in a
dynamic battlefield.
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Each level of a force organization has its own uncertainty requirements
pattern of density and diversity, and cormnand and control time requirements of a
control system. And the requirements depend highly on the type of decision of the
organization against the threat. The decisions that are related to the infantry unit
in ground forces has less time sensitivity than that of the Air Forces. The decisions
of higher level command require wider diversity of information than that of the
lower level command, while decisions related to a missile control mission require the
more density of certainty about the target than that of the ground firing weapons.
So there must be a distribution rate of time and uncertainty corresponding to each
type of decision and its follow on missions.
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Figure 4.6 Time-Uncertainty Plot in C2 Process
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Assume the commander in an unified command is faced wit! an
unrecognized flight object in his area of responsibility. In order to solve this
problem, the commander has to make an informational decision of the identification
of the object, the organizational decision of task force formation, and operational
decision of course of action, etc. Then, each C3 subsystem must operate in cycles to
make decisions and control the stages. Here, the time through the C3 process froin
the sensor to the unified commander, from the the unified commander to Ground
Forces Long Range Missile or Air Force Fighter Group must be short. Then the
time distribution rate to the intermediate command between the top level comniand
and operational firing stations must be close to zero. This rate is determinend by he
weight of the effect of each subsystem in each level of command. The sa,,, (on(e)
is presented in Lawson's work: The Role of Timt it Comwaiid anHd Control .5 ,/ft Ii
[Ref. 52:p. 9]. In his work, time T is defined as the weighted average of the response
times to several different stimuli, i.e.,
n n
T= E T.W. and W. =i=l 1 i~l
where:
Ti = the response to the ith stimulus type
W i  the weight of that stimulus in the total environmental set.
Adopting this in the response time in multi-level dynamic C- process,
each time to respond against an event must be:
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T(i): [T-Te (01 W(i)
e pm e
T(i): [T -T (I01 W(i)
TM1 = tm
Tp is the time length between the time that an event occurs and the respone is
preempted. The time length between the time that a response is initiated and the
response is implemented is designated tm
. 
Te (1) is the execution time in the weapo,
control level. So the time is the same as the weapon control time t I. Then the total
time to implement a respond (Tr) against a event will be:
Tr= [Tl - t] .W 1) +i[e - tm] .Wi) + t",
In some cases, if one intermediate level of command has the low weiht
rate in its observation function and decision function while carrying out the Inissionl.
the value of W and Wd will be zero, and the value of We will be close to zero.
Then the C3 system in this case must be organized with a kind of functional virtual
network, with the organization having a hierarchical tree chain of command. The
intermediate level of command will be used only as a link node to transmit orders.
directives, or tactical data. At the same time, the information processing rate must
be fast enough to cover the small amount of time available by the time weight rate.
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On the other hand, at the lowest level, the weapon controller is only
interested in the target or targets he has to engage, and he requires relevant
information to be accurate. This in turn implies that the tasks of radar/target
acquisition, correlation of local and remote tracks, and identification must also be
precise and quick. [Ref. 51:p. 130] The diversity of information would be almost a
few simple quantitative units such as the velocity, the location, the size, or the
identification of the object. Then the density of the individual diversity will be
calculated by its probability values.
Assume that the commander wants to know the exact location of flights
for resource allocation and higher probability when the available infornation
describes a big deviation in its location boundary and further a low probability. One
solution is to increase the number of sensors, or to improve the performance of the
information processing rate. But this solution must be preplanned prior to
engagement. The C3 system must be able to analyze the expected mission in
advance and support the commander in the planning stage.
The other solution is to wait until the observation subsystem provides
enough information. Is that possible? There is, however, a problem in military
decision making. When there is a conflict between a time constraint and required
information, how does the system optimally support decision making. For example,
assume that a task requires information with 95% of certainty, but, the C3 system
in a level produces information with 90% of certainty. Then, there is two
possibilities: to make a decision with some risk or wait a time until getting 5% more
of certainty breaking the time constraint. It depends on the commander. Both have
its advantages and disadvantages.
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But, if the lower level command has the capability to control this
uncertainty gap, that is, intelligence analysis capability to cover that, the higher
level commander can make a decision while meeting his time constraint. Also, if the
commander has a flexible span of control over his subordinate forces, he will make a
decision in a given time and make a judgment after dissemination of his decision
and control his forces with feedback mechanism. So, regardless of the decision
making model of the system, the good C3 system will solve this conflict. It does not
mean, of course, that a good decision making model leads to a good utility function,
and this utility function in turn drive a sound decision making.
2. Methodology to Improve C3 System
So far, it is recognized that the time-uncertainty requirement is the
basis for design of the C3 system in both its organizational structure and its
information system engineering. The design of a C3 system must be oriented by the
decision types in an organization. In other words, the decision type makes the time
-uncertainty distribution requirements equations. Then the requirements drive the
C3 organizational structure, and the C3 information processing rate and
architecture.
For example, at the lowest operational level, the data communications
structure must allow a rapid dissemination of tactical data, and the computer
processing capability must produce an individual utility function with a high
computing rate to reduce the uncertainty about a few individual quantitative
diversities. Also, the interaction procedure for coordination must be as simple as
possible to reduce the response time. In some cases, some intermediate level stages
in C3 subsystem will not be considered in the hierarchical chain of command, that is
a virtual network for information exchange or first decision and later judgment.
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The higher levels of command are concerned, less with individual targets
or tracks, and more with formations and raid sizes, directions and speeds of
approach. The type of certainty required here is certainty in interpreting the overall
track picture which depends rather less on the detailed accuracy than on its
completeness. The track accuracy and timeliness requirements are less stringent at
this level. [Ref. 51:p. 131] Thus, the communications system must have a large
volume of information traffic capacity, and the computer processing capability must
support the integrated utility functions for various situation assessment. Also, the
interaction groups must be well organized and operated for the better situation
assessment and unity of effort in mission control.
C. C3 ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH
In Chapter II, the relationships among the organization, information system,
and decision and control system was defined as such that an organization produces
the information, and decision system makes a decision using the capability of an
information system which processes the information, then the operational system
controls the organization toward to the objective following the decision. Thus the
primary functions of an organization are the information handling (information
exchange, information processing, etc.) and control of organization (either
objective-oriented or resource-oriented control).
1. Organize The Forcepower
Organizing the force consists of grouping the elementary units which are
dispersed geographically and building the network with communication links and
operations procedures. While grouping the forces, the level of organization and the
type of forces will be based on the expected mission. And the operations procedures
will follow the concepts of the effective information exchange and easy force control.
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Given a set of positions duly designed in terms of job specialization,
behavior formulization, training, and indoctrination, grouping means that, positions
are grouped into units, each under its own manager, and units clustered into ever
larger units under their own managers, until the whole organization comes under a
single manager-the chief executive officer at the strategic apex. Thus, a hierarchy of
authority is constructed through which flows the formal power to control decisions
and actions. That hierarchy is generally represented by an organizational chart.
[Ref. 39:p. 282]
Grouping units, two major questions arise in the design. First, on what
basis are positions and units grouped into larger units, and second, what size should
each of the units be?
Positions and units can be grouped on two fundamental bases. The first
is grouping by function such as by knowledge and skill, and by work process and
function. Here grouping is done by means, by the intermediate functions the
organization uses to produce or support the production of its final outputs. The
other is grouping by market such as by outputs, by client, and by place. In this
case, grouping is done by ends, by the features of the markets served by
organization-the products or services it market, the clients it serves, the places
where it serves them. [Ref. 39:p. 283]
The size of units is historically described in terms of the "span of
control". The classical literature says "no supervisor can supervise directly the work
of more than five or, at least , six subordinates whose work interlocks" [Ref. 39:p.
284, quoted from Urwick].
But, turning to an analysis of the coordinating mechanisms other than
direct supervision, the explanation of variation in the unit size has two clear
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relationships. First, the greater the use of standardization (of any kind) for
coordination, the larger the size of work unit. It stands to reason that the more
coordination within a unit can be achieved by standardization. The second
relationship is that the greater the need for mutual adjustment, the smaller must be
the size of work unit. [Ref. 39:pp. 284-286]
Tasks, loosely coupled, can rely on the standardization of skills for
coordination, and so it allows the professionals to work relatively autonomously in
large units. When tasks are rather complex yet tightly coupled, neither direct
supervision nor any form of standardization suffices to effect the necessary
coordination. The specialists who perform the various tasks must coordinate by
virtue of informal, face to face communication among themselves. [Ref. 39:p. 286] So
the social communications links among the positions and units may be different
from the structured links of organizational chart. The organizational chart may
show the shared power of authority and the division of labors or works.
Communication links, in turn, must be able to support the informal coordination
(information exchange) of labors as well as the direction and reports line over the
chain of command hierarchy which is the shared power of authority and
responsibility.
2. Design The Decision Making Organization
The issue of power structures is of interest in the design and evolution of
command and control structures. As defined by Jeffrey Pfeffer, the determinant of
power and influence in any organization include the following aspects [Ref. 38:p. 20,
quoted from Pfeffer, 1978]:
Formal authority - the delineation of decision responsibilities in a
rational, hierarchical sense.
Control over resources - the distribution of discretionary control over
critical and scarce resources.
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Information and access - the distribution of knowledge and awareness
which enables effective decision making.
Organizational design deals with the conscious distribution of these three
power mechanisms within a command and control organizations. But the
distribution of each type of power mechanisms must be balanced [Ref. 38:pp.
20-21]. In military organization, the information is handled by the staffs, and
merged to the commander who is the decision maker. The force control is
characterized by a centralized or decentralized control type. There is, however, a
conflict between the iiilitary control type, which is considered as the chain of
command, and the best information exchange path. The chain of command is a
hierarchical structure while the information exchange path is preferred to have a
virtual network.
One solution of this conflict is to build an optimal information exchange
path structure, and then transform this structure into the decision making
organization. The design of the information path structure must be decision
oriented. Then the chain of command in an organization will not be fixed such as
the hardware of a computer architecture, but flexible such as the firmware
corresponding to the characteristics of each decisions.
One approach to design the C2 organization (command and control
structure) is introduced by Andreadakis and Levis using the concept of Petri net
[Ref. 53]. In their work, the data flow structure is determined first and then the
decision making organization design is obtained by transform- on of the data flow
structure into a C2 organization.
The formulation of the design problem follows that, given a mission and
a set of tasks to be performed, design a C2 organization that is accurate, timely,
exhibits a task processing rate that is higher than the task arrival rate, and whose
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decision makers are not overloaded. The properties that characterize a decision
making organization such as accuracy, response time, task processing rate, and
workload, can be quantified by the corresponding measures of performance (MOPs).
[Ref. 53:pp. 1-2] The MOPs will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. But
the constraint that must be observed are that the decision makers are not
overloaded, i.e., the decision maker's information processing rate F be less than the
rationality threshold Fe:
F < Fe for every decision maker.
The design methodology has four phases (Figure 4.7): [Ref. 53:p. 21
Phase 1 - An algorithm for generating data flow structures produ~ces a
set of candidate designs, from which a few representative ones are
selected.
Phase 2 - The activity of the individual functions or processes, the
accuracy, the processing time, and the processing rate of each data flow
structures are computed.
Phase 3 - Each data flow structure is augmented and transformed into a
C2 organization in which the functions have been allocated to decision
makers and the communications protocols have been designed.
Phase 4 - The evaluation of the measures of performance of each C2
organization is performed and then the respective measures of

















Figure 4.7 Design Methodc!ogy Flowchart
The designs obtained in this matter are revised to increase their
measure of effectiveness by introducing decision aids, changing the function
allocation, or modifying the protocols. The introduction of the hardware and
its associated software (the command and control system), i.e., the
specifications for the required decision aids and data bases as well as for the
communica.ions links, transforms each decision making organization into the
corresponding command and control organization. Finally, a command and
control organization is selected from the candidate designs on the basis of the
greatest MOE value. [Ref. 53:p. 3]
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In order to generate the data flow structure, Andreadakis and Levis used
Petri net formalism. The processing stages are represented by transitions, whereas
the data or information that are input or output of the processing stages are
represented by places. The availability of data or information at specific places of
the Petri net is represented by the existence of tokens in the respective places. The
information processing includes the following five stages: [Ref. 53:p. 3]
Initial processing [IP] - This stage receives data from the sensors and
performs preliminary situation assessment.
Data fusion [DF] - This stage receives and combines (fuses) the results
of IP.
Middle processing [MP] - This stage follows the DF stage and performs
situation assessment.
Results fusion [RF] - This stage combines the results of several MP
stages.
Final processing [FP] - This stage operates on the outcome of the RF
stage and selects a response, i.e., it produces an output.
But there are various interactions between each stage, that is, some
information flow can skip certain stages, and followed by the next higher stage
directly. Thus there are three basic types of the permissible information flow line.
Figure 4.8 shows the three information flow types [Ref. 53:p. 3].
The combination of these basic information flow types will make
different kinds of data flow structures with different degree of complexity and
redundancy of data processing. One example is shown in Figure 4.9 [Ref. 53:p. 6]. So
the objectives of the second phase are to compute the total activity: an estimate of
the processing time of each function, the accuracy of the response, and an estimate
of the processing rate range of the data flow structure [Ref. 53:p. 4].
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Figure 4.8 Information Flow Types
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Assuming that each transition is assigned to a different decision maker
through a command and control time line, the processing time of each information
flow path is the sum of the processing times of the transitions that belong to the
path. The inverse of the maximum processing time is the minimum processing rate
of the data flow structure. If the task arrival rate is less than the minimum
processing rate, the C2 organization that will be designed from the data flow
structure is likely to satisfy the processing rate requirement. If the task arrival rate
is greater than the maximum processing rate, multiple processing channels, which
are copies of the basic data flow structure must be introduced, so that the arriving
tasks can be assigned to alternate channels of the C2 organization. [Ref. 53:p. 5]
The processing range obtained is, however, only an estimate of the range
of the decision making organization because information flow path using Petri net
does not take into account the delays along the communications links. For the
complete C2 organization, each candidate data flow structure must be augmented
involving the communication links and functions, and, in turn, the MOPs and
MOEs must be computed.
Function allocated to a decision maker must observe 3 requirements:
[Ref. 53:p. 5]
(a) They must be related through an input-output relationship, i.e., the
output of one function must be the input of the next function performed
by the decision maker so that each decision maker processes information
relevant to the same subtask;
(b) They must belong to different slices on the Petri net so that they observe
concurrency; and
(c) They must conform to the specialization of the respective decision
maker.
To meet the requirements, only functions that belong to the same information path
will be considered for allocation to a particular decision maker. When such a set of
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functions are allocated to a decision maker, a resource place is introduced that is an
output place of the last and an input of place to the first transition allocated to the
decision maker [Ref. 53:p. 51.
By computing the measure of performance such as accuracy, timeliness
and processing rate of the candidate decision making organization designs, and the
measure of effectiveness defined in the design strategy, if the result is not
satisfactory, the design must be modified for the increase of the result value. The
modification may include alternative function allocation, introduction of decision
aids and databases and revision of the communication protocols. [Ref. 53:p. 5]
Once a decision are made, it is followed by execution of the decision and
a control function. So the modification phase must consider the control mechanism
because the best information exchange path may be different from the control
network. The dynamic control function of C2 organization may interrupt the
processing stages by the random inputs to a particular nodes. Also a decision by one
C2 organization may be interrupted by the output of the other adjacent C2
organization. It is the coordination problem between multi-level decision making.
In this case, the control mechanism is more significant than the information path.
The technique to compensate for this friction is follows.
First, the significance of functions allocated to each decision maker will
be rated and counted in the phase of communication protocols definition and
capacity allocation.
Second, the resource-oriented decision making will prevent the relevant
decision.making similar to each others. The authority to use resources is limited to a
few decision makers, and the information base of each decision making nodes marks
the power of the resource control, then decision aids will check the authority.
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Third, in task-oriented decision making which is used in this design
methodology, decision-oriented information base will be used to reduce the delay
time caused by random control interrupt. The information base of each decision
making nodes will be generated and structured in support of problem solving related
to each decision type rather than problem reflection related to an event. If a
processing stage is interrupted by a random input, the decision maker can easily
switch his processing result to the other types corresponding to the order of control.
because the information base describes the current transition processes in each
stages.
For example, each newspaper reporter collects information from various
sources, then the columnist writes an article it. his interest area which is on the
significant issue of the day. Then a manager of an economic firm reviews all articles
related to this event through all articles which are related to this topic from the
past article to the current article. But these articles may appear in politics page as
wel! as economic page. It is not efficient to analyze and miake a decision for response
to this event. The manager will refer to the script that has been organized under a
expected decision. The script type information base is preferred to the newspaper
type information base.
D. APPROACH FOR C3 TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM
Once the forces are organized and decision making organization are designed,
these C2 organization will be enhanced by decision support systems applicable to
assist the decision makers or battle managers. To design the decision support
systems, the battle management application models are developed in advance. This
application model will be the products of combat models or command and control
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model by military analysts or operations researchers. Then software engineers and
knowledge engineers will implement the models into the real computer-based
decision support algorithm. Remembering the models of organization discussed in
Chapter III, a training system of battle managers is another area of command and
control system with the same significance rate as the decision support system. The
author will call the function of decision support system as C3 transformation system
excluding the training perspective of C3 system.
The C3 functional transformation system is divided into three subsystems
which will perform the C3 process. The functions of these subsystem is identical to
information management, decision management, and executive management
function of Thornton's conceptual architecture of the C2 process. The input to the
observation subsystem is the data from the sensor, and the output is the situation
assessment. The data will be processed through various steps such as aggregation,
filtration, correlation, analysis, and dissemination. This assessment is then
transformed to a decision through the decision subsystem which develops a course of
action, estimates the enemy's response, and evaluates the course of action with
comparison. Finally, this decision will be transformed into implementation form
such as fire distribution in execution subsystem through the steps of development of
plan, preparation of directives and reports, and issuance of plans, orders, and
reports.
1. State Equations of Battlefield
The design of C3 system must be decision-oriented, because the types of
decision makes the time uncertainty distribution through the C3 process. Then
there must be a study about what types of decisions are made in the battlefield and
how these types of decisions make the requirements of time and uncertainty. Once a
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general form of the answers to these questions are made, individual application
models can be developed naturally.
Chapter II states that the purpose of the C3 system is to transform the
state of the battlefield i-to the desired state. The time and uncertainty are the
constraints of this transformation function, and decision making in the battlefield is
nothing else but checking the variables and comparing and controlling them under
the constraints. Types of decisions will be determined by the combination of those
variables, then, the decision types will make the requirements of time-uncertainty
constraints automatically.
Now, what is the state variables of the battlefield in the dynamic battle
situation? To find these variables will be the key of developing the C3 system. Once
they are defined effectively, the dynamics of the battlefield situation could be
analyzed by operations research stochastic model methodology. Stochastic models
anal;-e the overall system with the microstate conditions. Then, what is the
steady-state equation of battlefield?
In the battlefield, C3 system observes the change of state, then
transform this into the desired state. The change of state will be observed by the
occurrences of events at a given time. Social scientists say that there is a symptom
before an event occurs. The symptom is represented by entropy theory. When a
event occurs, the entropy of the system is increasing. Adopting this theory, Lawson
used the thermodynamic entropy '2-,-ry. In his work: State Variab s of a Conmand
Control System, he used an "Ideal Gas" analogy to describe the state of the




Pm = military pressure
Vr = volume to be pressured or controlled
N = number of forces
T = tempo of operations
k = arbitrary constant
It is obvious that the "military pressure" or influence which can be brought to bear
is generally proportional to the number of forces involved. Similarly, if the tempo of
operations is increased, the military pressure is increased. On the other hand, with
fixed forces, if the volume within which they are to exert influence is increased, then
the military pressure at any particular point must of necessity decrease.
Lawson used this model in a surveillance system application. He derived
a relationship between the response time in decision making and the required
number of sensors when the value of uncertainty stay at a constant probability. It is
a great observation in command and control system analogy. However, the
interpretation of those variables are still in question. What does the variable k
mean, and how do you measure the tempo of operations, even what is the tempo of
operations?
Let's expand this equation in more detail. The usefulness of this equation
is that, if the enemy has the energy of (kNT), then the friendly forces has the
pressure of (PV), vice versa. So if we can observe the enemy's (kNT), then we can
measure the threat and develop a mission using the pressured energy (PV) in the
responsible area. The initial state of input to the C3 system is the enemy's (kNT)i
from the environment, then the state of output from the C3 system is friendly
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forces's (kNT)o into the environment. The internal transformation function of the
C3 system will analyze the (PV)i as the intermediate media, and derive the (PV)o,
then the control function of C3 system will control the (kNT)0 with a certain
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Figure 4.10 Application of State Equation
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Then, what is the proper way to interpret these variables for the best
application? Assume that standard military commanders follow the principles of
war, then the studies of principles of war will contribute to interpreting the
variables. Whether the thermodynamic theory can describe these principles depends
on the interpretation of the variables in the ideal gas analogy and the analysis of
those principles. The attributes of some principles are quantitative and those of
others are qualitative. But, most of the principles could be described by the
attributes of time of operations or events, location of objects on the time line,
direction, speed, weapon's destruction power, area of responsibility, or the number
of events in a given time, etc. For example, the principle of mass will be explained
by the quantitative manner such as the number of weapons or forces, the firing
directions of both weapons, the area of target, the hitting time to the target by the
various weapons. Even though the power is same, if the area of the target is wide,
then the mass decreases. Also, if the hitting velocity is small, then the mass will
decrease, too. That also means it loses surprise. Let's see one more principle. Unity
of command will be explained by the attributes of synchronization. Synchronization
has multi-dimensional vectors such as speed, location, and direction. If some efforts
are crossed together in its direction, it means that there are some conflicts in
controlling those forces, that is, asynchronized. On the other hand, if the speeds are
constant and the same on each, the initial position and the direction vector has the
same size in each unit, then it means that it is a synchronized operation. This can
be acceptable both by quantitative manner and conceptually.
Let's try to explain this example by the ideal gas analogy. Assume you
have a power group. Then, the group has its own internal power. This power is the
potential, steady-state energy. If this power is broken within the area of a critical
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sector, then the power affects the environment. Otherwise, even though it has a lot
of power, it can be disregarded. This points out that a power group will have
another attribute such as its total group movement. Let the formula "PV = kNT"
be the equation of steady-state of the battlefield, and let "F = ma" describe the
military operations as the same as the technology of mechanical. In this case, F is
interpreted as the threat, m is the power of steady-state, and a is the operational
movement or principles of war. If the steady-state power stays on a constant state,
that is, not on operations, it is not a threat. Now, let's rewrite the threat function
using Newton's Law.
Threat = (Potential Power of enemy) x (Operations of enemy)
where:
Potential Power = Effectiveness of a force x Number of forces
Operations = Integrated rate of states change
From this concept, the variables of ideal gas state in the right side of the equation,
will be determined clearly.
k = the effectiveness of a force or weapon
N = the number of forces or weapons
T = the integrated rate of group movement.
These terms in the right side of state equation will be used to analyze
the threat. If it is assumed that the accomplishment of missions in the battlefield is
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the fire distribution to the right place in the right time [Ref. 6:p. 58], T indicates
the changes of the subordinate assets in its location. This changes will be
represented by the initial location and the velocities of each individual objects, and
the rate of changes will be the frequency of changes in a given time unit. In ancient
times the frequency of the drum used to control the subordinate forces in the
battlefield was the commander's intentions telling the maneuvering speed. The
variable T will be the integrated function of frequency, velocity, and the initial
location.
T =i l fi) [Freq(i), Vel(i ) , L(i)]
Now, what about the terms (PV) in the left side of the equation? This
term is used to derive the missions measuring the pressure and volume to be
affected by the threat. The methodology to measure the variables P and V depends
on the analysis of the right side of equation. Assume that the information of a
variable k has the multiple-number of description attributes such that k( 1)
describes the range of fire, k(2), the affected area, and there is a fire after time At,
then the variable V after time At will be represented by the circle of k( 2 ). N
centering at the location after time At plus its movement path:
V= f VAtvel dt + k + (2 ).N (C)St 0 (11path () area
where C is the center of the circle at (Lo + Vel. At)
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The variable P in thermodynamic theory is the movement of the
particles. But, in the military situation, it can be considered as the massing of
troops [Ref. 52:p. 12]. A version of this concept quantified by Colonel Krawitz,
USAF in his development of the TALON war game introduced "military
momentum." This is the product of what he calls the "military mass" of an element
and its ability to move. The military mass in turn is a complicated function of the
entity's firepower (ability to hurt others) and its ability to absorb punishment. A
similar concept to Krawitz's military mass has been developed by Colonel T. N.
DuPuy, USA (Ret.) in which he uses historical data to derive "effectiveness values"
for various weapons and weapon systems and shows how they may be manipulated
to predict which side will be victorious in combat. Using this motion of military
momentum, another form of military pressure can be defined by the time rate of
change of momentum. [Ref. 52:p. 13] It is the frequency of momentum in the
equation above. But there are more than one frequency in the group movement
consisting of many partial events. Thus the military pressure will be the sum of the
frequencies. That is the "bandwidth" of momentum. The military pressure will
appear in the integrated form of the bandwidth and the entire firepower.
In many cases, however, the apparent state of the environment will not
change sufficiently to require a new "decision" until several events have been sensed,
processed, and entered into the comparison functions. It may require the
concatenation of several events to trigger the decision function to decide on a new or
changed objective which leads to the choice of a new course of action [Ref. 52:pp.
9-10]. Development of a course of action can utilize signal processing filtering
theory such as a high pass filter or a low pass filter for analyzing the threat and the
mission allocation. The course of action against the object with high frequency must
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have the ability to react for the frequent changes. For example, the course of action
for the operations of enemy's special forces must be specific compared to the others.
It can also utilize the utility theory in measuring the course of action with input of
the entire firepower. In the military battlefield it will be represented by the
effectiveness and number of the weapons or forces. So the variable P will be
represented by the function of
= f[ n nFreq(i) l
n
where the term E Freq is the bandwidth of Tempo and the term k*n is thei=1 (i)
firepower. If the velocity variable is added to this function, this pressure will become
the hostile actions. In other words,
n
ilFreq =T (at Vel =0).
2. Methodology of Modeling C3 Application Utility
The key considerations in the C3 applications model is the way of battle
managers on both enemy side and friendly side balance. If the knowledge of the
human way of doing is obtained, it is possible to expect what will occur in a
particular situation. And the battle manager can respond to the expected action.
The complete acquisition of the knowledge is impossible. But a good knowledge
engineer can produce reasonable and realistic knowledge.
When a event occurs, however, there is a set of pre-actions as discussed
earlier. In addition, assuming that the battle management is the resource allocation
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in a right place and time dimension such as fire distribution, the intention of the
opponent battle managers can be expected and the possibility of the expected event
will be quantified by the probability. If this probability meets the real action
frequently, that will be the pattern of the battle managers way of doing. Once a
pattern is formularized, the heuristic artificial intelligence system or
semi-structured decision support system can be developed for the event expectation
and resource allocation.
One approach to find the pattern of battle manager may be to analyze
the movements of the resources. If it is assumed that a military operation has a
pattern of force movements in its direction and speed, and that the military
operation requires an amount of forcepower to accomplish the objectives of the
operations, it is possible to estimate what is happening (surveillance), and decision
making will be made in time what resource must be allocated to respond to this
expected event (resource allocation) as well as the enemy's action. Of course, it
requires that military operations such as offense, defense, deception, have some
assumptions such as:
Attacking force has the higher forcepower ratio over the the defense force.
Attacking force has a frequent resource distribution in some pattern, i.e., there
are many changes in its force locations toward the opponent place in the initial
state.
Attack has an amount of positive velocity toward the opponent side.
Withdrawing force has the less forcepower ratio over the opponent force.
Withdrawing force has a frequent changes in its locations in disorder.
Withdraw has a amount of negative velocity toward the opponent side.
Defending force has an amount of forcepower to maintain its power.
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Defending force has a slow distribution of forces in a pattern along the battle
line.
Defense has zero velocity toward each sides, but the speed exists along the
battle line.
Assuming these factors, each type of tactical operations will be
characterized by following conditions.
(a) The offense operations of thc Ped force will be characterized by:
P P
Ratio of forcepower > 1, that is, (-)B >> (- )R'
V V
Center frequency of tempo [ H(T) ] >> H0, and
n
Velocity of movements [ E lV(i) >> 0,
where H is the frequency aggregation function, and H0 is the experimental
basis from the past pattern.
The H function observes the interval of time of each event for the same
type of moving object, and plots these interval times over an object distribution axis
then alculates the average interval tine regarding the rate of power (threat
degree) for each object type and invert this value for the frequency form. H means
the readiness of force for a specific tactical operations. For example, if the Red
Force has changed the location of its forces forward 40% out of its total forcepower
within one hour, and if it is a pattern of preparing an attack based on the past
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pattern or the judgment by the commander, then the Red Force must be considered
to be ready for offensive actions.
The state change time (T), the state change frequency (Freq), the
bandwidth of state change (BW of Tempo) at time t will be measured by the next
formula (see Figure 4.11):
n




to = the first event detection time
ti = the current time
n = the number of detection time between to andt i
E is the types of event,
and
Feq E  TE
T E
m
BW = E FreqE7 (m = the last type of event).
E=1
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Then the center frequency of the Red Force may be measured by the
highest frequency out of this BW with a rapid increase between t i and t i- in
detection time interval. If this center frequency is higher than H0 , which shows that
there is a state change more than 40% out of the total force power, it will be
considered as a pattern of offensive operations.
Also, the initial location (L), the number of forces (N) to be used for
nission allocation at time t will be:
L = (TE.VelE)
N = m (Number of Events).
INTERVAL
TIME
NUMBER OF EVENT (,)
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Figure 4.11 Event Detection Chart
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Once these values are determined and the military pressure (P) and the
volume of responsibility (V) are measured as discussed in the previous section, then
the mission can be developed. That is the weapon resource allocation and target
assignment. In the phase of weapon resource allocation, the variable k, which shows
the destruction power, will be used to check if they matched each other, while the
initial location and the velocity of a target will be considered in the target
assignment phase.
(b) The defense operations of Red force will be characterized by:
P P
Ratio of forcepower 2 1, that is, ( (
V V
Center frequency of tempo [ H(T) ] L= H0, and
n
Velocity of movements [ V(i) L 0.
(c) The withdrawal operations of Red force will be characterized by:
P P
Ratio of forcepower < 1, that is, (-)B < < (- )R'
V V
Center frequency of tempo [ H(T) I is not consistent, and
n
Velocity of movements [ v(i) ] << 0.
(d) The deception operations will be characterized by:
P P
Ratio of forcepower < 1, that is, (- )B < < (-)R'
V V
Center frequency of tempo [ H(T) ] is not consistent, and
n




Ratio of forcepower > 1, that is, (- )B >> (- )R'
V V
Center frequency of tempo [ H(T) ] is not consistent, and
n
Velocity of movements [iv(i) ] < 0,
because if the big velociLy .f forces with low power ratio or the small velocity of
forces with high ratio is abnormal.
Once the intention of the Red forces is identified, the response type will
be developed by the resource allocation corresponding to the speed of each moving
object, and the types of weapon, which have been observed and plotted in the
function H to produce a center frequency. To reduce the response time, the mission
to intercept the moving objects must be assigned to the weapons with the capability
of fast reaction. One is to select the weapons with high speed or the force located
close to the objects. Another is to select the type of weapons. For example, whether
to use missile or aircraft is dependent on the utility of the course of action and the
availability of the resources in the battle manager's level assigned corresponding to
his command authority over the chain of command. So during the resource
allocations, the software algorithm must compute the utility value of each course of
action, and the response time to meet the mission accomplishment. To develop the
utility algorithm, one can use various combat models and operation research
technologies such as Lanchester equations and Markov model.
Once the algorithm of the decision support system is produced by the
knowledge engineers, information requirements of the decision support system will
determine the required quality of information and the diversity in each processing
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stages. This, in turn, will determine the types of sensors and the number of each
sensor in each decision making level through the command and control organization.
Finally, each decision making organization will build an information matrix to be
used by the decision support system or to be disseminated to another decision node.
This information matrix will conform to the distributed decision support system,
and decision oriented structure.
In terms of individual decision making in each level of command rather
than group decision making over the distributed network, the key parameter of
design is the display system for the commanders. After all information processing
stages are completed through the information path, the final stage of decision
making in each transition is finished by human battle managers. So the interaction
between decision support system and human beings are very significant.
On the other hand, the distributed group decision making in the
hierarchical organization requires that the key parameter of design is the
information base which is used in each transition stages over the distributed
network. The raw data from the various sources will be reformatted for each specific
decision type. That is, the information requirements for each decision defines data
necessary to a specific decision and this data will have a standard matrix so that
transferable and accessible by each transition nodes related to the decision. This
decision oriented information base then interact with multiple decision support
system at the different location and different organization levels.
Decision support system for organizational decision, which may be the
task organizing network simulation system, requires information such as the current
status of assets, the characteristics of each asset, the geographical condition which
will affect the usage of these assets, the communications capacity of alternative
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organization network, etc. The type of decision support systems for organizational
decision tends to be the network simulation system of the chain of command, and
information resource allocation and exchange protocol type. This type of decision
has less significance in time parameter, and requires some statistical analysis by
human decision makers more than the other types of decision do. The information
base for this decision type is static and unique to the organization because no
decisions takes place related to this decision at different organization and the
assigned assets different to each organization. So the information base and human
computer interaction (HCI) is highly dependent on the capability of operators. Thus
the effectiveness of C3 system for organizational decision type requires the training
of battle managers to use the system relatively more than the other cases.
Decision support system for informational decision, which may be the
situation assessment system, requires information such as the identification of
moving objects, the intention of the objects, the problem solving pattern of the Red
Force commanders, etc. This type of decision has a significant time parameter and
the information base must be updated in real time base. So decision support systems
for informational decision type may be executive support system such as expert
system for identification, Al system to figure out the object's intention. The quality
of this type of decisions depends on the output of the other informational decision
system and cause a series of decisions in a chain reaction such as the operational
decisions. So the information base for this decision support system must be in the
form of decision oriented information. The decision oriented information base is
designed for. a specific decision and scripted out of the raw data with the probability
of accuracy and the range of description which is discussed in a previous section.
This information base is updated in real time. So an information base management
system, which has expanded functions over the data base management system, is
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required including the rules and knowledge for expert systems. The interaction ratio
of human decision makers is reduced but the role of confirmation by human decision
makers must be considered in designing the executive system.
Decision support systems for an operational decision, which may be a
planning system of the courses of action or a weapon resource allocation system with
its utility values, requires information such as the characteristics of the threat
objects, the available force assets under the decision making system's authority
(command), the availability of supporting assets and its coordination complexity,
the responsibility area by the threat pressure, etc. The main function of decision
support system for operational decision type may be the weapons allocation system.
So an information base management system must update the information base out
of the raw data with the probability and the description range in same matter of the
case of informational decision type including the engagement rules, the strategy, the
commander's way of problem solving. This type of decision support system can be
implemented by the Al technology or expert system. But the role of human decision
makers is most significant among three types of decision because it is a direction of
fire distribution. So all decisions by a full rate computerized decision making system
must be reviewed by human decision makers except just a routine computing
algorithm. An alternative way is that the human decision maker interact with the
partial decision making system (decision support system) in the required transition
stages of decision making process continuously. This interaction must be in real
time, for the operational decision is in real time basis. So the graphical display
system for the commander is the key design parameter in interaction with the
decision support system in this case. Also all decisions must be compared in a
certain basis such as all decisions for a specific responsibility area (V) or a threat
pressure (P).
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E. TEST AND EVALUATION
1. Approach of Evaluation
The evaluation of C2 systems can be approached from three fundamental
perspectives: performance of system components, or subsystems: effectiveness of the
total C2 system; and the contribution of the system to overall force effectiveness
[Ref. 25:p. 162, quoted from Snyder, 1988]. These three perspectives are divisioned
corresponding to its level of boundary and measured by the two basic measures,
which are measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).
The relationships between the system boundary and the measures are shown in
Figure 4.12 [Ref. 54:p. 109]. MOPs measure the technical capability of the C
3
subsystem, and MOEs measure the total effectiveness of the C3 system itself. In
addition, the contribution of C3 system out of the system boundary to the
environment are measured by the measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs), and the
measures of policy effectiveness (MOPEs).
SxTMSTSTftI
MOP
Figure 4.12 System Boundary
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The main purpose of the C3 system is to support the decision making in
each level of command and provide the capacity to control the force organization.
So the technical support provided by the C3 system will be measured by the quality
of the decisions out of the C3 system and the effect of the control network. So the
criteria to be measured as the basis are the accuracy of information, the timeliness
of information arrival or decision making, and task processing rate in a node.
If the criteria of MOPs is not matched to the mission requirements such
as the requirement of the particular human decision processes and the required
output of C3 system at a given command level, the capability of C3 subsystem must
be upgraded such as the message transmittal rate, communications capacity,
computing rate of computer hardware, the protocol, and the alternative network, in
order to increase the system effectiveness. For example, if the information provided
by the C3 system Is is less than the information demand Id, then the types of sensor
(T), the number of sensors (N), the performance of information processing (P), and
the interrelation network among the information processing system must be
reviewed:
If Is < Id
then
functions f, g, and h must be upgraded
because
(i) g I E Sj ih l j
j=i+l j=1
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On the other hand, if the response time Tr is l9nger than the available
time Tp, the weight of some transition stages will be set close to zero, that is to
disregard those intermediate transition stages, or the human decision processing
time in that nodes as well as the computing rate of hardware must be reviewed,
because the MOP of C3 system is a union of C2 process and C3 physical component
MOPs [Ref. 55:p. 881].
If T > T
then
set weight rate wi = 0 or




T = E [ To(') + Td(i)] + Te(1)i=l
Tr pi+ T+t m
MOEs are quantities that result from the comparison of the system
MOPs to the mission requirements. They reflect the extent to which the system
meets the requirements. To evaluate the MOEs, it is necessary to go outside the
boundary and consider the environment. [Ref. 56:p. 4] The environment outside the
system is the operational environment, which is the mission performance standards
of weapon systems where the functions of C3 system is performed. So MOFEs is a
MOE in which a standard of mission performance has been explicitly included. [Ref.
56:p. 5]
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The total measure of force effectiveness is then the MOPs of C3 system
plus the MOPs of the weapon systems. The MOPs of C3 system is divided into the
MOPs of human C2 process and the MOPs of the C3 physical components because
the C3 system is basically people intensive, whereas the weapon systems is only
hardware intensive. This evaluation approach is shown in Figure 4.13. [Ref. 56:p. .5]
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MOP 2 COMPOHENTS
CO P MOP C 2 PC
WEAPON
C2 SYSTEM SYSTEM




Figure 4.13 C3 Evaluation Approach
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2. Methodologies of C3 System Evaluation
Currently, there are three major system evaluation methodologies:
headquarters effectiveness assessment tool (HEAT), modular command and control
evaluation structure (MCES), and system effectiveness analysis (SEA).
HEAT is a data collection scheme based on the cybernetic theory of C3
(which divides C3 into cyclic activities - sense, assess, etc.) [Ref. 57:p. 6]. The
MCES is a decision maker driven analysis tool. The level of decision as well as the
mission and the specific nature of the decisions are taken into account. [Ref. 54:p.
106] The MCES methodology provides a logical and orderly structure that guides
the analyst through the process of formulating the measure of effectiveness that are
appropriate for the problem in question. SEA, however, focuses on the quantitative
aspects of obtaining and evaluating measures of effectiveness. [Ref. 56:p. 6]
SEA is conducted in seven steps. The seven steps of the methodology
and their interrelationships are shown schematically in Figure 4.14 [Ref. 58:pp. 3-4].
The SEA methodology is described by Levis analyzing the relationships with the
MCES methodology [Ref. 56:pp. 4-11]:
The first step in SEA consists of defining the system, the environment,
and the context, followed by the selection of the parameters that influence the
system MOPs. This step is a specific implementation of Modules 1 to 4 in
MCES.
In the second step, the analogous procedure is carried out for the
mission. Parameters of mission are defined that are consistent with the
environment of the context.
The third step consists of defining MOPs for the system that
characterize the properties that are of interest in the analysis. The MOPs are
expressed as functions of the parameters such as
MOPi = fi (Xl"..."xk)
The fourth step consists of selecting the models that map the mission
parameters Yi into the requirements:
R fil (yi,... ydY
m fml'"n
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The fifth step consists of transforming the system measures and mission
requirements into a set of commensurate attributes defined on a common
attributes space; the system MOP space or the mission requirements space.
The step six constructs system locus and mission requirements locus.
The measures of performance for the system are functions of the system
parameters. System locus is a set of values that MOPs take from the MOP
space in allowable range of the parameter x group. Mission locus is the set of
values that satisfy the mission requirements.
The seventh step consists of procedures for comparing the system's
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Figure 4.14 The Methodology for C3 System Effectiveness Analysis
149
The MCES approach was conceived and developed through a series of
workshops commencing with the Measures of Effectiveness for C3 Evaluation
Symposium hosted by the MITRE Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts, in early
1984. The MCES consists of seven steps (Figure 4.15) [Ref. 56:pp. 5-6].
In the first module, the decision makers requirements are expressed in
the form of a problem statement consisting of a set of objectives and the
associated assumptions.
In the second module, the problem statement is used to bound the
problem, i.e., specify the boundaries of the system to be analyzed. The result
is the identification of the system components and their interconnection.
In the third module, the particular command and control process is
described. The result is the specification of the set of functions such as
"sense", "assess", "generate", "select", and "direct".
The allocation of the functions derived in module three to the
components and structure is carried out in module four. Thus, in the first four
steps, the complete formulation of the problem is achieved.
The next three modules constitute the "solution" to the problem. In
module five, the various measures that are relevant for the problem in
question are specified: MOPs, MOEs, and, if appropriate, MOFEs or MOPEs.
Such measures as survivability, reliability, and interoperability are typical
examples of MOPs. However, these measures represent general concepts; there
is need for problem - specific variables that are measurable and can represent
these MOPs. The values of these variables should be computable from data
generated by the system. Finally, in module seven, the aggregation of MOEs is
carried out.
The MCES is a set of procedures that permits the analyst to evaluate
problems. The heart of this methodology concerns what to measure and how to
evaluate (Figure 4.16) and the key issue is properly matching the analytic objective
to the appropriate set of measures [Ref. 54:pp. 107-108]. The three last modules of
MCES can be implemented by the methodology of SEA because the SE ,cuses on
the "solution". In other words, the steps of the SEA can be embedded in MCES and
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3. C3 Effectiveness Analysis
In Chapter I, the force power driver was defined as the function of
performance level of each C3 component (P) and inertia power a:
Power Driver = f[P( 1)' P( 2 )' ... P(n)' I]
The term with P(i) is directly from the capability of each component and a is from
the potential capability of subordinate commanders which comes out of their
experience and the training level. How can these capabilities be measured?
Assume that a commander has three assets available to commit in an
operation and one target, and there are simply four variables as C3 components:
command, control, communications, and intelligence. The capability of the
computer component of C412 will be inserted in the intelligence part as the time
factor and the accuracy of the information because the advantage of computer are
the fast computing speed and the accuracy of calculation. The interoperability
component may be out of the C3 components boundary because it represents the
interaction between C3 systems. Within an operation of one C3 system, it will be
inserted in the command and control part as the directives or orders.
For the easiness of the tactical C3 system effectiveness analysis, for
example, let the intelligence component provide the information about the status of
both Red and Blue Forces, especially the location of the target, and the command
and control components assign the tasks based on the intelligence. Then the
command and control process (weapon resource allocation) in this simple case may













Figure 4.17 Tactical Commirand and Control Process: An Example
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Let the real position of a target be R1 at time t, R2 at time (t +At), and
the reported position of the target be Ml at time t, M2 at time (t + At). And
assume that the commander assigns the tasks T1 to asset 1 and T2 to asset 2, also,
after time At he recognized that the target moved to the position R2 and the size of
target (actually the military pressure or force power) turned out to be larger than
the old intelligence part provided. Then the commander will reassign the task to
asset 3 which destruction power matches the size of the target power.
In this scenario, the performance of the C3 components may be measured
by the following method. The capability of intelligence corresponds to the deviation
(dINT) between R1 and MI. The ideal case is that the location and the size of both
circles are the same. So the performance of intelligence may be
R I1 n M1
Pint ( i
In this case, the performance of intelligence has some amount of value as shown in
the figure above.
The capability of command corresponds to the deviation (dCMD)
between MI and (T1 + T2). The ideal case is that the location of all TI, T2, and
Ml are the same and the total size of both TI and T2, which are identical to asset 1
and asset 2 each, is same as the size of M1. The size means the military pressure,
too. Then the performance of command may be
p (T1 U T2) n M1
cmd (T1 U T2)
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In this case, the performance of command has some amount of value, but for the
forces it has no effect due to the misinformation.
The capability of control is to catch the deviation (dCTL) between (TI
+ T2) and R2 at time (t + -At) and reassign the task. The ideal case is that (1) the
location of all T1, T2, and M2 are the same and the total size of both TI and T2 is
identical to M2 and R2, or (2) the location of both T3 and M2 are the same and the
size of T3, which is identical to the asset 3, is same as the size of M2 and R2. So the
performance of control may be
P [(T1 U T 2 ) n M'] n R2 U (T3 n M2 Fn R2)
ctl (TI U T2) T3
If there is no reassignment and no adjustment of task TI and T2 in this case, the
performance of control is zero.
The capability of communications is to transmit the information signal
(status and command or control information) without distortion of the information
in time. The ideal case is that there is no change after time At, the interval time
between the target is detected in sensor node and the mission is planned in C ) organ
node, and the interval between the mission is planned and the mission is received
and initiated, in the status information (target location in this case), and there is no
difference between command information and status information. It means that the
mission is initiated simultaneously when the target is detected. But it is impossible
even though the C3 system is in real-time operation. So the alternative way to
measure is to check the change of location and the difference of both information
contents after time At. Let the time delay from sensor to C2 organ be t1 , and the
time delay from C2 organ to asset (subordinate unit), t9 . The performance of
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communications may be the multiplicative product of performance of
communications during t 1 and t2 because a failure in either link cuts the sequential
process of command and control. The performance of communications at t1 may be
the difference of status information between at time t in sensor node and at time t
+ t 1 in C2 organ node. That is
Pcomm(at t 1 link) = Pint (at t) - Pint(at t1 )
The performance of communications at t2 may be the distortion of command
information between at time (t + ti) in C2 organ and at time (t + t 1 + t2 ) in
subordinate units. That is
P (at t2 link) = Pcmd (at t+tl) - Pcmd (at t+tl+t9 ).Comm m
However, after time At, same kind of communications exists with factor of At
instead of t 2, that is, the control link:
Pcomm (at t+At) = Pctl(at t) - Pctl(at t+At).
So the total communications capability may be
Pcomm = [Pcomm (at tl link) n P commu (at t2 link)] U
[Pcomm(at t1 link) n PComm (at t+At)]
where t 1 link is the time when the commander recognized the misinformation.
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From the discussion above, the C3 effectiveness function may be
represented by the next form with multiplicative and additive charateristics.
Power Driver = Pint.P cmd. Pcomm + PintP ctl P comm + c.
If there is no communication link, intelligence (status information) is not
provided to the C2 organ, and mission or task (command and control information)
is not assigned (command) or reassigned (control) to the subordinate units. Tle
value of each intelligence and command or control is not added directly for force
operation, so the total value of C3 system becomes zero. The reason that the force
conducts its mission is from the self maintenance power of the subordinate units
when they are facing a hostile situation. It is a inertia power based on the higher
commander's past pattern and the subordinate commander's experience.
Also if there is no intelligence, the task assignment (command) or
reassignment (control) may be possible but arbitrary. So it is not direct effect from
the commanding force's C3 system. It is from the perception of the commander
based on the commander's ability.
If there is no command and control, the value of intelligence and
communications performance is not useful for the subordinate units. It is rather to
effect some negative effectiveness. The subordinate commander will think there is
some undesired situation at the higher command and may feel some fear which
decreases the motivation.
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V. A C31 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION PROCEDURE:
CASE STUDIES
A. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
1. Decision Needs Requirements Analysis
The general acquisition procedure of a weapon system consists of various
phases such as Program Initiation Phase, Concept Exploration/Definition Phase,
Concept Demonstration and Validation (D&V) Phase, Full-Scale Engineering
Development (FSED) Phase, Full Rate Production/Initial Deployment Phase, and
Operations Support Phase [Ref. 59]. The first phase initiates with the requirements
analysis. The typical requirements to be analyzed are the mission need
requirements. For the case of C3 system development, the mission requirements
drive decision requirements which are the key design parameters in C3 system
design because the output of the C3 system determines the quality of decisions at a
command. Adopting the decision-oriented system design approach by Metersky
[Ref. 55], these decision requirements are expanded into three sub-detailed
requirements: information requirements of organization, software requirements, and
hardware requirements. And these three requirements are transformed into decision
augmentation specification, software specification, and hardware specification
through various intermediate steps. These steps are shown in Figure 5.1 [Ref. 55:p.
888].
The decision requirement in a unified forces level must be developed
under the mission requirements of the unified forces level. The system context in a
unified forces level, thus, must be analyzed first. When a conflict occurs initially,
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the role of the unified force's cormix~axdei (initial iissioii) A.; to providc an assessed
report about the situation to the President. Once they receive a direction to respond
to the conflict, the follow-on mission is to accomplish the direction. So the decision
types in the unified forces level are a decision about the early warning to the
President and its subordinate command, and a decision about the response, that is,








Figure 5.1 Decision-rte Sysatm DeinApoc
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In the unified forces level, the decision is made in the central stage of the
command and control transformation process through the command and control
time line and the decision type is at the top battle management level. This
phenomenon is shown with the graph of Figure 5.2 [Ref. 60:p. 3]. So the decision
requirements will be the information requirements for the early warning and the
response type, the information allocation requirements to the subordinate units for
the early warning, the task allocation requirements to the organizational decision
making group such as the Navy, Air Force, and Army Components headquarters for
the response type, and software/hardware requirements for the two major decision
types to be able to meet the required quality of the decisions.
NORMAL POTENTIAL EXCHANGE RECOVERY










Figure 5.2 The Decision Making Level and the Time Plot
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2. Requirements Management
Requirements are proposed by the operations people, while systems are
designed by technical engineers or designers. The operations people know what they
need to accomplish but do not understand the technology well enough to know what
they could accomplish given a modern and affordable system; the technologists
understand what could be built but don't understand the operations well enough to
define what should be built. So together with requirements and system design,
operations concepts are developed in parallel based on policy, doctrine and the
performance of the new systems. [Ref. 61:p. 15]
To accomplish these three works successfully, the users must be involved
in the system acquisition together with the developers. The user/developer team,
then, analyzes the missions, operations environment, the required operational
capability (ROC), for example, in order to manage the requirements. If good
operational people and technical systems people get together under a set of well
structured rules, they could come out with requirements and affordable systems to
meet those requirements based on system analysis, system costing and significant
trade-offs. This team must regulate the desired changes in requirements which may
come up in the life of the program. The types of questions this team should be
forced to answer are: [Ref. 61:p. 20]
What is the object of the exercise?
What military job(s) is the system going to support?
What will be the improvement in military effectiveness if the system is
built?
What is the cost performance curve? How does it affect the system
requirements?
What are the absolute minimum requirements?
Have necessary/possible improvements in the way the user does things
(doctrine, procedure, etc.) been taken into account in formulating the
requirements?
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Can we get operational improvements without requiring new systems?
Are we pushing the state-of-the-art?
How do the requirements and improvements impact on other systems
and actions; How are they impacted by other systems and actions?
How are we going to use and operate the resulting system?
In order to do a good gob of requirements definition, do we need an
operational test bed? A developmental test bed? Subsystem test bed?
What are the requirements priorities? Have they been rigorously rank
ordered?
3. Subsystem Requirements
a. Command and Control Requirements
The establishment of the US military departments, services, and
the combatant commands set up two distinct chains of command. The first chain of
command is the operational channel of authority assigned to combatant commands.
The second chain of command is the service channel of authority for purpose other
than operational direction of combatant forces [Ref. 63:p. 56]. The command and
control requirements of unified forces is generated by the unified operations and
joint actions. JCS PUB 2 describes the requirements of command and control as
follows:
Unified operations and joint actions generate certain requirements. These
include integrating efforts toward common objectives, planning and
conducting operations under unified direction, developing doctrine for
preparing and training specific type of combat operations, and delineating
responsibilities and developing doctrine for unified operations. [Ref. 63:p. 96,
quoted from JCS Pub 2, para 101041
The commander of the unified forces is authorized to exercise his
assigned operational command. This operational command is exercised through
more than one service component commanders-the land, naval, and air components.
According to JCS Publication 2, the unified commander is authorized to:
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Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of assigned
forces.
Conduct joint exercises.
Exercise direct authority for logistics within his command.
Exercise direct authority over all elements of his command.
Establish plans, policy, and overall intelligence activities of his
command.
Participate in the development and acquisition of ,.-s command and
control system and direct its operation.
The command and control requirements are the key of the
architecture of the command and control organization. But one more aspect of
command and control requirements is the commander's leadership and the degree of
control. The U.S. Army defines military leadership as "... a process by which a
commander influences others to accomplish the mission" (FM 22-100, Military
Leadership). The leadership then can be represented by the degree of motivation of
the subordinates. The motivation and the degree of control required to accomplish a










Figure 5.3 Motivation vs. Control
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b. Intelligence Support Requirements
The intelligence requirements of a C3 system in a unified command
level follows information requirements corresponding to a specific decision under the
uncertainty-time distribution plot of the unified forces. As discussed in the first
section of this chapter thrcugh Figure 5.2, the role of decisions of the unified
commanders are inserted into the middle stage of the total command and control
time line from the event detection to response execution. The first one was the early
warning task and the other was the planning task for the required response. The
next concern is the available time to make decisions 'for the warning and to develop
planning.
The first function of the early warning decision is to monitor the
current situation. The intelligence system is the primary resource for monitoring the
enemy situation. So the time allocation of each intelligence system is a critical
factor in the intelligence support. Intelligence support requirements for the early
warning system must include the real or at least near real reporting channel. Thess
requirements may disregard the cost curve because the timeliness is the absolute
factor for this early warning decision type. In other words, the time delay in early
warning makes the benefit of the C3 system close to zero even the system took cost
to exist. To meet this requirement, the C3 system requires the machine to machine
interface module of information among each service individual intelligence system.
For the planning function of the unified forces level, a C3 system
has a little flexible time allocation. Remembering the transformation function of
command and control is the weapon resource allocation and its increasing utility,
the time allocation is affected by the available weapon resources and the area of
responsibility or the area of military pressure. Table 5.1 [Ref. 64:p. 206] shows
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one experimental planning time chart with its intelligence support system (RSTA:
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition). In a same matter, the
intelligence response time for weapons resources allocation can be estimated.
The intelligence support requirements is set by analyzing the
required information quality (accuracy, description diversity, and timeliness) for a
specific decision type. One example is shown in Table 5.2 [Ref. 64:p. 204]. When a
weapon is assigned to a target in a responsibility area, C3 system requires some
intelligence support corresponding to the allocation type.
Table 5.1 Areas of Interest for Planning
Level Planning Max Areas of RSTA
Block (hrs) Effective Interest Support
Range 'km)
Division Next 12 30 *120 km Corps
Corps Next 24 30 **240 km EAC, Nation
Army Group Next 48 150 ***480 km Nation
AFCENT Next 96 350 ****1920 km Nation
• 6 hr. road march @ effective 20 kmh
• * 12 hr. road march @ effective 20 kmh
24 hr. road march @ effective 20 kmh
48 hr. rail movement @ 40 kmh
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The concept of modern command and control systems can only be
implemented with the availability of a sophisticated communication network. In
fact, communication and data transfer are the key factors to effective C3 system
operation and are therefore heavily emphasized in any C3 system planning. The
communication technologies have an extreme range of options to offer the system
designer, as seen in Figure 5.4 [Ref. 65:p. 27].
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Figure 5.4 The Major Branches of Communication Technology
Effective C3  system operation also depends upon a well designed
communication network. The consideration of communications design in C3 is the
integral performance of C3 system. For the integral function of a large C3 system.
ISO proposed OSI seven layers for the open system model, which is introduced in
Chapter II. But the ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network ) technology is a
good candidate for C3 system networking. Ali modern information system firms
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tend to use this ISDN technology because it can povide interface among all
communications equipment involving voice, data, video, etc. The military C
3
system must use the industrial computer and communication technology in order to
save the R&D cost and save time of system acquisition. Then the development of
the C3 system can better follow the industrial technology to develop a system for
expansion of the system in the future. It supports the interoperability between
various systems: compatibility between existing and new system, interconnection
among different systems, etc.
Inadequate communication design results in delays in the
transmitted data before reaching their destination. One requirement of
communication is the communication transmission capacity. The "average traffic
rate" is not reasonable for C3 communications network design because the network
will be jammed at the peak traffic time. It can bring the system operation to a
standstill. So the designer must consider the maximum random message traffic rate
in designing the communications capacity. Whether to use real-time, near
real-time, or non real-time communication switching depends on the volume of
input message and the time sensitivity of the output which will be used for a
information system.
Another consideration of communication requirement is the
reliability or survivability of the network. Automation of C3 system is not always
best for combat situation. The designer must consider the failure of system
operation such as the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of system components
or the destruction of the communications network. Message transmission between
machines must have an alternative transmission means. For example, a digital data
computer communications network must consider the voice FM communications
channel as a backup.
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Mobility is another factor of communications requirements. But at
the unified forces level, the significance of mobility is less than the lower level. In
other words, all possible communications technology can be used in the high
command level, while in the infantry division level, the mobility is the key factor for
the communications design.
4. Joint Interoperability Requirements
Interoperability is discussed in Chapter II. In the definition of C3
interoperbility, what really counts in interoperability are the "forces". In the unified
level, the forces are of more than one military service. So the jointness is added in
the general interoperability requirements in this case. The general interoperability
requirements are implemented technically by the compatibility, standardization,
and procedure, as discussed in Chapter II.
This C 3 interoperability is achieved by a four step process: identify
requirements, develop standards, test and certify against star,'ards, and implement
arid plan support [Ref. 66:p. 232]. The narrow meaning of interoperability is that
communications and data processing equipment must be able to connect and work
with one another. But the broad meaning includes people. doctrines and procedures.
as well as the equipment [Ref. 67:p. 35]. So identif;ing the requirements of jointnvss
in the unified level will be (lone by the study of each service's people, doctrines and
procedures as well as the equipments used in each service.
The first step to identify the interoperability requirements is the efforts
for Achitecture" and "Assessment" [Ref. 66:p. 232].





establishes connectivity and information needs;
identifies supporting communications systems;
identifies interoperability deficiencies;
recommends corrections and improvements.
JTC3 A produces two kinds of architectures: Functional Interoperability
Architectures and CINC Architectures. The functional interoperability architectures
are being developed for each of the major combat functions. These architectures cut
• across all CINCS/services/agencies and attempt to capture the essentials of the
interoperability equation within the functions. On the other hand, CINC
interoperability architectures are developed by JTC3 A at the invitation of the
CINCs and are tailored for the theater of operation and the forces of that command.
They cut across (and are built upon) the functional interoperability architectures
and will be "refreshed" as the requirements change over time. [Ref. 66:p. 2321
.JTC3 A assessments are in two categories: technical and system.
Technology assessments are focused on a specific technology and attempt to identify
all the technological issues that affect interoperability. On the other hand, the
system assessments are focused on a specific C2 or communications system and
attempt to identify all the technical, procedural and operational issues that affect
interoperability. [Ref. 66:p. 232]
The methodology to identify the interoperability requirements
deficiencies is the requirements evaluation methodology. One approach to evaluate
the interoperability requirements is to check the sequence of information exchange.
When initial information is exchanged, it may often lead to a sequence of further
data exchanges. Marshall and Greenway expressed this as: [Ref. 68:p. 176]
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Verifying that information exchanged is comprehensible tc all
participating systems.
Verifying that the information expected by a system is generated by
another system.
Verifying that the information generated by a system is expected by
other systems.
Detecting any degradation of information when exchanged, and verifying
that this is acceptable. This is particularly important where information
is relayed through a series of inhomogeneous systems since minor
degradation at each system becomes a major degradation from end to
end.
B. SYSTEM DESIGN AND ENGINEERING
1. The Framework of C3 Architecture
The overall C3  architecture has three types of architecture:
organizational architecture, functional architecture, and physical architecture [Ref.
25:p. 128]. An organization has an objective and the C3 mission to command and
control the organization to obtain the objective. The chain of command, generally
represented in an organizational chart is the organizational architecture. Now the
C3 mission is decomposed and translated into its operational functions. These
functions have their own architectures. Finally, the functions are performed by
physical systems such as computer hardware and software or a communications link.
Each physical system has its own architecture, too. Examples of physical systems
are the command post headquarters facilities for chain of command, and information
system, and communication system. In Thornton's C2 process architecture, the
command and control headquarters is represented by the command executive at the
center position, and functional perspective of the overall C3 arcbitecture surrounds
the center. It is limited to the conceptual C2 process over the command and control
time line.
The purpose of C3 afchitecture is support C3 planning such as the C3
master plan and provide the technical framework for subsystem architectures, thus
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ailowir-g for development of the comm': iication architecture, the information
system architecture, headquarters architecture, air defense architecture, intelligence
architecture and so forth [Ref. 69:p. 68]. The development of C3 architecture begins
with the C3 mission analysis and end up with the design of the physical subsystem
architecture. For the actual development of C3 system, the conceptual architecture
of C2 process by Thornton requires the developmental framework for C
3
architecture. Jacobovits proposed a solution for this requirement with the "C
3
architecture conceptual framework" which is composed of C3 mission, physical
environment, control and flow of information, and representation, interpretation
and transformation of information [Ref. 69:p. 68].
The C3 mission defines the user aspects of the architecture. Complex
C3systems may need analyses to decompose the mission into operational functions.
This decomposition will allow the development of a C3 subarchitecture for each
operational function. The physical environment consists of command and control
centers, information systems, communications systems and input sources (sensors,
messages). The control and flow of information is driven by the operational function
and is essential in describing the architecture because it shows the interrelation
between each operational function. The representation, interpretation and
transformation of information describe the processing aspects of the information as
it flows from sources (sensor or message) to sinks (C2 centers), and the resulting
command and control messages that flow in the opposite direction. [Ref. 69:p. 68]
To present the four categories of C3 architecture framework, Jacobovits
[Ref. 691 used information flow diagram methodology consisting of operational
functions, nodes, branches and information sources (Figure 5.5) [Ref. 69:p. 71]. The
operational functions are generated by the C3 mission and defined clearly to identify
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the type of information and flow cf information. For example, the operational
function of surveillance subsystem requires the real time technical data for both
friendly and enemy identification and, needs to build a broadcasting network to
disseminate the surveillance result. The nodes on the diagram are generic processing
and control centers and represent the respective processing and control tasks within
C2 organization. Processing encompasses the representation, interpretation and
transformation of information aspect of the framework. Control encompasses the
control aspect of the control and flow of information. The brancLes represent the




2. C2 Organization Architecture
a. Unified Command Structure
The unified command structure is the integration of forces provided
by the military departments for combatant commands, and the underlying principle
of unified operations is the principle of unity of effort. JCS Pub 2 defines unity of
effort in the following manner:
The concept of the US military establishment as an efficient team of land,
naval, and air forces is based on the principle that effective utilization of the
military power of the nation requires that the efforts of separate military
services be closely integrated .... Unity of effort among service forces assigned
to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of operational
command ..... [JCS PUB 2]
There are two principles that must be applied to achieve the full
potential of the unified combatant structure. These are the principles of maximum
integration and the principle of full utilization of forces. Maximum integration refers
to the practicable integration of policies and procedures to "produce an effective,
cronomical, and harmonious organization which will insure the national security".
The principle of full utilization of forces states that each service's unique capabilities
must be exploited to their full potential to achieve the effective attainment of
overall unified objectives. [Ref. 63:pp. 59-601
The principles and doctrine above provide the framework to set up
a command structure to support the unified operations of the armed forces. This
structure must be designed to insure the effective coordination of the forces to
accomplish the assigned mission: [Ref. 63:p. 60]
In determining the most effective method,... consideration shall be given first
to the mission to be accomplished, and then to the capabilities and functions
of the services involved, the geographic location and nature of the
contemplated operations.. .and capabilities of US and enemy forces.
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The current US unified command structure consists of operational
command authority and service command authority (Figure 5.6) [Ref. 63:p. 173].
The overall commander personally exercises operational command. The unified
commander will not act as the commander of any subordinate or component
command unless specifically authorized by establishing authority. He exercises
operational control through the commanders of subordinate commands or
component commands [Ref. 63:p. 61]. The role of JCS is to advise the NCA to
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Figure 5.6 The Unified Command Structure [Ref. 63:p. 173]
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The subordinate unified or service component command is
commanded by the senior officer of that service assigned to the unified command.
These subordinate or component commanders exercise operational control over the
respective forces and report or "communicate directly with their respective chiefs of
services on matters which are the responsibility of the military departments and
services." This dual authority of the component commander is derived from the
National Command Authority (NCA) and has both service administrative and
unified operational authority. [Ref. 63:p. 61]
No matter the type of command (operational or service authority),
the command and control process in the chain of command of the unified forces is
conducted by the physical C3 system. Both operational command and service
command authority will be characterized by the type of information over the chain
of command. Thus the chain of command architecture may be represented by the
information exchange network.
b. Future Chain of Command
Information support to the commander's situation assessment is
currently generated mostly at the lower levels and flows upward toward the higher
echelons, along with associated requests for support. In response, orders flow down
to the lower echelons. At the lower echelons, the time available for planning is
generally shorter and the level of planning more detailed than at the higher
echelons. Also several echelons are involved in compressing and replaying reports, as
well as expanding and relaying orders. Much information is exchanged via messages
which are manually prepared, distributed, and analyzed. Therefore, the overall
response times can be quite long relative to the expected pace of future battles. [Ref.
70:p. 146]
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For greater interaction between information systems and the
command and control process in the future, each echelon must speed up the
operations or need to be informed simultaneously to reduce time delays. Some of
these information systems would also provide automated aids to assessment and
planning [Ref. 70:p. 1461.
In Chapter IV, the alternative methodology for this issue was
discussed already, but for the chain of command, Signori and Cheilek suggested the
future command and control process with comparison of the current chain of
command (Figure 5.7a and 5.7b) [Ref. 70:pp. 147-148]. According to his opinion,
the improved sensor system and improved message handling (e.g., preparation,
storage, and retrieval) and exchange (e.g., wide-area, jam-resistant
communications capability) at each level of echelon reduce time delays of the
response. Improved sensor systems give commanders at all echelons some ability to
anticipate requests for support, and planned improvements speed up the operations
at each echelon. [Ref. 70:p. 146]
The future command and control process shows two types of
information exchange links. One is the formal links that provide the message
exchange link for orders and reports; the other is the information source exchange
links among the sensors and information systems. The first may be called the formal
chain of command and the other may be called the virtual chain of command.
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Figure 5.7.a Command and Control Process: Current
Figure 5.7.b Command and Control Process: Future
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3. Command and Control Center Design
In Chapter III, the function of command and control was discussed as
the transformation of situation evaluation into response implementation. Chapter
IV states that the implication of this transformation function is done by information
resource allocation and weapon resource allocation. During the battle, information
about the environment which is an object of battle management is merged in
command and control center, and decisions to control the environment to the
desired state comes out from the command and control center. Figure 5.8 depicts
the information flow around the command and control center.
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Figure 5.8 Information Flow around Command and Control Center
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In cybernetics the decision making process is usually defined as
conversion of status information to command infoemation (or control infolination)
by the control organ, i.e., conversion to information by means of which the tasks of
the ebject of control are then assigned, and thus its actions and the functioning of
the system as a whole are given a purposeful nature [Ref. 71:p. 14]. Once decisions
are made, the control organ is dealing not with status information, but with
material objects and action on them by transmission of command (control)
information to them to implement the decision and plan [Ref. 7 1:p. 15]. Thus the
structure of the command and control center will consist of four major functional
modules connected with the unique information flow. That is, the information
obtaining module, decision making module, task planning module, and operations
control and monitoring module; input to the information obtaining module may be
either electronic signal or text messages or both and the output of that module may
be the status information to flow to the decision making module, and there will be
task or action information between the decision making module and the planning
module, finally command information flows into the operations control and
monitoring module.
The architecture of the command and control center, then, is configured
by the elements of the four functional modules and the information flow branches.
Each functional module will be made up of various man-machines cells, and the
information flow branches will be made up of the communications equipment and
'bhe protocols. The man-machine cells will be classified into the six "functional
areas" as discussed in Chapter II; command, information management, engagement
management, sensor management, communications management, and system
management. On the other hand, the information flow branches will be classified
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into three types of connectivities as discussed in Chapter II; command connectivity,
coordination connectivity, and information exchange connectivity. Through the
three types of connectivities, all information such as technical data transmission
between machines, status information, and command information will flow with a
form of electronic signal, text messages.
The part of man in man-machine cells of the command and control
center is the commander, staffs, and technical system operators. On the other hand,
the part of machine in man-machine cells will be divided into five major groups,
based on the purpose and the nature of operations: communications equipment,
information acquisition equipment, equipment for processing information and for
performing tactical estimates, documentation and document reproduction
equipment, and command vehicles (Figure 5.9) [Ref. 71:pp. 70-71]. In order to build
the command and control center architecture these men and machines will be
combined and assigned to the six functional modules. Then all functions are
networked, and finally the standard operations procedures within the command and
control center are set up.
When the command and control center architectures are designed, the
first consideration is that the command and control center is one part of the large
scale C3 architecture. One methodology to design the command and control center
architecture as a part of the large scale C3 system is to set the requirements of a
specific command and control center through the overall hierarchical chain of
command and information flow line, then list all attributes which are related to the
specific command and control center, found in the large scale C3 architecture (the
command hierarchy and information flow line). The attributes may be functions to
be performed, the information systems to be used, the communications systems
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connected, the messages originating there and the connectivity of the specific
headquarters [Ref. 69:p. 72]. Then these attributes will be mapped to the functional
modules of the command and control center architecture. Figure 5.10 [Ref. 69:p. 72]
shows an example of mapping the attributes from the overall large scale C
3
architecture to the subsystem, command headquarters architecture.
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4. Subsystem Design and Engineering
The subsystem architectures (hardware, software, people) of the overall
C3 architecture framework represent conceptual designs or systems specifications
rather than C3 planning. They can be categorized into two major types: physically
oriented subsystem architectures and topically oriented subsystem architectures.
Physically oriented architectures are defined by the physical constraints imposed on
the architecture. Examples of physically oriented architectures are headquarters
facilitics, communications, information processing, and sensor architecture. Topical
subsystem architectures describe an operational area (topic) such as air defense or
intelligence. [Ref. 69:p. 72]
The methodology to d- elop the subsystem architecture has been
presented in the above section. The methodolgy is to extract the attributes from the
overall C3 architecture and map these attributes to each subsystem. Then these
items form a list of capabilities (baseline architecture) or requirements (goal
architecture). [Ref. 69:p. 72]
The subsystem of people (commander and staffs) in the C3 architecture
has its own role and capability. In modern warfare, the capability of one-man
command has limit on their capability because of the complexity of the battle
situation and technical development. So Chapter II introduced the "hypothetical C
2
organization" to compensate the limited capability of one-man command. The
subsystem of hardware and software in C3 architecture are directly related to the
specifications of the technical C3 equipment. For the architectures of these areas,
the OSI'seven layer model and the C3 Reference Model have been discussed already
for software architecture. Also Chapter IV states that the C3 system is based on the
distributed, hierarchical network in the embedded organizational system which
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determines the hardware architecture such as the location of information base,
information processing technology, communications technology to meet the
distributed network, and so on.
These architecture requirements are transformed into the technical
specifications for system design and engineering under the constraints of system
characteristics such as survivability, flexibility, security, user-orientation,
interoperability, and reliability which are discussed in Chapter II. In terms of
system acquisiion, however, the design and engineering approach must be
consistent through the whole system development so that the subsystems are
compatible with those of the other systems and maintained and supplied properly in
the battle. A typical approach is the Modular Building Block (MBB) concept to C3 I
system approach. This approach has the potential for significantly facilitating the
acquisition of DOD C31 systems and for reducing life cycle costs of both fixed and
mobile/transportable systems at the tactical level, crisis/contingency level, and
strategic/theater level [Ref. 72:p. vii].
The basic concept is to build or assemble C3 I systems using physically
and electronically compatible modules interconnected with a multi-purpose data
bus which is capable of carrying voice, data, video signals, and control information
and hence can be used to implement remote monitoring and control of the modules.
The MBB is essentially a standardization and packaging approach which is
independent of specific systems or mission equipments. The MBB concept does not
attempt to standardize on specific types of manufactures of electronic equipments,
communications equipment, automatic data processing, terminals, etc. The concept
relates only to the packaging and interconnection of these items in a way which
focuses on their interchangeability by virtue of standard physical and electrical
ir, eifceb to the data bus. [Ref. 72:p. 81
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C. C3 SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
1. C3 System Management Organization
The chain of command for operational employment of forces runs from
the President to the Secretary of Defense and to the CINCs of the operational and
combatant commands. By law, all forces must be assigned to one of the optrational
commands. Meanwhile, the Joint Staff, under the JCS Chairman, acts as the
military staff to the Secretary of Defense for planning and operational direction of
those forces. The Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force are responsible for the
administration, training, and supply of their component forces assigned to the
unified and specified commands. The functions of building force structures and
supporting resources are accomplished in the chain of command from the Secretary
of Defense to the Secretaries of the military departments. Approval by the Secretary
of Defense for these is accomplished both on the basis of supporting plans developed
by JCS and on advice from its Chairman. [Ref. 72:pp. 33-35]
In June 1982, JCS initiated action to improve the capability of the Joint
Staff to focus on management of strategic C3 and joint tactical C3 systems. In
subsequent actions continuing through 1984, JCS proposed and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense approved the following major steps to improve C3
management.
A C3 Review Council chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and intelligence (ASD[C 3 1]) was established.
And JCS reactivated J--6 (the command, control, communications systems
directorate), which was eliminated during the post-Vietnam contraction. The C3
management organization at the assistant secretary level and each military ;ervice
level are shown in Appendix A.
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The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) was realigned, with the
DCA director reporting to the Secretary of Defense for acquisition related matters,
and JCS providing guidance and direction for matters involving planning,
requirements development, establishing priorities, operational concepts, policies and
procedures. DCA has become the principal C3 support activity for the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) for C31, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the unified
and specified commanders. The Director, DCA, reports to ASD[C 31] and the Under
Secretary of Defense (USD) (Acquisition), but receives his operational direction
from the JCS through the J-6. In July 5, 1984, ASD[C 3 I] directed the formation of
Joint Tactical Command , Control, Communications Agency (JTC3 A) to solve the
lack of interoperability of tactical C3 systems in each service during joint and
combined operations. The structures of DCA and JTC 3 A are shown in Appendix A.
DCA plans, engineers, manages and gives operational direction to DOD's
long distance switching and transmission systems and the computer systems of the
National Military Command System (NMCS). It also is the system engineer for the
World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). [Ref. 73:p. 91]
J-6 serves as the interface between the users (operational commanders)
and the suppliers (military services). It develops plans, policies and concepts in
support of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs), validates joint requirements,
evaluates technically feasible and affordable solutions, determines joint implications
and points of interface, tasks one of the departments to head a joint design and
acquisition program, and accomplishes global C3 system performance assessment
[Ref. 73:p. 871.
JTC3 A's mission is to ensure interoperability in joint and combined
operations through the development and procedural interface standards by the
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military services. The approach is a four-step process: develop architectures for
each theater or mission that will expose the points of critical interface and what
data must flow across them; provide the technical and procedural interface
standards for those points; test and certify that the standards work as intended; and
monitor and enforce their use. [Ref. 73:p. 93]
2. Acquisition Strategy
One of the reasons that C3 becomes a big issue in modern warfare is due
to changes in computer and communications technology. In other words, high
technologies inserted in modern weapon systems such as nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, electronic warfare systems, etc. require more advanced technology in
command and control in turn. Commercial technology in the information system
field is, however, advancing at any extraordinary rate, and military people wish to
benefit from this rapid growth like any user [Ref. 74:p. 1061. So industry and
government must continue their joint efforts to maintain a balanced approach and
provide C31 solutions that are affordable, interoperable and integrated. A
philosophy that industry and government can work together embraces total quality
management (TQM). One must build quality into C3 systems, instead of testing for
quality. That is, all limited resources must be used wisely to craft quality into the
design, manufacture and maintainability of future systems [Ref. 75:p. 23].
TQM is not a technique but a philosophy. Quality must be ensured by
every function through the whole acquisition process, regardless of the jobs.
Engineers are responsible for quality of design; secretaries for quality of typing;
financial people for quality of a program budget [Ref. 77:p. 123]. Some steps must be
taken for good C3 quality management: the user involvement in system design,
appropriate acquisition strategy, good government-industry relationships, etc.
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User involvement in system design is essential especially for C3 system
design. The user (the command that is supposed to use the system) must be
involved in the acquisition process because industrial designer does not understand
fully the operational environment. The technical support by the industrial people
and the operational support by the user will produce good quality.
Acquisition strategy must follow the best acquisition approach:
Evolutionary Approach (EA) or Pre-Planed Product Improvement (P 31). Each has
its trade-offs. The evolutionary approach is usually adopted as C3 acquisition
strategy because: [Ref. 74:p. 114]
it is so difficult to state requirements adequately at the beginning of a
true C2 program,
such requirements are expected to change frequently over the life of the
program,
users cannot specify acceptability criteria adequately in advance due to
the subjective nature of these criteria,
an overall program to which the evolutionary approach is being taken
may involve little or no advanced development of any type, such as when
the user upgrades his C2 capability through regularly adapting existing
or modifiable commercial or military material. In contrast, P31 approach
ordinarily does involve advanced forms of development, and
C3 system acquisition has the strong real user influence over the
acquisition. The fundamental need for continuous iterative interaction
among all of the participants in the C3 system acquisition process is
basic to EA, whereas no such need exits in general under p3 1.
Evolutionary acquisition strategy is a system acquisition strategy in
which only a basic or "core" capability is acquired initially, for quick fielding, based
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on a short requirements statement that includes a representative description of the
eventual overall capability needed and the architectural framework within which
evolution will occur. Subsequent increments, or "blocks", of capability are then
defined sequentially, based on continuous feedback from the lessons learned in
operational usage; concurrent provider, user, and tester evaluation of the adequacy
of the hardware/software configuration being proposed; and judgments of the
improvements or increased capabilities that could result from application of new
technology where feasible. [Ref. 74:p. 115]
Good government-industry relationships can save money and increase
the quality. For example, the use of standard, off-the--self, non-developmental item
as C3 system components is tbe key to save money because the R&D cost has been
paid already. Meanwhile, the contract, which establishes the relationships between
government and industry is another factor to increase the quality of C3 product. If
industry tries to "hide-the-problem-until-later", the quality may decrease. So the
source selection and the contract is essential to the government and industry
relationship or coordination for the good quality.
3. Project Management
The considerations in project management exist in three categories:
complexity of the program itself, the government incentive, and the industry
incentive.
If the system is complex, then the government can not figure out what
the system looks like until some visible aspects of the system produced. This
uncertainty causes tl'e acquisition plan to be updated repeatedly, and still causes
questions of the operational use in the real field. The contractor is dependent on the
system requirements or the subsystem specifications in the engineering phase. If
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they can estimate the requirements further, they do no., need to redesign the system
whenever the requirements is updated. The best way to develop a system is for the
user who makes the requirements to design and engineer the system, because the
user will get the product as his own preference. But they don't have the capability.
That is why industry takes over the engineering jobs. But, the user must have at
least the capability to make the requirements consistent with the engineer's point of
view and the industry must have at least the capability to see the system with
user's point of view. But in that case, due to the uncertainty and complexity of the
C3 system, both sides are highly dependent on each other for the other's jobs.
Usually, government is focused on just their requirements and industry is focused on
their design and engineering. In order to solve the uncertainty problem about each
other, it is necessary to provide more information about the program to each other.
That is information exchange.
The main reason of the delay in the system acquisition schedule is the
complexity of system. The Posistion Location and Reporting System (PLRS), which
is a joint program of US Army and US Marine Corps, proved this. The program
took 23 years from problem initiation to product delivery. The reason of delay in
product delivery was due to the system complexity [Ref. 76]. But, if the government
strategy to acquire a new system emphasizes quality rather than the delivery time,
the delay will be compensated by the improved quality, because the significance rate
of design parameters is ranked high on quality, low on delivery time. So government
must set up the priority between the quality and the delivery time. That is a
decision problem among the quality and delivery time required by the user, budget
available to the program, and the capability to meet the required quality within the
time.
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What would be the strategy of the contractor? They will think about the
benefit. The way to increase the benefit must be something different in C
3
programs. The total quality of any system is highly dependent on the system itself.
TQM expert W. Edwards Deming maintains that 85% of quality problems are
caused by the system; just 15% are caused by people [Ref. 77:p. 123]. So if industry
people just focus on the quality of the system in R&D phase, 85% of quality will be
guaranteed in the first stage of acquisition process. Thus source selection for a
complex C3 system acquisition is proposed to be a sole source selection because it
save the R&D money and the type of contract is proposed to charge the R&D risk
to the government rather than the contractor. Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) or Cost
Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) are examples of these types. The PLRS program is a
good example of sole source selection and those kinds of contract types. Then there
is no reason to try to make benefits in R&D phase. Contractors will focus just the
quality of the complex system if they are not behind in the schedule for the loyalty
of the company which is a sort of benefit.
D. TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Technological changes in the type of modern war have changed the types of
military people's jobs, too. For more advanced command and control, C systems
must be developed and fielded with fully skilled people as well as highly
technology-embedded equipment. The high quality of CI personnel is evident
especially in jobs related to electronics repair and computers [Ref. 78:p. 103].
The speed of decision making needs to be accelerated and decision aids are
needed to enable the staff to look at a wide range of options, each in more depth,
and in near real time. What is the solution? The solution to acquire high quality
C31 people is through the short-term training and long-term education.
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As the short-term solution, commanders need to practice in conmand to
develop the technical and tactical competence anid a leadership philosophy that will
spark the needed behavior in the chain of command. Second, commanders must
train on a realistic battlefield with the right tempo of battle and against a tough,
competent enemy. Third they have to provide trained observers who can point out
breakdowns or inadequacies in the commander/staff relationships and functioning
and who can offer workable solution. Fourth, they need a laboratory to provide
focus for development efforts to enter into the era of tactical automation and expert
decision aids- a laboratory to instruct what to teach staff officers. (Ref. 79:p. 28]
Generally the short-term solution has two types of programs: seminar type
and simulation type. The U.S Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
is a typical training model. The BCTP consists of two phases, a tactical seminar
and a CPX. The BCTP seminar brings together commanders with their primary
staffs and major subordinate commanders for a five day series of workshops and
tactical decision exercise focused on AirLand Battle doctrine. The topics covered in
the seminars fall into four major areas: doctrine/tactics, leadership, sustainment and
threat. The second part of BCTP is the warfighter CPX. The warfighter exercise
follows the seminar by two to six months, and BCTP conducts it in a tactical CPX
mode. [Ref. 79:pp. 28-29]
The growth in computer hardware, software and applications over the past 10
years has opened up a door of opportunity for more realistic and varied simulations
of both weapon systems and battlefield scenario [Ref. 80:p. 57].
Army simulations basically take the form of either computer assisted or fully
automated simulations. Three different types of simulations are in operation: the
seminar trainer, which is a stand-alone training simulation for very small audiences;
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the command staff trainer, a single echelon trainer where one level of command can
train by itself; and the larger simulation, the command post exercise driver, which
serves as the multi-echelon trainer. The simulations in the Army can be conducted
at different levels from echelon above corp (EAC) down to company level, and
participating personnel are separated into two groups: training officers and role
players. [Ref. 80:p. 57].
The Navy uses ships with high technology (SPH-1, 20B-4, and FFG-7) as
simulators, which are controlled by onshore mobile units in many cases. To
implement a pierside simulation, the training command for either the Atlantic or
the Pacific Fleets would assign the ship an appropriate training unit for the ship's
home port time. The ship's personnel would designate the desired areas of training,
and the training commander would assign exercises, beginning with remedial efforts
and working up to multiwarfare battle problems.
In the Air Force, one piece of simulation equipment, the System Trainer
Exercise Module (STEM) serves in operation and testing of new command, control
and communications gear entering inventory, and it functions as a trainer and
exerciser in conjunction with the tactical air control system. [Ref. 80:pp. 59-60]
As the long-term solution, the education reform is a long-term project
requiring a national level commitment. With a growing emphasis on computerized
communication and intelligence functions, such systems tend to be more
complicated than their predecessors and will increase the requirements for skilled
military technicians. In 1945, approximately 10% of the enlisted personnel were
assigned to technica, jobs. Today, that number is 30%. Moreover, approximately
45% of current recruits perform work that would be classified as white collar in
civilian life. [Ref. 78:p. 1011
194
Estimation, quantitative and problerr solving skills are lacking in entry level
employees at the post-high school level, and because these skills are gatekeepers for
technical careers, there is a shortage of people making technical career choices in
colleges or the military [Ref. 78:p. 102]. Thus a long term education program must
be developed in college or military organizations in order to acquire the high quality
of C3 people. The program will focus both on the technical background about the
computer, communications, and information system and on the problem solving
skills such as mathematics, operations research technique; and decision theory.
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VI. C3 DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS AND ENVIRONMENT
A. C31 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINT
1 User-Developer Relationships
The successful acquisition of a C3 system requires participation by both
users and developers. The extent of involvement of users and developers varies with
the type of system being acquired (Figure 6.1) [Ref. 81:p. 320).
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Figure 6.1 User-Developer Involvement
As it moves from the more physically constrained, high technology radar
or weapon systems to the inventory or payroll systems which support the
administrative needs of the command, the chance of funding off-the-shelf
processing capabilities increases. For sensor systems, most of the processing is in line
196
with the desired capability and serves to tailor the components to the physical and
electromagnetic environment. The disciplines and experience required are more
likely to reside with the developer. The greatest difficulties in C3 system acquisition
have been associated with systems to support the higher level commands. For
headquarters type command systems, the processing is generally in the form of
management and decision aids and must be tailored to the command tactics,
procedures and operational style. In these systems, the experience and discipline
required lie more heavily with the user. [Ref. 81:pp. 320-321]
Progress has been made in recognizing the need for user participation in
system development, especially in the software aspects of command and
management systems. Operational employment plans must be kept up-to-date.
Early attention to creation of the operational database, to system training and
evaluation and to the need for overhead facilities is required. Continued
consideration of these factors as the program develops is also necessary. [Ref. 81:p.
321]
But the participation must take place in a responsible way or
requirements will escalate or change frequently. A more formal process of
requirements definition, evolution and control is needed to make the user more
accountable for requirements, to coordinate across user staffs and to reset
requirements as experience (more realistic cost and performance tradeoffs) becomes
available as development proceeds [Ref. 81:pp. 321-3221.
The combination of the user's role and the developer's role in system
development is a critical element to the success of the system acquisition and the
performance of products. When users are familiar with the industrial technology
required to develop an information system, the technology is considered as a
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relatively low technology. And the frequency that the user is involved in project
management will represent the structure of project management. Let the
organizational experience with the industrial technology (or the user's background
knowledge about the developer's technology) be rated as high technology when the
user knows little about the technology to be used in system development; low
technology when the user knows much about it, and the project is managed in the
low structured method when the user is involved in the project frequently; in the
high structured method when the user is involved in the project seldomly. Then the
risk of the success for the system development will be represented by four classes.
Table 6.1 shows the relationship between the acquisition success and the degree of
user involvement [Ref. 82:pp. 430-433].
Conventional development approaches used to define system
requirements involve developer and user inputs early in the definition process and
late in development. Early in the definition phase, the developer and user state
mission and operational objectives and guide the development of requirements
specifications. They then approve these specifications and give the contractor
approval to build the system. As the development process proceeds to system-level
testing, the developer and user again enter to evaluate results. At this point
requirements deficiencies may surface, and it becomes necessary to modify the
approved system requirements specifications and corresponding design. In some
cases, the existing design is not flexible enough to accommodate all of the desired
changes. One solution to avoid these serious shortcomings is the Martin Marietta
system development approach presented by Martin Marietta Aerospace. Figure
6.2.a and b show those conventional and Martin Marietta system development
methods. [Ref. 83:p. 158-159]
198
Table 6.1 The Risk of System Development Success
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The key element of this approach is early simulation in the C3 Systems
Laboratory using the C3 Simulation Software (C3SS) which was developed in-house
as a real-time system to provide graphic display capabilities through an
event-driven simulator. And the C3 I Systems Laboratory was designed to simulate
the operational environment and provide a realistic operational center to
demonstrate operational concepts and procedures. The simulation is based on the
system operational concept and apprcpriate scenario. At this simulation point, the
system requirements and user direction is revised in addition to the conventional
approaches. The development phase then proceeds with minimum risk and avoids
the problems of conventional methods. This method is able to minimize
development risk by avoiding, eliminating, or reducing the possibilities for
inadequate operational concepts, an efficient or complex design, workload
imbalance, and complex or confusing user interaction. [Ref. 83:p. 159]
199
HOI.C CwwI~ Inv
I ro sy ,,. .II . JU W Im.I . A
svSyits.
I I




Figure ~~as 6.. onetonlSstmDvlopmes I"Nnt
mM... Oeomvant
I ~ ~ ~ ~ " and~t~q nen
ISy fyt
Figure 6.2.b Martin Marietta System Development
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2. State of the Art
Problems within the C I environment are calling for new technical
approaches to satisfy the unique situations facing commanders. In order to solve
complex and difficult C3 problems, the systems needed are those that perform
complex problem solving operations; that can process a multiplicity of signals; that
possess common sense knowledge and reasoning ability; and that can recognize
anomalous behaviors [Ref. 8 4 :p. 34]. The DOD has a large program sponsored by
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to address potential
solutions. The DARPA program has a goal of improving the cost and space
requirements for the hardware and software. Specifically, research programs address
performance advances in the areas of expert systems, natural language processing
and distributed problem solving [Ref. 84:p. 36]. Expert systems are probably the
best known subdiscipline of AL. There are, however, limitations on the current
capabilities of expert systems to solve a large, complex C3 problem. The limitations
are:
The power of AI is most formidable when it is focused at a specific, amenable
target. Expert systems technology is best applied to well-bounded. simple
problems. But there are countless bounded problems in C3 [Ref. 8.5:p. 178]. It
is difficult to apply the Al technology to a large complex problem.
The representation of knowledge remains a challenge. The emphasis in
knowledge representation has been on the experiential knowledge of an expert.
Most representations have been less than adequate for representing causality,
functionality and structure [Ref. 84:p. 38].
Expert systems have limitations in extending their knowledge. Humans extend
expertise in a variety of ways: by learning; by reasoning through use of
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analogy to similar problems or events successfully dealt with before; or
through going to an outside expert to handle a problem that is beyond their
own expertise. It is, however, difficult for current AI systems to determine
what is outside their own boundary when an event occurs out of its own
domain. And attempts have been made to have streams learn by examples, by
being told and from the system's memory of its own performance, but, in
general, most AI systems show no evidence of learning. [Ref. 84:p. 39, quoted
from Barr and Feigenbaum]
Part of the difficulty in dealing with unanticipated events also stems from the
heavy reliance on empirical associations, which are considered to represent
only the surface knowledge of an expert. When an unanticipated event occurs,
the expert may extract from the deep structure of his expertise a new rule to
cover the unusual occurrence. It is precisely this deep stricture that is not
available in most expert systems today [Ref. 84:p. 38].
In addition, building knowledge bases for expert systems causes a bottleneck,
either because it is so time consuming and thereby difficult to obtain from
humans or because human experience and experts do not exist for some
domains (e.g., nuclear weapons release authority) [Ref. 86:p. 166].
Al represents one class of methods among many in C3 problem solving.
State-of-the-Art involved in C3 problem solving includes many analytical methods
such as operations research, decision analysis and conventional computer science
(non-AI) as well as AL. They all have their strengths and weaknesses [Ref. 85:p.
177]. These technologies can serve the optimal information resource or weapon
resource allocation and fast computing speed for command, control and
communications. Limitations of these analytical methods to apply to real C3 system
development are that the optimal resource allocation (state information, command
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informa'ion and weapon allocation) and faster timing itself are not enough for C3
problem. C3 deals with human factors. Transformation of state information into
command and control information is followed by the control function of C3 . This
control function is conducted by controlling the objects, that is, material such as
information or weapon. In fact, this is actually done by controlling human objects
who are the operators of the physical material. But the current analytical methods
are developed in material environment and mathematical science, not in human
factors. But the human factors in C3 problems are especially significant. For
example, C3 in special operations command requires more human motivation rather
than control to accomplish their mission. If some decision support system assigns
tasks to the forces based on the availability of assets and its utility (material
oriented decision) regardless of the force's motivation, it will increase the
probhbility of failure in a high motivation requirement mission.
Another aspect of the current state-of-the-art is limited to the lack of
skills in software development. It is very difficult to develop an information system
that works perfectly to meet the desired functions of the user even if the application
models are developed in the best analytical way. Current software design and
engineering skills usually result in errors in the implemented products. Once the
software is developed, the product requires continuous maintenance through the
system life cycle to account for the incorrect functions or the system extension. In
software development, specific software errors are frequently classified into one of
three categories: requirements errors, design errors or coding errors [Ref. 87:p. 241].
According to the result of the AIAA 1977 Software Conference [Ref. 87:p. 245), the
number of design defects exceeds the number of coding defects. Thus software design
skills must be emphasized to develop better information systems in addition to the
improvements of Al technology and the analytical sciences.
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3. Budget Constraint
According to a report presented at the AFCEA 7th Western Conference
and Exhibition [Ref. 88J, the defense budget for C31 mission area has increased
gradually. Even though the budget for C3I area increases gradually, it still has a
constraint that a fixed defense dollars is allocated to the CI area. For example, in
FY-86 the total money for US national wide C3 was 14,642.7 million dollars, and
17,253.8 million dollars in FY-88 [Ref. 89:p. 199]. On the other hand, the required
money for C3 system acquisition and operation is accumulated year by year because
the operation and support money is added to the R&D money due to the software
maintenance costs. Under these constraints, the CI systems must be developed to
meet the requirements.
In this environment, a good economic analysis is required to solve the
budget constraint. Estimating costs for the entire C3 system procurement is not
enough for C3 project management. Cost analysis relative to system functional
capability and alternative system development actions is more realistic within the
constant level of dollars. Specifically, the cost analysis must be conducted through
the whole system life cycle cost, because the C3 system development includes
information system mostly with a small portion of hardware, and the information
system maintenance requires continuous commitment of budget through the system
life for the software maintenance. Usually the system life cycle cost for
communications/electronics system is distributed in three phases as shown in the
Figure 6.3 [Ref. 90:p. 1641. But in information system development, the portion of
operations and support costs is bigger than the usual case. According to Dr. Barry
Boehm, speaking at the Software Summit Series in Los Angeles in May 1980, the
cost trends for both software development and software maintenance are rising
substantially and are not projected to improve (Figure 6.4) [87:p. 241].
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Figure 6.4 Hardware-Software Cost Trends
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Thus, for the successful acquisition of C3 system, the system life cycle
cost must be carefully estimated so that the project would not stopped due to the
lack of budget during the middle phase of acquisition, which is supposed to be used
for maintenance and operations support. Multiple applications of the economic
analysis such as design-to-cost (DTC), design-to price, cost-benefit analysis,
cost-effectiveness analysis, POM (Program objectives Memoranda)/FYDP (Five
Year Defense Plan)/budget formulation, cost credentiating, and discount rate, etc.
will be considered as directly applicable methods to usual system cost estimation.
For the C3 system acquisition, however, they will be reviewed again based on the
the unique C3 system development environment, that is, the information system
development environment.
B. C31 SYSTEM SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT
1. Operational Readiness in an Organization
A full scale development of C3 system in an organization includes both
organizational system development and functional transformation system
development as shown in Figure 3.2 (page 61). But it is very difficult to develop
both at the same time. Even the functional transformation system which major
system will be the information transformation systems can not be developed
simultaneously because of the budget or labor, etc. When a part of those systems is
procured, then, the operational readiness of the organization or force must be
prepared in order to operate the system effectively and economically. For example,
assume that a company has produced a car, but the car can not be in operation due
to the lack of gas and poor road conditions, not because of the defects of the car
itself, then the company loses money until it is in operation.
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To prevent this undesired situation, the operati(,nal readiness must be
analyzed and measured. And the priority of each project, which is directly related to
the C3 system or affects the operation of the C3 system indirectly, must be assigned
when the C3 system is planned and initiated. Then how can the operational
readiness of an organization be measured? The answer to this question may be the
solution of this problem.
One alternative method is to measure the connectivity of the new C3
system to the existing C3 network not just in terms of hardware such as links and
nodes but also in terms of network entity. A similar concept is proposed by Lee and
his team in "operational readiness performance measures of a C31 network" [Ref.
91]. According to Lee, the probability of a C3 I network being available when it
needs to be accessed is called operational readiness. In other words, operational
readiness is defined as the probability that the component is ready for use at a given
time [Ref. 91:p. 32]. The basic concept is explained by the following statement [Ref.
91:p. 31].
Since no components can contribute to system performance unless they are
operationally ready, the operational readiness is the fundamental measure.
The purpose of a C3 I system is to support the information exchange
requirements between various users within a command and control
organization. There is a set of performance indices associated with each entity
when it is in an operational state. The performance index is a function of the
internal behavior of the entity. However, because of its internal behavior, an
entity may not be available for use at a given moment. Therefore, when
evaluating the performance of a C3 I network, one has to incorporate the
probabilistic nature of operational readiness and the probability tha an entity
is ready for use whenever it is needed into the overall performance measure.
According to the boundary of the entity, this operational readiness can
be defined as just the hardware connectivity consisting of the links and nodes, or as
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the force organizational connectivity consisting of each specific sensors and weapons
related to the C3 system. In the large scale C3 network, the entity can be extended
up to the adjacent C3 network entities. Analyzing the wide range of the entity, one
can plan for effective, economical use of the new C3 system. For example, from the
small boundary of the entity parameter analysis, one can adjust the requirements
about the transmission rate, media, capacity, etc. which is used for the C3 system
operation withip the force organization and plan to acquire them; from the broad
boundary of the entity parameter analysis, the project management agency can
modify the existing C3 system acquisition plan and assign the priority to each
system acquisition project again according to the updated plan. For an automatic
early warning system, which networks between the Air Defense Artillery in the
ground and the Air Strike Planning Team in the air, the exchange of a few liaison
officers with voice communications equipments such as telephones and FM radio is
not enough to meet the effective operation of the early warning system. It may
require a fiber optic transmission media with machine to machine connection
without the intermediate phase such as the liaison officer's assistance. For this
requirement to be met, the force organization must acquire new communications
equipments and mod *.he operations procedures.
Thus, to it .d the entity to connect both the existing C3 network and the
new developed C3 system and to define the boundary of the entity is essential to
measuring the operational readiness and preparing the force organization in order to
operate the new C3 system.
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2. Human Capabilities in Man-Machine Interface
The purpose of the C3 system is to support the commanders in decision
making. The way to support the commander is through the interaction between the
computer and the commander (man-machine interface). The portion of computer's
support to the commander, then, can be presented by the success of the
input/output to/from the computer in the desired matter. Even though the
qualitative or quantitative capacity of an information system is the same, the
quality of the C3 system operation output can vary according to the success of the
operator's (commander, staff, or technician) capabilities to use the system at the
maximum full rate. For example, a decision support system such as a spreadsheet
type personal computer package can be used as a powerful statistical analysis
method for an expert who is familiar with the package itself, and the essentials of
the problem must be solved with the spreadsheet. But for the poor analyst or the
person who has the poor knowledge about the function or power of the applications
models embedded in the spreadsheet, it is just a bunch of mass storage and a simple
calculator and not a decision support system.
The owner's capability relative to the C3 system (especially the C3
information system software or hardware) will be classified with two major types.
One is the basic knowledge about the computer itself and the essentials of the
problem facing him. It is not a perfectly intelligent system. The basics of the
computer is obviously that it is a machine and calculator. So there can be a kind of
error in its output from the logic of the developer to the technical malfunction of the
subcomponents. The decision maker must not trust the output of the information
system at 100%. His decision must not always rely on the output of the computer.
Remembering this, the owner must have his own operations strategy when he is
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facing a problem. Then the decision support system will be operated based on the
strategy. In other words, there is no standard way to solve a problem. The owner
must study and try to find the answers to
what kind of problem can he solve using the C3 information system?
how can he solve each problems?
what is the limitation of this system?
how can he cover these limitations?
These answers will provide the owner with the way to use the system in an effective
way without a critical undesired conflict.
Another type of capability is the owner's input skill and the output
interpretation skill. If a battle manger has some information which must be
disseminated to a certain destination or broadcast over the whole forces, he must be
able to identify the best information path route including source and sinks and input
into the selected source computer with a proper form using any input devices such
as a keyboard for text message, a voice recognition device, a scanner for picture or
graphical type information, or sometimes facsimile.
The output interpretation skill is also significant in decision making.
.During World War II, the Pearl Harbor case is a good example of poor
interpretation skills. Most C3 system (decision support system) will just provide a
type of information, except for a few specific expert systems. Then the capability to
interpret the output (information) from the information system (any type of
information system) determines the value of output or information.
If there is a lot of time delay and errors in input or output in interaction
with the C3 information system, the value of information from the system is
reduced as much as the degree of time delay and errors. If the time and error are
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sensitive to the decision making, the value can be zero in some cases. These time
delays and errors in both input and output may be caused by lack of experience,
poor knowledge about the problem or computer itself, or owner's physical or
physiological conditions. Thus the owner (commander, staff, technician) will be
trained and educated with background knowledge about the computer and its
applications models to problems facing the owners using the information system.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CURRENT TRENDS OF C31 SYSTEM RESEARCH
The command and control problem is central to national security. In the top
command level such as theater, joint, or combined operations command level, the
direction of development of the military application models is primarily toward
command, control, and communications [Ref. 81:p. 151]. Over the years, the
demands made on command and control systems have grown exponentially. The
increased range, speed, and accuracy of weapons systems have significantly
increased the commander's volume of interest and, at the same time, decreased the
reaction time. Concurrently, technological developments have provided commanders
and their staffs with more capabilities to cope with the C2 problem [Ref. 44:p. 25].
But most of the technology involved in this process is new and has never been in
large-scale combat [Ref. 81:p. 152]. Each technology involved in the C2 theory has
been already established in its own field such as control theory, communications
theory, information theory, acquisition theory, system evaluation theory,
organization theory, combat modeling, etc., and they are still progressing in their
own fields. In fact, C3 is the integration of all these areas. Figure 7.1 shows the
potential relevance of C3 theory [Ref. 44:p. 25].
The second trend of C3 research in western countries is that the research is
oriented by "The American Way of War", which is defined as: [Ref. 67:p. 179]
machine oriented rather than human oriented,
technology driven rather than doctrine driven,
attrition dominated rather than maneuver dominated, or
industrial approach rather than agile approach to war.
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These are less visible, but nonetheless very influential, causes of the poor
performance of C3 products. This trend says that if military forces have a command
and control problem, look first at a technological solution to this problem.
Sometimes this works. But when this tendency goes too far, the people who do the
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Figure 7.1 The Potential Relevance of C3 Theory
During the last 10 years, the US defense RDT&E budget has been increased
gradually. The budget which has been allocated to each mission area, however,
shows that the C31 mission area has been emphasized year after year. Figure 7.2
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Figure 7.2 Defense RDT&E Budget: Mission Area Trends
As shown in the figure, the R&D money primarily was allocated to
tactical/strategic weapon systems prior to the middle of 1980s, but after that the
money was scheduled for research and development in the science and technology
area and the C3 I area. It is natural. The world has enough weapons to destroy the
Earth. Now the integration of the effectiveness of those weapon systems is a key
point of defense strategy. Also the world may not be able to increase its budget for
new weapon systems due to the disarmament issur Then the only possible way to
increase the force power is to have the existing forces generate their full rate power
performance. That is possible through the effective command and control of the
forces. Good C3 systems multiply the forces; poor C3 systems divide the force
power.
214
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE C3 RESEARCH
While everyone believes that C3 is important, it is less widely accepted that a
theory of C3 is important. The process of developing C3 systems begins with
concepts and doctrines. More realistic results will be obtained if the C2 implications
of a proposed doctrine, war fighting concept, or weapon systems are considered from
the beginning.
The development of C3 systems is unique compared to the other weapon
system development. In a usual weapon system development it is possible that the
whole development process may be decomposed into sub engineering phases, and
design engineers can work out their tasks alone even though they are not familiar
with the complexity of the battle situation. The role of the C3 system, however,
must be emphasized in terms of a force integrator. So without the fundamental
understanding of the battle and the various weapon system's characteristics, it is
nearly impossible to develop a good force integrator.
For this, C3 system development researchers must have their professional
community and professional journal in applications development. At the same time,
C3 research must be at the academic threshold including all related academic areas
such as decision making, computer and communications technology, operations
research technology, psychological theory, organization theory, cartography,
economics, national security, etc. This academic involvement is essential to
developing a C2 theory.
Second, the western way of solution to the command and control problem
must be more focused on human factors such as leadership and motivation. The
command and control system for a platoon leader is simple. It is a direct
communications equipment such as a telephone line or FM radio. But a more
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significant aspect of command and control is motivation, which represents the unity
of effort of individual rifles. The unity of effort is the essential requirement of the
C3 system. Of course, in the top strategic level, the C3 system requires more
complex hardware and control rather than the motivation of the subordinate
commanders. Studies about C3 must include the human physiology related to
motivation, and this be considered as a designing factor.
Thirdly, the C31 system is no longer considered as just an adjunct to a weapon
system but instead is now looked on as providing the capability to combine
individual weapon systems into an integrated, effective force. And more budget
must be committed to the C3 R&D, or the budget must be at least equal to the
other major weapon system development.
C. FINAL COMMENTS
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a background knowledge about the C3
concept, system, design, test, trends, and so on. So most parts of the thesis are
broadly descriptive and comprehensive. For application of the thesis to the C3
system development, the contents must be expanded and modified in a realistic
matter. The author will leave this to the project manager's fatigue and system
design and engineer's efforts.
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APPENDIX A
U.S C3 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
[Ref. 92:pp. 86-91]
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APPENDIX B
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND DIRECTIVES
AAE Army acquisition Executive
ACE Army Corps of Engineers
ACNO Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
ACQN Acquisition
ACS Assistant Chief of Staff
ADP Automated Data processing
AFCC Air Force Commuiications Command
AFCSIO Air Force Communications-Computers Integration Office
ARCH Architecture
ASARDA Assistant Secretary Army Research Development Acquisition
ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASN R,E&S Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Engineering and
Support
C & G Command and General Staff College
Staff College
C2 Command and Control
C21 Command, Control and Intelligence
C3  Cemmand, Control and Communications
C3 CM C3 Countermeasures
C31 Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
C4  Command, Control, Communications and Computers
C4 12  Command, control, communications, Computers, Intelligence
and Interoperability
C6/ISMO/CEO Communications/Information Systems Management
Office/ Communications-Electronics Office
CACDA Combined Arms Combat Development Activity
CI Counter Intelligence
CIC Counter Intelligence Command
CINC Commander in Chief
CINCLANTFLT Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy Europe
CMC Commandant, Marine Corps
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CNOD Counter Narcotics Operations Division (OJCS)
COMAIRLANT Commander, Air Atlantic
COMAIRPAC Commander, Air Pacific
COMSUBLANT Commander, Submarine Atlantic
COMSUBPAC Commander, Submarines Pacific
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COMSURFLANT Commander, Surface Atlantic
COMSURFAC Commander, Surface Pacific
DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DASN C31 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Command,
and Space Control, Communications and Intelligence and Space
DCA Defense Communications Agency
DCS Defense Communications System
DMS Defense Message System
DOD Department of Defense
DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System
EW Electronic Warfare
HSC Health Service Command
IEW Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
ISSAA Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency
J-3 Operations Directorate
J-4 Logistics Directorate
J-5 Strategic Plans & Policy Directorate
J-6 Command, Control, Communications Systems Directorate
J-7 Operational Plans & Interoperability Directorate
J-8 Force Structure, Resource and kssessment Division
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDSSC Joint Data Systems Support center (DCA)
JITC Joint Interoperability Test Center (DCA-JTC 3 A)
JITF Joint Interface Test Force (DCA-JTC3 A)
JTC3A Joint Tactical C3 Agency
JVIDS Joint Visually Integrated Display System (OJCS)
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCCR Mission Critical Computer Resources
MCEB Military Communications-Electronics Board
MIS Management Information Systems
MTMC Military Traffic Management Command (Army)
NAVTELCOM Naval Telecommunications Command
NCA National Command Authority
NCCS Navy Command and Control System
NDI Nondevelopment Item(s)
NMCS National Military Command and Control System
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NTDS Navy Tactical Data System
NTISA Naval Tactical Interoperability Support Agency
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PEO Program Executive Officer
PM Program Manager
PM COMM/NAV Program Manager, Commuications/Navigation
PM GRD/CSS C2  Program Manager, Ground/Combat Service Support
Command and Control
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PM INTEL Program Manager, Intelligence
POM Program Objective memorandum
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
RADC Rome Air Development Center
SAF/AAD Directorate of Information Management (AF) (Office
Symbol)
SAF/AK Deputy Assistant Secretary of Air Force for C4 Systems
(Office symbol)
SAF/AQ Assistant Secretary of Air Force-Acquisition (Office Symbol)
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
SIS Strategic Information Systems
SPAWARL Space and Naval Warfare
STAMIS Standard Army Management Information Systems
TENCAP Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
WAM WWMCCS Automation Modernization (DCA)
WG Working Group
WHCA White House Communications agency
WIN WWMCCS Intercomputer network
WIS WWMCCS Information System
WWMCCS World Wide Military Command and Control System
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